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ABSTRACT 
 
Yousuf Al-Bulushi: The Struggle for a Second Transition in South Africa:  
Uprising, Development and Precarity in the Post-Apartheid City 
(Under the direction of John Pickles) 
 
 
 
 This dissertation explores the limitations of post-apartheid liberation in the specific 
environment of Durban, South Africa.  It takes a social movement of shack dwellers, 
Abahlali baseMjondolo, as a looking glass into urban debates concerned with the wellbeing 
of some of South Africa’s most marginalized communities.  As the country struggles to deal 
with the ongoing crises of mass poverty, inequality, and unemployment, the government has 
responded with a range of developmental projects.  At the same time, poor people around the 
country have protested injustice in record numbers, rivaling levels of unrest in any other part 
of the world.  A mix of state repression and increased governmental redistribution of wealth 
has been the official response. 
 This study explores these contentious issues by placing them in the context of South 
Africa’s Second Transition.  More broadly, the approach situates the study at multiple 
geographical scales of analysis from the global to the continental, and the regional to the city.  
In so doing, it tries to de-center the nation-state as a central unit of analysis without losing 
site of the specificity of South Africa’s challenges.  The dissertation begins by exploring 
national debates around the resurgence of social movements in post-apartheid South Africa, 
before moving on to approach to the issue of racialization as a central divisive factor within 
South Africa and in many of the global uprisings that have occurred since 2011.  The study 
 
 
 iv 
shifts to explore state responses to these moments of unrest and rebellion from below by 
thinking about the rise of a South African developmental state over the past decade. The 
developmental state in Durban is examined through one of the country’s largest public 
housing projects.  Finally, the dissertation explores the other side of the coin to the state’s 
response to movements: beyond developmental initiatives too often lies naked repression.  
The violence that racialized communities living in slums throughout South Africa face is 
explored through a variety of debates around the peculiarities of precarity beyond the global 
North.  The study closes by putting the findings into conversation with Mahmood Mamdani’s 
seminal work on the legacy of African colonialism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
METHOD, RESEARCH, POLITICS: LIVING LEARNING 
 
 African politics has for too long been characterized by the central dilemmas of 
violence, civil war, and the supposed necessity for benign foreign intervention.  Beginning 
perhaps around 1974, with the triumph of independence movements in Guinea Bissau, 
Mozambique and Angola, African politics began to shift from the dilemma of overthrowing 
colonial rule to healing internal divisions. Southern African nations like Angola and 
Mozambique slid from anti-colonial struggles into civil wars.  While Zimbabwe, Namibia 
and South Africa all continued to fight for self-determination in a struggle against their 
internal white colonizers, much of the rest of the continent began to experience the “pitfalls 
of national independence” followed by the lost decade of the 1980s with the rise of neoliberal 
structural adjustment.  Over the next thirty-odd years, the question of politics shifted from 
non-alignment, (pan) African unity, and African socialism to transitional justice, 
modernization, humanitarian intervention and anti-corruption. 
 With the end of formal South African apartheid in 1990 and the coming to power of 
the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994, the long independence struggle on the 
continent was largely complete.  My interest in the post-apartheid moment was stimulated by 
the fact that the struggle for social justice there continued despite the attempts by the 
liberation party to subsume the variety of political viewpoints under the single hegemonic 
banner of the ANC.  This struck me as particularly important, and serves as one way through 
 
 
 2 
which to re-insert Africa into the broader debates around social movements that have largely 
been defined by the Latin American context over the past decade.  South Africa did not 
require humanitarian intervention.  The problem of ethnic divisions—so crucial to the 
colonial and apartheid eras—was matched if not exceeded by the continued way in which 
race and class mapped onto each other, typifying a broader articulation between global 
neoliberalism and regimes of racialization.  Indeed, it struck me that much could be learned 
from the South African experience of a transition from apartheid to neoliberalism.  For me, 
this took the form of studying one particular poor people’s movement: Abahlali 
baseMjondolo.   
 The more I learned about Abahlali from a distance, the more I became intrigued by 
the overlaps in discourse, theory and practice between the group and other movements 
around the world.  Falling under the banner of alter-globalization struggles, autonomous and 
anarchist organizations, indigenous people’s movements, or gatherings of the multitude, the 
global struggles of the post-Cold War era were too often confined to the geographical 
continents of Latin America, Europe, and North America. These included occasional 
references to Asia (Katsiaficas 2012), but hardly any mention of Africa.  The Arab Spring in 
2011 began to change this pattern, with a renewed attention to North Africa (albeit largely 
through a Middle Eastern/Arab lens). It transformed the peoples of that part of the world 
from mere victims of US imperialism and domestic authoritarianism, into subjects 
confronting a similar predicament as other marginalized people elsewhere but nonetheless 
capable of changing the world. 
 The different movements for an Other globalization—and arguably the 2011 
uprisings from the Arab Spring to European anti-austerity struggles and the Occupy Wall 
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Street explosions—shared a number of different characteristics.  They were confronted by a 
global enemy they variously termed neoliberalism, Empire, or the fourth world war—all 
attempts to define the latest phase of global capitalism.  They all grappled with forms of 
democratic organization that were experimental in nature, but nonetheless did not emerge 
from a vacuum.  The radical struggles were all defined by the question of the relationship 
between state and movement, and this problem was addressed based on the specific 
shortcomings of the previous state socialist experiments that had dominated so much of 
radical political theory and practice in the 20th century.  As such, the problematic of 
autonomy emerged as central in much of the discourse and practice associated with the new 
upheavals.  The varieties of autonomy included the autonomy of movements from the state, 
autonomy of the superstructure from the base, autonomy of women’s caucuses from men, 
people of color from white groups, queer identified rebels from straight people, and the 
autonomy of the working class from capital. 
 It was this vocabulary that attracted me to Abahlali, a group that was of course 
intervening in this global conjuncture through the specificities of their own context: shack 
communities in post-apartheid South Africa.  Yet another characteristic of Abahlali’s 
organizing that overlapped with the issues at the center of movement debates elsewhere 
included the question of the relationship between knowledge and practice, or the 
professionalization of knowledge and the marginalization of struggle intellectuals.  This 
concerned not only the relationship between academics and movement activists, but also the 
way in which NGOs and middle class political projects interacted with more grassroots and 
community-based groups.  Abahlali was extremely critical of middle class individuals and 
organizations that refused to see them as actors in their own right, capable of autonomous 
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thought that did not require any of the professional attributes to be taken seriously.  The 
resonance between their critique of academics and NGO workers and Biko’s critique of 
white liberals who constantly wanted to advise and lead the anti-apartheid struggle on behalf 
of Black South Africans is undeniable.  This was attractive to me because it meant that the 
movement already had a critique of outsiders like myself, and would likely assist in holding 
me accountable in an otherwise uneven power structure between American researcher and 
South African shack dweller.   
 I had been confronted with those uneven dynamics in prior research work abroad, 
initially on a class trip to Beirut, Lebanon.   “Why are you here?  What exactly brought you 
to this place?  We already have plenty of Americans that come through to see the camps, to 
witness the suffering of the Palestinians first-hand.  It ends up being purely voyeuristic 
political tourism.  I’m not sure we need any more of your people here.”  These were the 
words that greeted me as I took the taxi ride from Hamra to Shatila with my Lebanese host in 
early 2002.  She was to show a few of my classmates and me the camps.  I later learned that 
she was forced into this position because our professor was a good friend with one of her 
professors, who had in turn begged her to show these Americans around Shatila as a favor for 
an old friend. 
And yet, I thought I was different from those other Americans.  After all, I was born 
in the Middle East and had Arab ancestry.  I identified strongly with this part of my 
background, and upon arriving at college I had immediately begun to organize politically, 
starting a student group in my freshman year intended to highlight issues of social, political 
and economic justice in the Middle East and North Africa. I remained active on these themes 
throughout my undergraduate career, organizing teach-ins, protests, and writing newspaper 
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columns highlighting the variety of issues that determined the relationship between the US 
and the Arab world.  Surely, I was different from these other “Americans” who came merely 
as political tourists? 
Unfortunately, what my companion was telling me about the problem with my 
presence in the camps was indeed largely true.  This confrontation from someone who would 
later become a dear friend was my first lesson in the need to transcend solidarity as a political 
platform, and ultimately pushed me in the direction of engaging politically, primarily in the 
immediate surroundings of my own community.  And yet, it did not result in eliminating the 
internationalism behind my political vision, nor do I think this is what my friend was 
intending.  In what follows I reflect briefly on the relationship between researcher and 
movement in terms of my own experiences in the US and abroad, and in the terms of the 
theoretical traditions that have informed the development of my own political outlook. 
If one of the central problems that has consciously guided movements in Latin 
America in recent years, and we might argue has unconsciously penetrated the terrain of the 
Arab uprisings, is that of the tension between state and movement, then we might make a 
preliminary formulation along similar lines about the relationship between the university and 
intellectuals.  That is, the university serves too often as an apparatus of capture for radical 
ideas, stultifying them, separating them off from the social realm, and confining them to 
academic venues which, while far from useless, are dramatically decreased in intensity in 
terms of their ability to attach themselves to other productive desires and becomings that are 
often most active and pregnant with possibility within movements. 
As an example of the theoretical stakes and misinterpretations that are possible 
depending on the specific locus of enunciation one speaks and studies from, we might think 
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of the different (mis)interpretations of French theory. To many American academics, Michel 
Foucault’s writings often lead in the direction of an all-consuming power, and thereby appear 
to position resistance as futile.  In contrast, for many movements his work points in a very 
different direction, one more akin to what Deleuze says about Foucault in his short book on 
his work. 
It is as if, finally, something new were emerging in the wake of Marx.  It is as if a 
complicity about the State were finally broken.  Foucault is not content to say that we 
must rethink certain notions; he does not even say it; he just does it, and in this way 
proposes new co-ordinates for praxis.  In the background a battle begins to brew, with 
its local tactics and overall strategies which advance not by totalizing but by relaying, 
connecting, converging and prolonging. The question ultimately is: What is to be 
done? The theoretical privilege given to the State as an apparatus of power to a 
certain extent leads to the practice of a leading and centralizing party which 
eventually wins State power; but on the other hand it is this very organizational 
conception of the party that is justified by this theory of power.  The stakes of 
Foucault’s book lie in a different theory, a different praxis of struggle, a different set 
of strategies (1988: 30, original emphasis). 
 
Here Foucault’s microphysics of power leads towards a different problematic that de-centers 
the state and the political party from forms of radical political practice, and thus opens us up 
to a multiplicity of terrains upon which political organizing and the production of knowledge 
can take place.  The Italian Operaismo and Autonomia movements of the 1960s and 1970s 
drew from this interpretation of Foucault’s work, and saw their political practice as realizing 
the best of such theoretical traditions.  Christian Marrazi, in an attempt to redefine the debate 
around the arrival of the post-political, argues that in these Italian movements, “the ‘end of 
politics’ involves a search for new political areas of struggle, new territories for the 
massification of the struggle.  In Italy, the French theories, like those of Foucault, Deleuze, 
Guattari, and Baudrillard too, are immediately translated into the Movement’s language, that 
is, into concrete struggle” (Autonomia: 12). 
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The Argentinian group Colectivo Situaciones is equally inspired by this Franco-
Italian tradition of theoretical struggle as well as the rich set of political experiments that 
emerged coeval with the December 2001 post-political uprisings that toppled successive 
governments in Argentina.  Colectivo Situaciones works closely with a number of these 
movements. They reflect upon the relation between researcher and movement through the 
figure of the “researcher militant.”  Their first intervention is to highlight the fact that 
“Militant research works neither from its own set of knowledges nor from how things ought 
to be.  On the contrary, the only requirement for researcher-militants is a difficult one: to 
remain faithful to their ‘not knowing’.  In this sense militant research is an authentic 
antipedagogy” (2003).  Here I think Colectivo Situaciones comes very close to Fanon’s own 
conception of the militant in Wretched of the Earth—discussed below—when he says the 
sole job of the political activist is to teach the people that everything depends upon them.  
Again, as Situaciones argues, “Research-militancy…tries to generate a capacity for struggles 
to read themselves” (2003). 
And yet they are equally aware of the danger of reifying this conception of research-
militancy.  Like participatory action research, or activist anthropology, or any number of 
similarly formulated radical approaches to research within academia, it has the potential to 
become stultified by its university-oriented context.  It can become the latest trend in a field 
constantly looking for and valorizing the new, a unique way to carve out additional 
publications and advance your career.  Once militant research has devolved into this practice 
then it ceases to be useful, and as Situaciones argues, becomes “deprived of situational 
anchoring” (2003).  Nonetheless, it is still possible to reframe this intellectual-political 
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practice in refreshingly tangible fashion: “In more practical terms, research-militancy 
develops through workshops and collective reading” (2003).   
In my own studies and political involvement, such a framing of the potential for 
militant research is part of what attracted me to my work in South Africa with the 
organization Abahlali baseMjondolo.  As an organization of people who live in shacks, 
Abahlali is often critical of intellectuals and the extractive nature of much academic 
knowledge production.  And yet they simultaneously understand the necessity of intensifying 
their struggles through the production of alliances and resonances in all areas of society: from 
the squatter camps to the workplace and the university. Despite their stinging critique of the 
ruling African National Congress, and Abahlali’s own repeated insistence upon 
organizational autonomy, they open themselves to building ties with certain divisions within 
the South African government. This organization has done much of the useful work that is 
required to hold intellectuals accountable, and can offer a lot to research militants who want 
to engage in a collective process of transformation. 
Reflecting on their experience within an experimental university study group and 
their exchange with a number of academics that established a practice extremely akin to 
research militancy, a number of intellectuals from the shack settlements affiliated with 
Abahlali had this to say about the process they termed “Living learning”:  
Living Learning is about what’s happening in and outside of the University 
classroom. So we are trying to combine the two universities – the one of 
experience and the one of academics. … So there is a need for a good translation 
and interpretation to make it really a living politics. …The point is that it is not 
our work – it is the people’s work. They sent us and we need to report. 
…Knowledge is a dangerous thing! The publication will help the people where 
we come from because people compare these two universities – the University 
emijondolo and eplasini and the academic University of KwaZulu-Natal. There is 
this assumption, for example among the people in the shacks, that when you go to 
the academic university you don’t think about what you are learning daily in life 
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but you are just theorizing and talking about the people. But if this publication 
comes, it will show that it can be different; that the people and daily life are 
included by us in our Living Learning, and that the work continues. And sure, 
maybe there will be critique on our thinking. But you know, if a car is running, 
the dogs will be running alongside and barking. Anyway, if the car stops, the dog 
just pees on the car (Figlan et al 2009: 7-8). 
 
While I don’t believe my own research practice ever achieved exactly this kind of living 
learning as a form of research militancy, I did take it as a goal to strive for, and I continue to 
believe it provides us with a beautiful example of the potential relationship between 
knowledge and movement that we can and should aspire to. 
 This dissertation does not, however, take as its goal the concrete elaboration of the 
practices and daily lives of the members of Abahlali.  Much useful work has already been 
written with this in mind (see for example Pithouse (2005), Patel (2009), Chance (2010), 
Gibson (2011)).  Rather, I approached my study as an attempt to see South Africa through the 
political problems that Abahlali as a social movement revealed.  As such, the chapters in this 
work examine the following issues: the reconstitution of social movements in post-apartheid 
South Africa, the nature of political organization when the liberation movement is now in 
charge, the role of racialization as an under-examined and divisive factor weakening many 
global uprisings over the past few years, the relationship between movement and state as the 
rebirth of the development project unravels globally, and rethinking precarity from the 
specific site of the South African shack settlement.  Each of these themes emerged through 
my concrete examination of Abahlali, where I attempted to use the movement as a window 
into broader debates of central concern in South Africa and the world at large. 
 The research was conducted over three years in three different visits to the country in 
2011, 2012, and 2013. Throughout my study, my qualitative research methods included semi-
structured interviews, participant observation, and policy analysis. I attended academic 
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workshops like the Johannesburg Workshop on Theory and Criticism and those organized by 
the Center for the Critical Research on Race and Identity and the School of Development 
Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, activist intellectual gatherings organized by the 
Tribe of Moles, radical convergences such as BRICS from Below, student organized debates 
on non-racialism, panels on social movements at the Time of the Writer Festival, 
documentary film screenings at the Durban International Film Festival, and talks given at the 
Antipode Institute for the Geographies of Justice seminars organized in Durban.  I attended a 
variety of community meetings regarding issues like community displacement due to the 
expansion of the port in Durban and water sanitation challenges in low-income communities 
where dry toilets had been installed.  Most of all, I shadowed members of Abahlali as they 
held meetings in their downtown office, attended court hearings throughout the city, traveled 
to the different shack settlements affiliated with the organization, launched new branches of 
the movement, held community consultations, and organized the election of the Abahlali 
Youth League, Women’s League, and overall organizational leadership, and held protests or 
organized massive gatherings like Unfreedom Day.  While the vast majority of my research 
focused on Durban, I also spent time in Johannesburg and Cape Town, where I was able to 
interview scholars, activists and journalists working in the areas of housing, water, race 
relations and the law.   
  When I set out to conduct a study of Abahlali and social movements in South Africa, 
I already knew a fair amount about the nature of social movement divisions and internal 
debates and splits due to my own participations in such spaces in the United States.  I had 
read a little about similar debates surrounding Abahlali from a distance with skepticism, but I 
also kept an open mind regarding the different positions that seemed to be laid out in these 
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forums.  I decided I wanted to approach the study with an open mind so that I could 
determine for myself through direct observation where I stood on many of these issues.  I 
also wanted to learn as much as possible from the different actors involved in social 
movements in the country, and therefore I tried to avoid taking too strong a position that 
might cut me off from any particular actor in these debates.  Nonetheless, my ultimate 
decision to shy away from some of the more heated debates surrounding social movements 
like Abahlali in South Africa might still be viewed by some as a compromise or an attempt to 
evade difficult issues.  I took this decision because, as a participant in movements within the 
US myself, I understand that many of the divisions within struggles are quite complex and 
require first-hand knowledge to even begin to take a position.  Were you even present at such 
and such a meeting in 2006?  Do you have a stake in these struggles? Does it affect your own 
livelihood?  Many of these questions I could not answer positively, and I therefore did not 
see it as my place to intervene into internal movement dilemmas.  However, in the 
dissertation I still approach some of the most central debates I observed within the 
movements by addressing the issues on a theoretical terrain.  By taking the most 
sophisticated theoretical representative of the different positions, and putting the theories into 
conversation, I try to grapple in my own way with some of these key disputes.  Through it 
all, I have tried my best to avoid the sectarian, absolutist approaches that too often fracture 
progressive communities and begin to eat them from the inside out. 
 Finally, while I have a relatively strong background in the issue of race on a 
theoretical and practical level, I did not set out to place racialization at the center of this 
study.  Instead, the theme emerged as a glaring absence in too much of the existing literature 
and political discourse in South Africa. For a country that is so obviously structured along the 
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lines of race, South Africa remains surprisingly color-blind.  I found this to be the case across 
the board, from everyday life to the media, from academic studies to the courtroom, and from 
social movements to the government.  This is perhaps attributable to a purportedly post-
apartheid moment and the attempt to construct a rainbow nation.  But when power, 
geography and inequality are so clearly structured by race—historically and in the present—
one simply cannot afford to ignore the issue.  As such, racialization emerged as one of the 
central threads stringing together the different chapters of my study. 
 The most glaring aspect of the ongoing racialization of South African poverty and 
politics might be found in the composition of shack dwelling communities.  In Durban, the 
shack communities I visited were almost exclusively African, with a small sampling of 
Indian and Coloured residents mixed in.  Abahlali as an organization is roughly 99% African 
(Black), with most prominent representation from Zulu, Xhosa and Mpondo tribal groups.  
Despite having its origins in the Kennedy Road shack settlement, a community of shacks 
built along a hill adjoining the municipal dump in Durban, the group quickly gained citywide 
attention in both the English and isiZulu press, and began to attract interest from other shack 
communities.  Most often, a few grassroots community leaders in a specific shack settlement 
where issues of public home allocation, water, sanitation, electricity, crime or corruption 
have gone unaddressed by the local ward councilor (who is most often a member of the 
ANC, but could also be an IFP, NFP or DA representative, depending on the ward) will 
decide of their own accord to get in touch with Abahlali for advice after reading about the 
group in the newspaper, or hearing about them through word of mouth.  This often takes the 
shape of visiting Abahlali’s headquarters, which have been located in a downtown office 
building since their 2009 displacement from the Kennedy Road shack community at the 
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hands of an ANC-led mob.  Abahlali leaders will often advise such communities willingly, 
without necessarily encouraging them to join the movement.  But if the community leaders 
express greater interest in politics and in joining a broader struggle, Abahlali will often 
explain to them the process for joining the organization.  
Typically, in order to join the movement, a shack community must organize at least 
fifty members to agree to form a chapter of Abahlali.  This is required in order to emphasize 
that, despite joining a broader group with a centralized leadership, the initiative and drive for 
any movement activism must always come from a strong local base, grounded in and 
knowledgeable about the specific dynamics of their own particular shack settlement.  Once 
fifty members have been recruited, a few Abahlali representatives will visit the community to 
explain more about how the group functions, their broader political vision, their insistence 
upon political autonomy, and the rights of poor South Africans yet to be realized.  If the 
community is welcoming and organized, Abahlali will agree to return on a later date with 
more leaders in tow in order to facilitate an official branch launch.  At the branch launch, a 
series of formalities are organized with readings from the South African constitution and the 
Abahlali constitution, along with political speeches from a variety of group leaders.  Local 
leaders will also be encouraged to speak out about the challenges facing their community, 
and this will generate a process of collective visioning whereby the existing political system 
will be proven inadequate, and the need for an independent social movement will be 
reinforced as clear to all in attendance.  Lastly, elections will be held for the leadership of the 
local branch, and Abahlali membership cards will be issued to all those in attendance who 
wish to join the struggle. 
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In the almost ten years since its inception, the movement has experienced many ebbs 
and flows in its membership and composition.  It is incredibly impressive that the group 
continues to exist despite the meager resources they rely upon in order to survive, and in the 
face of an extremely repressive governmental response to their mobilization.  While the 
group has claimed a presence in anywhere from 30-40 different shack communities 
throughout the city, this is difficult to document at any one given time.  The group struggles 
to keep new branches active after initial victories are won, such as the right to housing or 
access to better services.  This is the case because where the ANC does make concessions to 
locally active branches, this can be read as a sign that the ANC is still committed to the 
liberation struggle.  The ruling party is thus often able to effectively wage a counter-
campaign wherever the movement is active.  This usually consists of a combination of 
disinformation leveled at the movement, along with promises that they should stick with the 
powerful people in government, because they will be able to deliver the goods.  Where the 
local party apparatus is unable or unwilling to improve conditions for shack dwellers, 
Abahlali branches may remain quite active.  This has been the case with a number of the key 
settlements throughout the city.  While fifty members is the minimum required to join, most 
branches have many more members who attend local meetings.  At the 2013 Unfreedom Day 
gathering that Abahlali organizes to openly denounce what they see as the ANC’s 
hypocritical annual celebration of a “Freedom Day” when, they argue, the poor are clearly 
still not free, approximately three thousand group members from across the city attended the 
rally.  This was the largest gathering of the group I witnessed during my time in Durban, 
although they have brought together many more at protests or other rallies organized in the 
past. 
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 Events such as these bring a lot of attention to the group.  They have been at the 
center of a range of debates in the city and the country regarding the nature and limits of 
post-apartheid liberation, and the accomplishments and failures of democracy.  While this 
dissertation relies upon extensive research with the group, as argued above, it uses the group 
as a window into some of these broader debates regarding the bottlenecks faced by social 
movements in South Africa and elsewhere, the relationship between oppositional movements 
and state-led developmental initiatives, and the theories of precarity and surplus populations 
that can easily be associated with marginal groups living in slums.  It is to these debates that I 
now turn. 
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CHAPTER 1 
EMERGING ALTERNATIVES IN THE “TRANSITION” TO DEMOCRACY: 
WHAT IS AT STAKE IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICAN STRUGGLES? 
 
Democracy lives only by struggling to preserve itself, and by going beyond itself 
toward a society freed from the state and from political alienation. (Henri Lefebvre 
1968: 7) 
 
For me, the problem of autogestion shifts more and more away from enterprises 
towards the organization of space. (Henri Lefebvre, quoted in Merrifield 2006: 141) 
 
 South African society has been undergoing a prolonged transition to democracy over 
the past 20 years since Nelson Mandela’s release from prison in 1990. The liberation 
movement waged against apartheid from 1948-1990, led primarily by the African National 
Congress (ANC), proclaimed that its goals reached far beyond an end to political racism, and 
that a post-apartheid South Africa would necessarily be a just society for all.  The political 
outlook of the ANC might have been described as revolutionary nationalist, as it formed 
strong and lasting alliances during the struggle with the South African Communist Party, as 
well as with socialist countries around the world form Cuba to Tanzania. The Freedom 
Charter of the ANC, written in 1955 and still strongly adhered to by Mandela in a letter to the 
nation two weeks prior to his release from prison in 1990, contained central demands for the 
redistribution of land and for a people’s democracy.  They read as follows: “The people shall 
govern! The people shall share in the country’s wealth! The mineral wealth beneath the soil, 
the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a 
whole. The land shall be shared among those who work it! Restrictions of land ownership on 
a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it to banish 
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famine and land hunger. All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose.”  The 
charter also included important clauses guaranteeing the right to freedom of speech and 
assembly, and to decent housing as a human right. 
 Since the initial transition period of 1990-1994 when the white supremacist National 
Party handed power to the majority-rule party of the ANC, however, the situation for the vast 
majority of South Africans has not only not improved, but has in some cases deteriorated 
(Bond 2000). Despite governing under a clear majority—the ANC won 70% of the National 
Assembly seats in the 2009 election—the government has simply failed to deliver the goods. 
Much of the basic vision of the Freedom Charter lies in ruins, and South Africans have 
decried the supposed shift from a strictly white supremacist society to one where neoliberal 
capitalism rules (Gibson 2006).  Scholars and social movements alike have attempted to 
grapple with this devastating defeat by searching for explanations as to what went wrong.  
How could a liberation movement clearly dedicated to implementing a more just society have 
so radically altered its position?  How can the ANC and its allies—most notably the South 
African Communist Party (SACP)—continue to govern the country while it is clear that the 
oppression they came to power to ameliorate if not erase has outlived formal apartheid? 
 One should note that overall poverty has in fact decreased throughout the country, 
primarily in the rural areas.  However, urban poverty has increased according to the South 
African Labour and development Research Unit. Ashwin Desai, Brij Maharaj and Patrick 
Bond explain this apparent dichotomy: “In other words, what ordinary observers view as a 
manifestation of dreadful policy failure—the peri-urban shack settlement stretching for miles 
with dreadful living conditions—is in reality an improvement over life in the depressed, 
hopeless rural periphery of South Africa” (Maharaj, Desai and Bond eds. 2010). 
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Additionally, the country’s Gini coefficient reveals that it is the second most unequal society 
in the world, demonstrating that the transition to an egalitarian democracy still has a long 
way to go. It boasts perhaps the most progressive constitution in the world—enshrining 
women’s rights, human rights, and even linguistic rights for underrepresented groups—yet it 
also experiences one of the highest levels of social unrest in the world with more protests per 
capita than any other country besides China (Bond 2010).  While it plays host to the largest 
stock exchange on the continent, it also struggles with an unemployment rate hovering 
around 25%, officially.  Many of the unemployed, together with some workers in the 
informal economy, have mobilized politically into community organizations, predominantly 
located along the urban peripheries, that have been described as South Africa’s “new social 
movements” (Ballard et all 2006, Desai 2002). These movements have garnered a significant 
amount of attention worldwide and many commentators see them as embodying a new 
political subject in an increasingly post-industrial world where the traditional industrial 
working class, pressured by economic precarity, is finding it ever more difficult to exert 
political power (Saul 2011). 
Rather than looking to the past to account for this failure, then, this dissertation will 
attempt to examine the present for clues to the future.  In this introduction I assess a number 
of the vigorous debates that have emerged regarding the first transition—what Patrick Bond 
terms an “elite transition” (2000).  I then examine those groups most actively mobilized 
against the new government in the more recent push for a second transition: a burgeoning 
collection of social movements.  The chapter closes by introducing the work of Abahlali 
baseMjondolo, an organization of shack dwellers based primarily in the city of Durban that is 
an extremely prominent contemporary South African social movement.  Abahlali’s 
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conception of the right to the city, it is argued, provides us with an alternative understanding 
of “transitions to democracy”, and is a model that will be traced throughout this work. 
While much of South African society remained in permanent suspension during the 
late 1990s, the early 2000s witnessed a re-emergence of grassroots forces that directly 
challenged the new “majority-rule” government of the ANC.  These movements have been 
incredibly diverse in outlook and program, but they share a number of general characteristics.  
They have largely concerned issues of service delivery and basic needs demands such as 
health, housing, electricity, water and land.  While all these issues played a role in mobilizing 
resistance during the anti-apartheid struggle, the most notable absence in the current round of 
organized opposition concerns that of organized labor.  The Congress of South African Trade 
Unions’ (COSATU) alliance with the ANC and the harsh realities of de-industrialization in 
South Africa has led to a situation in which the labor movement is increasingly viewed as a 
peripheral and weakened force as regards potential sources of opposition to the current 
government (Barchiesi 2006).  Nonetheless, the massacre of a number of striking 
mineworkers at Marikana in August 2012, as well as the recent split of the National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa from the tripartite alliance of the ANC, COSATU and the 
SACP, has brought the potential of a renewed labor movement back to the fore.  Arguably 
the key factor determining the future success of such a breakaway movement will be the 
ability of these renegade unions to forge an alliance with the spontaneous social unrest and 
organized social movements that are most active in urban settings throughout the country.   
Understanding the Limits of the First Transition 
 Patrick Bond takes up these issues and others in his account of the early years of 
ANC rule in Elite Transition.  He surmises that the COSATU intellectuals who adopted a 
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post-Fordist approach to the post-apartheid national economy were much more likely to take 
up a cozy alliance with the ANC in its capitulation to International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank (WB) pressures to align the economy according to the needs of foreign 
investment and structural adjustment.  Domestic business elites, often working in partnership 
with international financial organizations and the post-Fordist intellectuals Bond critiques, 
developed a series of “social contract scenarios” during the transition in order to pacify left 
elements and slowly solidify consensus around neoliberal policies.  None of these scenarios 
tackled the historically weakest aspect of South Africa’s economy according to Bond: 
“overproduction of luxury goods as a result of high import barriers and the capital-intensive 
technologies of multinational corporate producers.”  Ignoring these issues led to “capital 
flight, under-production of both machines and basic needs goods, and those speculative 
financial bubbles”(75).  Thus the social contract scenarios were successful attempts at 
maintaining the status quo in South Africa because they managed to incorporate previously 
excluded elite members of society in the discussion, while simultaneously marginalizing the 
most progressive actors. 
 Bond’s analysis of the failed transition to democracy centers on the framework of 
uneven development. Such a framework allows us to grasp the important continuities in the 
shift from Fordism to Post-Fordism in the way capitalism extends its tentacles to all regions 
of the world in a fundamentally asymmetrical manner.  For Bond, uneven development is 
rooted in capitalism’s overaccumulation crisis as spelled out most famously by Rosa 
Luxemburg. Therefore the common thread running throughout his book is that “the rise of 
financial markets during periods of capitalist overproduction—or overaccumulation crisis—
amplified unevenness, as South Africa demonstrates clearly”(6).  The process of 
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overaccumulation leads to a shifting of the crisis throughout time and space.  Unfortunately, 
the only real long-term solution to this crisis is the incessant process of creative destruction 
elaborated by Schumpeter, which plays out today through “widespread devaluation”(10) of 
physical and human labor. His central argument is that “as overaccumulation begins to set in, 
as structural bottlenecks emerge and as profit rates fall in the productive sectors of the 
economy, capitalists begin to shift their investible funds out of reinvestment in plant, 
equipment and labor power and instead seek refuge in financial assets”(11).  The rapid 
growth of the “non-productive” Johannesburg stock market in the past two decades was 
therefore coupled with a tremendous de-industrialization process nation-wide that has 
brought record levels of unemployment—25% has been a relatively steady official 
unemployment rate over the past decade. 
 For Bond, such an analysis of capitalism is paired with a corresponding state-based 
solution.  Uneven development, it would seem, can only be curbed through a traditional 
socialist response that puts up barriers to capital’s global reach while facilitating entry-points 
for global solidarity between various people’s movements and governments around the 
world.  Because neoliberalism brings with it a necessary erosion of state sovereignty, the 
ANC was unable to fully determine its country’s destiny and was instead brought under the 
sway of international elite forces and ideologies advancing the Washington Consensus.  This 
can only be solved by a re-assertion of South African sovereignty as a protective-mechanism 
that guards against international incursions while cultivating the domestic resiliency to test 
alternative paths to development.  Such an alternative Bond sees as squarely within the 
tradition established by Samir Amin known as “delinking.” 
As unrealistic as this appears at first blush (recall this chapter’s long list of populists-
turned-neoliberals), the recent, present and forthcoming conditions of global 
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economic crisis appear to both demand and supply the material grounds for a 
profound change in power relations.  The ideological hegemony and financial 
stranglehold that neoliberalism and its sponsors have enjoyed are discredited and 
could fast disappear (2006: 251). 
     
 A key lingering question, however, concerns where such an internal oppositional 
force strong enough to seize state power in South Africa would emerge?  On this matter, 
Bond demonstrates a clear desire for a truly oppositional South African Communist Party 
and for the apartheid-era strength of the labor unions. Discussing these groups, Bond claims 
“there was always the possibility that the SACP—the only party on the South African Left 
with more than a few hundred cadres—would break free from the Alliance early in the 
twenty-first century” (245).  Regarding the labor movement, Bond asserts again that “there 
was always the hope that, perhaps, Cosatu would move leftwards again…After all, under 
generally less propitious conditions than South Africa, Moody observed, a series of political 
mass strikes by national workers’ movements had shaken Nigeria, Indonesia, Paraguay and 
Taiwan in 1994…and then with the 1998-99 crisis, many other important sites of East Asian, 
East European, African and Latin American proletarian suffering due to neoliberal economic 
disaster”(246-247). These passages demonstrate Bond’s clear allegiance to the traditional 
Left alternative of instituting a socialist government through the establishment of a mass-
based political party. Such a party would gather its support from those workers who hold a 
privileged point in the production process by virtue of their proletarian status and their 
supposed ability to lodge a monkey-wrench in the system of capitalist accumulation, and it 
would use this strength against capital in order to gain state power. 
 By 2006, six years after Bond penned his penetrating critique of South Africa’s “Elite 
Transition,” the situation in South Africa had shifted significantly.  The emergence of new 
people’s movements once again raised the hope that opposition to the ANC’s neoliberal 
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platform was growing.  Many hoped these movements would open a window for 
implementing a more just society under the banner of the democratic transition most South 
Africans believed would occur immediately after the fall of apartheid. And yet this new 
source of opposition was rooted firmly in social movements that did not appear to have 
sprung from either the organizing efforts of political party cadres or from the center of 
proletarian power in the labor movement.  Rather, these movements emerged in community 
settings in some rural and many urban areas. This chapter will largely focus on the struggles 
confined to urban settings that involve a mixture of proletarian and lumpen proletarian 
classes that some scholars prefer to refer to as a kind of “precariat” class (Standing 2011, 
Saul 2011). 
 In revisiting some of the same questions regarding the potential source of opposition 
to the new ANC hegemony six years later (2006), Bond tacitly acknowledges that neither the 
SACP nor the labor unions have been directly instigating the new social movements.  Yet he 
focuses on Johannesburg’s agglomeration of movements in order to demonstrate that while 
the actors may have changed slightly, “the Johannesburg left has simply reconstituted itself 
via community activists, while the traditional goals of socialism via state power remain 
intact”(116).  For Bond, the “vast proletarian townships” located along the peripheries of 
Johannesburg have historically constituted these movements’ base.  As such, the current 
struggles are building off an earlier round of movement associated with the township civic 
associations that peaked in the 1980s (Mayekiso 1996).  Most active among these new 
movements were the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) and the Anti Privatization 
Forum (APF) that formally presented socialist candidates for election in open opposition to 
the ANC.  Rather than viewing these emergent movements as oppositional to the traditional 
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left, Bond prefers to see them as part of a re-scaling of struggle.  Thus, in place of only the 
scales of the factory, the state, and the international realm of solidarity, the new South 
African social movements typified by the SECC and the APF have grounded themselves in 
the scales of the body (particularly the HIV struggles), the household, and the neighborhood 
as additional sites of class struggle and contestation with the state.  This expansion beyond 
the state and the factory has led to the struggle being presented around the “political principle 
of decommodification”(120-121). 
New Subjects Emerge 
 Others have taken the emergence of new social movements as a sign of more 
profound changes in the composition of oppositional politics within South Africa.  Franco 
Barchiesi argues that the failure of South Africa’s attempted transition to democracy is best 
exemplified by ever-decreasing levels of voter-turnout throughout the country.  “Popular 
participation in the elections has shown a trend to constant decline, which means that in 2004 
the ANC was voted into power by an actual minority of eligible voters”(213).   Concomitant 
with the decline in democratic participation through the electoral process, post-apartheid 
South Africa has experienced dramatic shifts in the labor market.  We might juxtapose the 
current round of struggles, then, with those of the previous generation in order to grasp what 
has changed in the objective and subjective conditions underlying social change in South 
Africa.  This requires an attempt to “relate the rise of new community movements to changes 
in waged employment and working class organizations”(217).  
 While the labor union movement enjoyed an incredibly close relationship with the 
new ANC government, Barchiesi claims that the largely neoliberal Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution policy (GEAR) of 1996—undemocratically adhered to by the ANC—gutted 
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this partnership of any radical content. “The growing institutionalization of organized labor 
mirrored the deepening crisis in the living conditions of largely unemployed and un-
unionized poor, and was unable to stem rising uncertainty, precariousness and vulnerability 
that face many union members as well”(222).  Parallel to this marginalization of organized 
labor as a political force is a general rise in precarity within the broad working conditions 
throughout South Africa.  Precarious work emerged in part as a consequence of the de-
industrialization and de-unionization effects of the rising neoliberal economy during the 
1990s. While COSATU lost members by the hundreds of thousands, worker militancy was 
focused not simply around increased wages but also on a rebellion against work itself.  This 
extended a long tradition within the worker’s movement in South Africa, where struggles 
revolved not merely around improving workplace conditions but often were also directed 
against work itself, even in the height of anti-apartheid activism.  By de-centering the 
workplace as the site for improving life conditions, other arenas of struggle began to emerge.  
While under apartheid “the most relevant contribution on the left to mass grassroots 
organizing was undoubtedly provided by the growth of militant trade unions of the black 
working class,”(220) Barchiesi claims that this militancy was not limited to the factory but, 
due to a lack of formal citizenship rights under the apartheid regime, the struggle often 
exploded into the community realm beyond the factory: 
Coercive labor control in the absence of citizenship rights within colonial realities 
encounters insurmountable problems in enforcing workers’ loyalty and reducing their 
ability to escape from, and refuse, wage labor.  In South Africa, workers’ refusal and 
subversion of the wage relation was translated into exporting worker militancy from 
the factory to the community.  Workers’ refusal of the wage relation as a terrain of 
emancipation isolated from radical social change made deep-seated desires of 
liberation from wage labor co-exist with workplace-based demands for social and 
political recognition (227-228). 
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This led to a split in the movement between the struggles organized around the sphere of 
production (the factory) and struggles coalescing within the arena of reproduction 
(community, housing, electricity, water).  As Altha Cravey and Georgia Ann Cravey argue, 
“attention to the material and bodily necessity of social reproduction is one way to sharpen 
our analysis of class struggle” (2008: 26). Bond and Barchiesi certainly concur with this 
analysis, and conceptualize this shift in their own competing terminologies: what Bond 
highlights as a shift in scale of struggle, Barchiesi sees as an expansion and transformation 
within the struggle against capitalist productive and reproductive realms. 
 It is only after comprehending this history within the labor struggle, one where this 
split and tension already existed under apartheid between factory and community struggles, 
that we can understand the contemporary resurgence of social movements in South Africa.  
Globally, the rise of precarious labor has dealt a blow to the once central labor movement.  
South African labor struggles remain much more vibrant than those in most countries around 
the world, but workplace struggles have arguably been displaced as the principle site of 
antagonism with state and capital by movements emerging in the space of the city as a whole.  
Yet, argues Barchiesi, we cannot erase workers’ own subjectivity in this demise, in that much 
of their struggle historically entailed a fight beyond the factory, explicitly rejecting the wage 
relation while insisting on the importance of struggle at the community level.  In his 
examination of contemporary movements, Barchiesi points to the same organizations as 
Bond, but in doing so he stresses their break from earlier models of struggle more so than 
their continuity.  “In general, these movements do not mobilize in alliance with mainstream 
unions, including COSATU ones, which express suspicion and even overt hostility towards 
them”(232). 
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 While he celebrates the APF both for its open opposition towards the ANC and for its 
attempt to link struggles within the factory to community struggles by highlighting 
privatization as their common neoliberal enemy, Barchiesi is also weary of the group’s 
continued insistence upon conquering the state apparatus as a struggle objective, and upon 
their centralized, “party-like” decision-making structure.  He draws from Ashwin Desai’s 
own assessment of the resurgent South African social movements to drive home this critique: 
There is an agreement that while left values are still important to us, the left project 
often took on forms that became obstacles to realizing those values.  This was true at 
least to the extent that left organizations are based on a mere philosophy of 
domination that confines social subjects to the role of either passive victims or card-
carrying members of the revolutionary party.  The left has been unable to recognize 
the teeming life in between.  Life! (238). 
 
Such a concern with ‘life’ is often traditionally confined to what is seen as the “private” 
dimension of citizenship in a republic.  While older models sought to place emphasis on the 
“public” realm of the state as that space where a general will could be forged amongst the 
divided masses, community concerns were often sidestepped as inconsequential, especially 
because they lacked a direct relation to the privileged sphere of the economy that was seen as 
fundamentally determining much of political and social existence.  But South Africa’s new 
social movements are seen by many as good examples of the refusal to accept this split 
between public and private life.  In an effort to defend his own use of the term “multitude” to 
adequately characterize this collapse between public and private citizens, Barchiesi explains 
that: 
Community movements’ prominent characters are the ‘unemployed, single mother, 
community defender, abandoned, neighbor, factory worker, popular criminal and rap 
artist,’ a social landscape that does not easily fit homogenous identities, especially 
when the national liberation ideology is undergoing a credibility crisis.  Rather than 
delegating the definition of citizenship to political institutions, those subjects tend to 
experience it as a permanently fluid field of contestation.  Many in the official left can 
dismiss community movements as ‘single-issue,’ ‘particularistic’ and ‘confused.’ It is 
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however unquestionable that their very presence interrogates the established lefts’ 
ability to redefine the confines of the ‘possible’ and ‘feasible’(239). 
 
Civil Society and the State 
 A similar concern permeates reflections upon the intertwining relevance of the realms 
of civil society and the state in contemporary South Africa.  Michael Neocosmos, for 
example, picks up from Barchiesi’s line of thinking regarding the contested terrain of 
citizenship and the challenge that new movements present to traditional conceptualizations of 
social struggle.  Neocosmos, however, directs his critique most profoundly towards what he 
sees as two interchanging forms of authoritarianism that consistently divide state and civil 
society: (neo)liberalism and state nationalism. He avoids framing the challenges of South 
African democracy in terms of the individual psychologies of ANC leaders, and instead 
focuses attention on structural dynamics in place preventing a real transition to democracy.  
When viewed as interchangeable authoritarian frameworks for governing, (neo)liberalism 
and state nationalism equally produce a civil society that is gutted of its political content. 
Instead civil society operates merely as the arena where the reproduction of state hegemony 
occurs.  By siphoning off the political content from non-state spheres, capitalism is able to 
prevent any true democratization in the realm of society at large.  The countervailing project 
of politicizing society is rooted in Neocosmos’s belief that “the state is not the exclusive site 
of politics and it is clear that it is certainly not the site of an emancipatory politics on the 
continent”(2006: 60).  
 Such a framework runs counter to the traditional approach to the realm of civil 
society whereby it becomes the space from which citizens can compete for influence upon 
the state and thus express their societal agency.  This traditional view of civil society, which 
Neocosmos ascribes to neoliberal ideology, insists that “the more extensive this pluralism as 
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manifested by the ‘vibrancy’ or ‘diversity’ of civil society, the more extensive supposedly is 
democracy itself”(63).  Political theorists from Karl Marx to Partha Chatterjee present us 
with a different analysis of civil society by claiming that it is characterized by its divergence 
from the state in that the realms of society and the economy become “largely 
depoliticized”(63). Neocosmos tells us that this separation forms the basis for a continued 
authoritarianism at the heart of liberalism.  Such authoritarianism is made possible by placing 
“politics out of reach of the society and the economy beyond the reach of politics”(64). 
 Thus, when considering the relation between the two realms of state and civil society 
on the one hand, and the supposed universal goal of democratization in contemporary Africa 
on the other hand, Neocosmos is adamant that we must refute any correlation between a 
deepening of activity within civil society and said democratization.  Quoting Marx, he insists 
that democratization “consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed upon 
society into one completely subordinate to it”(65). Such a subordination of the state to 
society at large is extremely difficult to achieve within civil society when a group is only 
granted civil society status once it has ascribed to the state’s preferred and recognized 
criteria: namely, not being a member of a purportedly illegal or underground organization.  
Tellingly, Neocosmos claims that the vibrant political resistance movements that spread 
throughout the townships in 1980s South Africa never constituted a civil society precisely 
because they were viewed as openly subversive by the state and therefore beyond the realm 
of “mutual recognition” between state and society required to gain civil society status. 
 The framework for achieving social justice commonly referred to as “human rights” 
might equally fall under this critique.  Precisely because human rights are presented as 
universal values that the state must provide to its subjects, they become potentially 
 
 
 30 
problematic as part of the depoliticization of society as a whole.  “These rights, even though 
fought for and achieved through popular struggles throughout society, are supposed to be 
“delivered” and “guaranteed” by the state.  They are taken out of popular control and placed 
in a juridical realm, where their fundamentally political character is removed from sight so 
that they become the subject of technical resolution by the judicial system”(67).  Thus rights 
become subsumable under the technocratic process of governing properly, rather than a 
means to increasing the democratic political power of people in society as a whole.  This 
helps us to understand how post-apartheid South Africa can be home of the most progressive 
constitution in the world and at the same time have the highest level of inequality of any 
country. 
Human Rights and the First Transition 
 There are at least three critical positions available for assessing the successes and 
failures of what I’m calling “the first transition” in South Africa, often associated with the 
early negotiations between the ANC and the National Party, and followed by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission that was established once the ANC came to power.  The first 
position sees the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as the defining moment in the first 
transition in South Africa, but it views it as a project with tremendous shortcomings.  In 
distinguishing between political and economic rights, and choosing to focus the proceedings 
of the TRC on supposedly political violations, the TRC is thought to have missed an 
opportunity to frame apartheid as a crime that mapped onto a broader context of colonial 
rule.  Coerced labor and forced removals, two of the principle crimes of apartheid, are in fact 
simultaneously political and economic (Mamdani 2002: 39).  Land dispossession, a crime 
that dates to 1913 in pre-apartheid South Africa, is similarly taken off the table as a non-issue 
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for the TRC.  The bifurcated rule of apartheid, where rural tribal homelands confined much 
of the African population to a structure of rule outside the apartheid legal framework, meant 
that treating apartheid’s crimes as principally a matter of unethical laws, as the TRC did, 
simultaneously failed to grapple with the historic and ongoing form of rural despotism that 
facilitated apartheid rule.   
In a similar fashion, one might argue that the problem today in SA is not that political 
rights haven’t extended into the economic terrain, but that political rights are accessible only 
to those elite communities that have access to the realm of civil society.  Here, a critical 
interrogation of civil society becomes crucial:  Michael Hardt sees it as withering away in 
late capital (1995); Partha Chatterjee (2004) and Michael Neocosmos (2006) argue that civil 
society is a space where only privileged sectors of the urban population can interact with the 
state; and Frank Wilderson (2007) goes even further in arguing that anti-blackness as an 
exclusionary paradigm predicated on gratuitous violence is the very condition of possibility 
for civil society. 
The idea that the TRC, as the paradigmatic form of transitional justice, represented 
the realization of political justice along with an ethical commitment to acknowledge past 
wrongdoing, is problematic in the South African context for a variety of reasons.  First, it 
represents a continuation of the ethical tradition in political theory that still fails to grapple 
with the reality of power relations as a central terrain upon which justice must be realized.  
Second, it ignores the ongoing struggle for a second transition in South Africa, whereby 
economic rights are being fought for as an entirely neglected part of the first transition 
symbolized by the TRC.  Thirdly, it ignores the persistence of precisely that form of rule 
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thought to be paradigmatic of apartheid: racialized forms of dispossession in post-apartheid 
South Africa (Hart 2002).  
The second critical position regarding the TRC identifies a break in transitional 
justice that occurred with the end of apartheid.  Human rights in this framework first emerged 
as a problem of the Rights of Man in the 18th century French Revolution, as an explicitly 
political project.  The second phase of human rights is thought of primarily as a post-WWII 
problem that confronted the evil of the Holocaust in an effort to proclaim ‘never again’.  
Thus this second phase framed human rights as principally requiring an ethical project, rather 
than a political one, for it was politics that was blamed for bringing about mass killing in the 
first place.  Emanuel Levinas, and perhaps Judith Butler today, are two principal figures in 
this ethical philosophy of responsibility to the Other. As Mahmood Mamdani (2011) has 
argued, this paradigm of human rights evolved into the present by basing itself in the lessons 
of defeat, rather than the lessons of revolution.  And yet, the Nuremberg model of human 
rights that gathered steam in the late 1970s was predicated upon a notion of criminal violence 
with responsibility ascribed to individual perpetrators.  What the South African TRC was 
supposed to challenge was the problematic universality of this second phase of human rights.  
The problems that arose with this purported universality led Gustavo Esteva and Madhu 
Prakash to reframe human rights as “the Trojan horse of recolonization” (1997).  In this 
sense, it is important to remember that the modern human rights movement gathered steam in 
the wake of not only the Holocaust but also the multiple projects of decolonization that 
reclaimed state sovereignty for indigenous populations.  The end of South African apartheid 
can be viewed as a pinnacle of this movement.   
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And yet, argue some, the fall of apartheid and the first transition that accompanied it 
also broke with this second phase of human rights in that it challenged some of the universal 
aspects of the earlier discourse.  Rather than endorsing the framework of mass violence as an 
ethical problem, the first transition in South Africa managed to reframe it as a political 
problem, involving collectivities.  It is in this sense that Mamdani argues “Political violence 
requires more than just criminal agency; it needs a political constituency.  That constituency, 
in turn, is held together and mobilized by an issue.  More than criminal violence, political 
violence is issue-driven” (2011:8).  While Nuremberg is thought of as approaching justice as 
a mater of criminal proceedings, the first South African transition, and the negotiations that 
the ANC undertook with the departing National Party were supposed to have been framed 
around a notion of “survivor’s justice”.  Survivor’s justice here is thought of as a collective 
project of reconciliation, whereby the categories of victim and perpetrator are transcended in 
a collective healing process that allows all populations to move forward into a new, post-
conflict moment.  More important than the late-1990s TRC in this first transition, then, were 
the early 1990s negotiations between the ANC and the National Party, when the groundwork 
was laid out for the dismantling of juridical and political apartheid.  In these early 
negotiations, precisely by ceding power to the formerly dominant white minority, the ANC is 
thought to have overcome the traditional model of victim’s justice.  As Mamdani argues  
If South Africa is a model for solving intractable conflicts, it is an argument for 
moving from the best to the second best alternative.  That second best alternative was 
political reform.  The quest for reform, for an alternative short of victory, led to the 
realization that if you threaten to put the leadership on either side of the dock they 
will have no interest in reform.  This change in perspective led to a shift, away from 
criminalizing or demonizing the other side to treating it as a political adversary.  It led 
to displacing the paradigm of criminal justice identified with Nuremberg”…These 
earlier set of negotiations “prioritized political justice…Political justice affects groups 
whereas criminal justice targets individuals.  The object of criminal justice is 
punishment, that of political justice is political reform (2011: 16-17). 
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However, this second critical position which celebrates the early negotiations between the 
ANC and the NP as a promising model of survivor’s justice predicated upon political justice, 
is also easily critiqued by a third position regarding the first transition in South Africa. 
The notion of “survivor’s justice” could be accused of falling victim to exactly what 
Grant Farred denounces about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: “The TRC can only 
perform its political function if it suspends the past, if arbitrary temporal barriers, separating 
the past from the present, are imposed” (2007: p. 156).  And more forthrightly:  
The genius of the truth commissions is that they allow for the ethical betrayal of the 
time passed.  Because of the TRC, the time known can now be represented as the time 
unknown, the time unknown until now, until the justice-instituting event of the 
TRC…The TRC allows for the postapartheid nation to be ‘asboluted’ into the 
nonracial, democratic present…The reconstituted nation makes the past different 
from, but no longer disruptive of, the present.  To be absoluted is to allow for the 
confession of guilt and the national forgiving of the perpetrators, the erasure of 
historical erasure, and the coming into absolute oneness of the new nation (2007: 
159). 
 
Here Farred provides us with a temporal critique of the suturing together of apartheid and 
post-apartheid societies, in a manner that still maintains the image of an absolute break that 
has been healed through the TRC.  In essence, white South Africans and other elites are left 
off the hook, and this is all possible through South Africa’s own version of color-blindness.  
This complicates Mamdani’s insistence that the primary legacy of colonial rule in the post-
colonial moment is ethnic, rather than racial rule (1996).   This may have been an extremely 
poignant analysis of the period between 1990 and 1994, when the Zulu nationalist Inkatha 
Freedom Party became a principle perpetrator of violence throughout the country, attacking 
ANC communities.  Mamdani’s critique then was that this was possible because the 
liberation movement, like the TRC as a whole, failed to take account of the particular nature 
of colonial rule.  An urban bias in the ANC caused it to neglect the rural areas that were ruled 
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under a tribal logic of decentralized despotism, and thus the movement failed to unite across 
tribal lines.  And yet, while Mamdani is correct that the South African state has been de-
racialized in the post-apartheid moment, society remains fully racialized.   
Farred therefore offers us a model for how to think through the persistence of race, 
rather than ethnicity, as perhaps the central problem in post-apartheid South Africa.  He 
deploys a temporal critique of the continuities between an apartheid past and the ongoing 
forms of exploitation in the purportedly post-apartheid present.  We might ask what the 
spatial corollary would be of this temporal ‘absolutizing’?  Spatial justice is clearly 
foreclosed upon in the post-apartheid present in a dual fashion.   By delimiting its period of 
study to 1960-1994, the TRC avoided discussion of the issues of land reform and forced 
removals from urban areas, which, as we have already mentioned, date back to the 1913 
Native Land Act.  In the post-apartheid present, then, apartheid geographies are allowed to 
persist.  Rural people struggle to eek out a living on land they were confined to over a 
hundred years ago.  In the absence of land reform, many migrate to the cities and set-up 
precarious dwellings in shack communities, which pepper all urban landscapes throughout 
the country.  While the country has built almost 3 million homes since the end of apartheid in 
an effort to provide shelter to this population, because it refuses to link the urban and the 
rural in its policies, it simply cannot keep pace: another 2 million still sit on housing waiting 
lists throughout the country, forced to eek out a living in shacks.  And yet these same shack 
settlements make up many of the few instances of de-segregating urban South Africa, 
penetrating the heart of the historically white cities in an effort to access public resources, 
transportation, and jobs.  The model of transitional justice in South Africa, then, clearly 
lacked a corresponding notion of spatial justice. 
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 Given the blind-spots and shortcomings of the first transition, one might legitimately 
ask at this point what other kinds of politics actually exist that do not fall into the bottlenecks 
of the human rights framework celebrated by the TRC, or the elitist tendencies of the domain 
of civil society?  For Neocosmos, the answer is clear.  “Indeed it is an argument of this paper, 
that popular-democratic or consistently democratic politics are the kind of politics which are 
by their very nature emancipatory and which are of greatest interest to the majority of the 
people of Africa—the poor and the oppressed”(78). Such criteria can allow for a consistent 
critique of the ANC’s own authoritarianism and offer a template for oppositional movements 
seeking to produce new social relations in South Africa that can provide the basis for a true 
transition to democracy. The contradiction between nationalism and liberalism found in 
geographically distinct parts of the world might therefore comprise an internal contradiction 
within the contemporary South African state when viewed through Neocosmos’s framework.  
While under Fordism there existed a relative confluence between national interests and the 
interests of capital, under post-Fordist regimes of accumulation the divergence between these 
two means that the ANC is increasingly proved incapable of balancing the two forces within 
one government.  Thus the liberal state is unable to provide national solutions to correct past 
wrongs and bring about justice (the failure of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission) 
while it is equally unable to advance national development through the market as witnessed 
by the failure of Structural Adjustment Programs throughout the continent.  Thus, while 
some states revert to nationalist authoritarianism, the ANC pays lip service to nationalist 
interests through its programs of Black Economic Empowerment, empowering a select few 
to become members of a new Black elite, while doing little for the vast majority of poor 
South Africans who are also Black. 
 
 
 37 
 All of this reinforces Neocosmos’s belief that the state is a feeble instrument when it 
comes to instituting social justice.  “The possibility for the development of emancipatory-
democratic politics therefore will tend to be found primarily within the popular domain of 
politics as, despite the contradictions within it, the domain of state politics is founded on 
administrative, managerial and bureaucratic concerns, the nature of which is anything but 
democratic”(78).  Neocosmos’s skepticism about the state notwithstanding, he is careful to 
say that he is not arguing along anarchistic lines, whereby the state should simply be 
abolished or not taken into consideration at all when we consider potential political projects.  
“Clearly this should not be taken to be an argument against the sate as such, but only an 
argument against reducing politics to the state”(85). 
 But what does this mean when it is taken into account regarding specific social 
movements in South Africa?  Both Neocosmos and Barchiesi are quite skeptical of 
movements which fall victim to reproducing the weakest dynamics of the old Left through 
vanguardist approaches and centralized leadership structures.  They are both equally critical 
of attempts to re-direct such movements towards the direction of the state by subsuming them 
under the exclusive guidance of an existing or alternative political party. Bond too, 
approaching the issue from a more traditional socialist perspective, was able to recognize the 
importance of the new social movements that emerged in South Africa during the 
interregnum between 1999 and 2004 when the country began to once again witness strong 
oppositional grassroots forces. The question that begins to divide oppositional voices 
concerns what direction these movements should take and how we should understand their 
composition in relation to previous projects of social justice? This question takes on special 
urgency in light of the fact that the ANC’s project of a democratic transition has now been 
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met with such tremendous grassroots discontent, proclaiming the still unrealized nature of 
any transition to a just society.   
My own contention is that the transition to democracy was by and large a failure 
when viewed from above.  But it is precisely this failure that has forced people amassing in 
slums to enact the transition to democracy in their own communities.  As uneven and 
inconsistent as this may be, it is a project that refutes the contention that South Africa’s 
transition never took place.  Rather, it is taking place.  The question is where is it taking 
place?  Rather than seeing democracy as something located at the state-level, democracy 
might be understood as something akin to what French critic and spatial theorist Henri 
Lefebvre termed “autogestion”: the self-government in all realms and at all scales of life.  In 
this vein I would like to use Lefebvre’s concept of autogestion to reflect upon one of the 
post-apartheid movements that has garnered much attention in recent years.  
Autogestion and the Withering Away of the State: The Transition Reconceived 
 
 In their introduction to the collection of essays by Henri Lefebvre entitled State, 
Space, World, Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden reflect on the fact that Lefebvre’s writings on 
the state were largely produced during the height of Fordism in Europe and at the beginning 
of the transition to a post-Fordist society.  Writing 30-40 years later, they ask their readers to 
reflect upon the question of what “a Lefebvre-inspired interpretation of the current round of 
worldwide sociospatial restructuring entail?...And how successfully is Lefebvre’s work able 
to “travel,” to offer insight into the very different geographical regions?” (32).  In this section 
I will gather some preliminary reflections on the relevance of Lefebvre’s thoughts concerning 
the state in post-apartheid South African society. In so doing, I seek to examine the very 
questions Elden and Brenner pose to their readers as a challenge. I hope to reveal the 
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continued relevance of Marxist thought in the 21st century as well as the extent to which 
Lefebvre’s ideas do not simply explain current events but rather serve as a lens through 
which we can uncover social formations that are congealing in our current global conjuncture 
that all too often remain confined to the invisible.  In what follows I will explore not the 
explanation that might seek to retroactively condemn the ANC for selling out the movement, 
but instead one of the most promising political formations that has emerged despite of and 
often in direct opposition to ANC hegemony over the new South African state. 
 Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM), or the shack dwellers, emerged in the city of Durban 
in 2005.  While it is largely confined to the city of Durban and its surrounding districts in the 
east coast state of Kwazulu-Natal, it recently opened an office in the city of Cape Town, and 
is one of the most visible oppositional social movements in the country.  As Raj Patel 
demonstrates (2009), after many years of waiting for basic services to be delivered to their 
slums, the shack dwellers began to give up on the newly elected “liberation” government.  At 
first, they began to appeal to the local ANC government.  Soon, this turned into outright 
protests, demanding attention be brought to their squalid conditions.  Eventually, a coalition 
was formed amongst a number of the various shack-dwelling communities located 
throughout the city in an attempt to formalize and strengthen an otherwise dispersed 
movement for what was seen as basic survival services: water, electricity, and decent 
housing. 
 As local elections approached in 2006, the movement began to realize that the same 
ANC ministers who had been ignoring their demands now approached them for their vote.  
The black poor still comprise one of the ANC’s strongest voting blocks, while the opposition 
Democratic Alliance party is composed disproportionately of whites, coloreds and Indians.  
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The shack dwellers used this dependence upon the black poor against the ANC, and quickly 
inaugurated an abstention campaign under the banner of “No Land, No House, No Vote.” 
While this may be a minor intervention in the larger scheme of things, it is an important one 
nonetheless.  For it shifts the locus of power from state-centered to people-centered.  Without 
the people’s consent and cooperation in the form of the vote, the state’s power, and 
especially the ideological role it serves as stand-in for the people as a whole, begins to stand 
on shaky ground. 
 Three years later, in the fall of 2009, Abahlali would suffer a major attack at the 
hands of paramilitaries under the guidance of the local ANC party (Abahlali 2009).  Many of 
its leaders were arrested on trumped up charges, while numerous shacks were completely 
destroyed.  The community center the movement had managed to open was shut down by 
force, and many of its members were forcibly relocated.  At issue was both the growing 
effectiveness of the organization in organizing voter abstention campaigns, and also the 
refusal of the members to be re-located to a distant area so that land speculators could begin 
to make money off the land they were occupying.  In State, Space, World, Lefebvre’s 
otherwise fragmented notes on the production of social space now begin to capture these 
tensions that emerge in the city as it transitions from Fordism to Post-Fordism:  
From the space of productive labor to the global production and management of 
space.  Conflict between the production of a rationalized space by the State 
(regulator) and the production of space by “private” capitalism and institutions that 
escape the control of the center (localities, regions, peripheries). Conflicts between 
so-called productive investment and so-called social investment (the framework of 
life, etc.) The State and urban problems.  Conflicts between integration and 
segregation. Integration and disintegration. Disintegration. Social relations. Violence 
and fear (117). 
 
More recently, Abahlali has moved steadily along a trajectory that began with a 
politics of opposition, transitioned to a politics of confrontation while withholding 
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participation, and has ultimately become what they call a “living politics.” Their “living 
politics” is one that is not defined by the terms laid out by the state for its citizen-subjects, 
but rather seeks to produce its own platform for doing politics.  This is a platform that moves 
slowly away from mere appeals to the state and towards an ethos of self-organization.  This 
living politics of Abahlali organizing has emphasized the establishment of their own 
university, community gardens, day-care centers, sewing cooperatives, soccer tournaments 
and the organizing of cultural gatherings around dance and music. It is a politics that is 
extremely in-line with the self-organization celebrated by Lefebvre in his attempts to theorize 
autogestion as an affirmative project designed to bring about the withering away of the state 
(Kirsch 2012).  
Lefebvre states:  
Autogestion, far from being established once and for all, is itself the site and the stake 
of struggle…Each time a social group refuses to accept passively its conditions of 
existence, of life, or of survival, each time such a group forces itself not only to 
understand but to master its own conditions of existence, autogestion is 
occurring…This definition also includes all aspects of social life; it implies the 
strengthening of all associative ties…This theoretical definition points toward a 
practical struggle that is always reborn with failures and setbacks..  Above all, this 
definition points to the fundamentally antistatist tendency of autogestion, the only 
efficient and active form of the famous “counterpowers.”…The democratic nature of 
a State or any other apparatus can be evaluated in terms of its capacity to avoid 
snuffing out contradictions by restrictions or by formalism; it should not only allow 
their expression and allow them to take shape but should also directly provoke them.  
This does not happen without real struggles.  Autogestion must continually be 
enacted.  The same is true of democracy, which is never a “condition” but a struggle 
(SSW 134-135). 
  
It is precisely this understanding of self-organization as the primary form of 
Abahlali’s “living politics” that is being emphasized in their writings and actions.  A 
delegation of shack dwellers was invited to attend the Social Urban Forum in Rio de Janeiro 
in March 2010.  The forum was organized as an alternative venue for urban social 
 
 
 42 
movements to gather and discuss their visions for a just city, while government delegates and 
international NGO participants were gathered at the same time in Rio for the World Urban 
Forum organized by the United Nations.  In preparation for this meeting, the shack dwellers 
issued a statement called “The High Cost of the Right to the City.”  The statement warns 
forum attendees of the many attempts governments will make to incorporate them into local 
government systems.   
Some of the ways that the militant slogan of the ‘right to the city’ can get taken and 
tamed are when:  
- it can be reduced to a ‘technical’ issue of working out how the state system can 
‘deliver’ services and amenities to the people’ 
- it can be turned into a legalistic issue of ‘human rights’ fought over in the courts of 
law between lawyers; 
- it presents the only possible solutions in terms of ‘participation’ in good 
governance’ as defined by the power-players in the system of the state and the 
political parties.  
In our own struggles as Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) we have taken up all of these 
avenues and issues to fight for justice for shack-dwellers—but our living politics and 
our total struggle does not start and end in these limited definitions and confined 
spaces. (2010) 
 
 This framework for doing politics is one that exceeds the highly technocratic project 
of better service delivery, and instead emphasizes democracy and dignity as the central 
concepts of movement mobilization. While careful not to be dismissive of such avenues for 
politics, it directly critiques the models and language of “good governance” as potentially 
disempowering of already existing decision-making structures at the community level. In a 
statement strikingly similar to Lefebvre’s own statements on self-management as well as his 
critiques of urban planners, the movement proclaims that:  
There is really no such thing as a 'right' that can be given to you by a government or 
NGO. As the poor we have to organise ourselves to increase our power and to 
decrease the power of the rich and the politicians. The only way to succeed in making 
the right to the city a living reality for everyone instead of a slogan which repressive 
governments can hide behind is to democratise our cities from below (2010). 
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And yet, in its daily functioning and in the campaigns it has adopted, Abahlali clearly does 
not adhere to any purist model of politics that would refuse any interaction with institutions 
of the state. One of their most effective campaign strategies has entailed legal struggles in the 
courts. They have tried to uphold aspects of the country’s constitution when confronted with 
the municipality’s plans to demolish their homes in a shack eradication campaign.  At other 
times the movement has sought out meetings with local councilors and officials within the 
municipality in order to have their voice represented and to attempt an implementation of 
more democratic modes of local government and community development.  Thus, what 
emerged from my investigation of Abahlali’s diverse campaign strategies and movement 
orientations is an appreciation of their ability to simultaneously apply a mixture of internally 
oriented democratic practices and institutions with externally directed platforms to hold the 
state accountable for its developmental responsibilities, broadly conceived here as the 
provision of housing, electricity, water and sanitation to the country’s most marginalized 
residents.   
Transitions, Rebellions, Democracies 
 Reconceptualized through the language of transition, Abahlali’s internal democratic 
practices and their organizational autonomy arguably constitute a better model of the 
“transition” to democracy than the political rights enshrined in the written post-apartheid 
constitution, or the new hegemonic force of a democratically elected ANC government.  As 
Michael Hardt argues in his engagement with Thomas Jefferson’s work from a different 
moment of historical transition to democracy, “A transition ruled by a hegemonic figure does 
not teach people anything about self-rule; it only reinforces their habits of subservience and 
passivity.  People only learn democracy by doing it” (2007: xx).  Writing twenty years after 
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the end of apartheid in 1994 and the country’s first democratic election, we might find useful 
a return to Jefferson’s thoughts on the relationship between transition, rebellion and 
democracy. Rather than emphasize any formally enshrined laws or electoral system as 
representative of democracy, Jefferson placed faith in the assembly of everyday people as 
constituting a living democracy.  For this reason he argued that periodic rebellion was 
required to throw out the old and bring in the new.  Every constitution, he stated, required a 
revolutionary upheaval at nineteen-year intervals.  “No society can make a perpetual 
constitution, or even a perpetual law.  The earth belongs always to the living 
generation…Every constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years.  
If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force and not of right” (Jefferson 2007: 56-57).  In 
Hardt’s reading,  
He provocatively brings together, on the one hand, constitution and rebellion and, on 
the other, transition and democracy.  In other words, for Jefferson the work of the 
revolution must continue incessantly, periodically reopening the constituent process, 
and the population must be trained in democracy through the practices of 
democracy…Jefferson insists on the virtue and necessity of periodic rebellion—even 
against the newly formed government.  The processes of constituent power, he says, 
must continually disrupt and force open an establishment of constituted power (2007: 
xii). 
  
 This introduction has sought to identify, in broad strokes, the general limitations and 
positive platforms for organizing provided to us in some of the recent and most visible social 
movements and their corresponding theorizations.  The woes of the post-apartheid moment in 
South Africa have generated an incredibly diverse and productive debate regarding 
contemporary capitalism in the periphery.  This debate has been helpful for identifying the 
multiple challenges facing those sectors of the population that are still seeking a more just 
society.  The next chapter therefore takes the opportunity of situating Abahlali and South 
African struggles within a global conjuncture of struggle that has defined much of the past 
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few years, particularly since the 2011 birth of the Arab Spring and the corresponding 
uprisings it inspired.  We then turn our attention to the realm that lies “above” movements: 
the state.  Through an examination of the local municipal government’s shifting position with 
regards to informal housing communities in Durban, we will explore the extent to which the 
ANC has really transitioned from a neoliberal first transition to a developmental logic of 
governance in the second South African transition, and what the potential benefits will be for 
the most marginalized sectors of the city.  The dissertation closes with an exploration of 
precarity from a South African vantage point by deploying the murder of Abahlali activist 
Nkululeko Gwala as a window into broader debates regarding surplus populations and 
spontaneity.  A uniting theme throughout the chapters is the articulation between post-
apartheid developmental neoliberalism and processes of racialization that are spatialized in 
dramatic fashion in the particular site of the slum, but which I argue remain thoroughly 
underexplored.      
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CHAPTER 2 
UPRISING: SOUTH AFRICAN AND GLOBAL STRUGGLES                         
BEYOND THE VERTICAL TOPOGRAPHY OF POWER 
 
 When Nelson Mandela stepped down from office in 1999 after one term in power, he 
bequeathed South Africans a nation rife with division.  For all the talk about healing, 
reconciliation and truth telling, the country remained extremely fractured. One in four people 
searching for work remained unemployed, inequality skyrocketed throughout the 1990s, and 
the HIV/AIDS crisis was at its peak.  Despite governing for only five brief years since the 
first democratic elections in the country, the public image of the African National Congress 
was already showing signs of vulnerability.   
 Much energy has been spent examining the extent to which Mandela himself, or the 
ANC as a whole, should be blamed for the shortcomings of post-apartheid liberation.  
Against such arguments, detractors posit the global dominance of neoliberal institutions like 
the World Bank, the Washington Consensus, and the threat of white capital flight as 
collectively backing Mandela and the ANC into a corner where the Thatcherite slogan that 
‘there is no alternative’ truly became a reality.  These debates, however, are largely confined 
to the period of South Africa’s “first transition”.  The first transition occurred, strictly 
speaking, from 1990-1994, in the interregnum between the demise of apartheid, the 
legalization of anti-apartheid organizations, and the first democratic elections in 1994.  More 
broadly conceived, the first transition also encompasses the initial five years of Mandela’s 
presidency, during which the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, headed by Bishop 
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Desmond Tutu, sought to forever put to rest the scars of an apartheid past in an effort to 
announce the birth of a properly “rainbow nation”.  These were also the years of major shifts 
in ANC economic policy, from the 1994 neo-Keynesian Reconstruction and Development 
Program (RDP) to the neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy of 
1996 that would come to be characterized as erasing many of the liberatory promises the 
ANC had attached itself to historically.  My study, in contrast, focuses on the period being 
termed South Africa’s “second transition,” and it is most predominantly characterized by the 
emergence of a new round of social upheaval since 1999.  Beginning with the formation of 
the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in 1998, new social movements began to challenge 
the ruling party’s legitimacy, indirectly and directly.  From 1999 until 2004, the country 
witnessed a renewal of popular protest, much of it organized through the formal channel of 
organizations drawing upon the legacy of the anti-apartheid movement.  These groups 
denounced the new government for failing to realize many of the original struggle objectives. 
 The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) highlighted the plight of people infected 
with HIV/AIDS who were struggling to survive in a society weakened by the monopoly 
powers of pharmaceutical industry and plagued by official state denial of the disease.  The 
movement sought broad anti-retroviral treatment access, and deployed mass civil 
disobedience as a means of publicizing the plight of their constituency. It was also careful to 
highlight the new but unrealized rights enshrined in the post-apartheid state’s progressive 
constitution (Mbali 2005).  Soon after, the Anti-Privatization Forum formed in 2000 in 
Johannesburg as a collective attempt at critiquing the negative effects of the ANC’s 
neoliberalization (Naidoo and Veriava 2004).  Towards the end of that same year, the Anti-
Eviction Campaign was founded in Cape Town in an effort to prevent evictions and service 
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disconnection in the city’s poorest communities (Oldfield 2006). The Landless People’s 
Movement followed suit in 2001, placing the unfulfilled demand for land reform back on the 
table by highlighting the plight of rural and peri-urban landless communities, something the 
group saw as potentially bridging the rural-urban divide (Alexander 2006).  While the TAC 
attempted to walk the fine line of being ‘within and against’, refusing to break officially with 
the ruling party, the other movements all took strong stances against the ANC and most other 
political parties.  A common uniting slogan became “No Land, No House, No Vote,” and 
symbolized the emergence of a significant block of organized poor people’s movements 
operating primarily outside the bounds of electoral politics. These groups combined to fill the 
vacuum left in oppositional politics by the labor movement’s (COSATU’s) decision to enter 
into an official alliance with the ANC as a part of the tri-partite governing parties, alongside 
the South African Communist Party (SACP). 
 Collectively, these groups highlighted the ‘pitfalls of national liberation’ by situating 
their critique of the post-apartheid state within a broader conjuncture defined by the 
prerogatives of homo-economicus (Read 2009).  The precise political make-up of the 
movements varied from insider-today, outsider-tomorrow status in relation to the ANC, ex-
SACP activists purged from the party for Trotskyist tendencies, to Pan-Africanist and Black 
Consciousness-inspired organizers and even those who were not active historically but 
became politicized by the disappointments of post-apartheid democracy.  How to categorize 
these new political formations became a matter of important debate, but the most common 
consensus emerged around the idea that they represented a combination of new formations 
that continued to draw from older traditions of struggle. “Although these movements are 
‘new’ in the sense that they have emerged in response to the ANC post-apartheid 
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government, they also trace a lineage to the militant township ‘civics’ who have pitted some 
of the most sustained and active movements against late apartheid regimes/policies” (Gibson 
2006: 4).  The political visions that undergirded the stakes of the struggle, however, remained 
highly contested.  Some believed they could be most successful by pushing the boundaries of 
liberalism in deploying rights-based approaches to address inequality and injustice (Robins 
2008).  Others thought that the movements collectively represented a shift to a political 
terrain beyond the state-civil society framework (Neocosmos 2006).  By 2004, however, the 
majority of these groups already faced a crisis of durability, and experienced a slow decline 
in membership and effectiveness.  The reasons for the ebb and flow of movement activism 
are varied (Pithouse 2013).   
 Despite the relative decline of these initial post-apartheid social movements, popular 
unrest throughout the country has anything but subsided.  The continued boom in protest—
albeit largely outside the confines of many formal groups with a name, decision-making 
body, and organizational platform—has led sociologist Peter Alexander to term this second 
period of post-apartheid unrest unfolding since 2004 “a massive rebellion of the poor” (2010, 
2012).  The debate over the past decade has thus revealed a series of important questions 
regarding the supposedly insufficiently radical content of the movements (Sinwell 2010), 
their inability to scale up to the national level (Bond and Mottiar 2013) versus the primacy of 
the local as a universal but often-times fleeting grounds from which all struggles spring 
(Pithouse 2011), and the necessity for bridging social movement and labor union struggles 
(Friedman 2012, Naidoo and Veriava 2004).  Important though these debates have been, too 
often missing is a wider conceptualization of South African struggles within a global 
conjuncture.  While much productive work has taken the first round of post-apartheid 
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struggles’ highlighting of neoliberalism as a productive platform to critique what the 
movements are fighting against on a global scale, less work has been done to compare the 
internal dynamics of movements at a similarly global scale.1 
 Such a project has become all the more important since 2011 with the emergence of 
the Arab Uprisings, Occupy Wall Street, European anti-austerity movements and other 
similar struggles.  A blossoming of movements (and their corresponding repression) has 
characterized much of the global conjuncture over the past years.  This context begs for a 
comparison with the specificities of the South African conjuncture.  My approach therefore 
takes a cue from the work of James Ferguson, who argued that “the assessment of the 
political situation in Africa must move beyond the state-centered framework entirely” (2006: 
86).  While the relationship between movement and state remains important, an excessive 
focus on these dynamics can occlude other aspects of movements operating at a variety of 
scales. Echoing the recent work of Richard Pithouse (2013), Ferguson continues: “Indeed, 
many of the most important political processes on the continent are occurring, as I have 
suggested, at subnational and transnational levels.  The local institutions and grassroots social 
movements referred to earlier must be taken seriously and understood not as regression or 
throwbacks, but as potentially formidable political responses to contemporary realities” 
(ibid).  
In an effort to deconstruct the state-civil society binary—and in an analysis that also 
parallels the work of Michael Neocosmos—Ferguson is at pains to deconstruct a “vertical 
                                                
1 This critique should not be taken to mean that South African theorists fail to situate the dynamics of South 
African capitalism within a broader global context.  This has been covered quite well in the work of numerous 
South African scholars, most particularly Patrick Bond.  My argument, rather, is that the conversation around 
South African movements is rarely presented within a broader global conversation of internal movement 
dynamics.  This does not entail merely suggesting that all movements are struggling against a global 
neoliberalism, but rather requires an exploration of the dynamics of class composition within each struggle. 
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topography of power” that he sees as dominant in many contemporary explorations of the 
relationship of Africa to globalization. In such a scalar conception of power, the global 
impacts the national, which in turn determines the local.  “Whether this contact zone is 
conceived as the domain of pressure groups and pluralist politics (as in liberal political 
theory) or of class struggle in a war of position (as in Gramscian Marxism), this imaginary 
topography of power has been an enormously consequential one” (93).  The problem, he 
argues, is that globalization has in fact made power into a much more diffuse relation, in part 
explaining the rise of terms such as “governance” to account for the necessarily diverse, 
networked, and transnational sources of power relations.   
Displacing the vertical topography of power requires new conceptualizations of 
power at different scales of analysis. “What would it mean to rethink this?  What if we 
question the self-evident ‘verticality’ of the relation of state to society, displace the primacy 
of the nation-state frame of analysis, and rearrange the imaginary space within which civil 
society can be so automatically ‘interposed between’ higher and lower levels? As we will 
see, such a move entails rethinking ‘the state’ and looking at transnational apparatuses of 
governmentality” (ibid).  And yet, very little of such comparative work is drawn out in 
Ferguson’s own study.  Instead, his most prominent example of a movement situated in a 
horizontal network of power is the South African civics movement.  Unfortunately, this 
analysis is extremely outdated for a book purporting to examine twenty-first century 
globalized Africa.  The oppositional nature of the civics movement was essentially captured 
by the ruling African National Congress after the end of apartheid, making it a far cry from 
what Ferguson claims is “today a major player on the national scene and serves as an 
independent advocate for worker and township interests” (105).  The other example Ferguson 
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points to of a transnational social movement is the Zapatista struggle in southern Mexico.  
This is certainly a more apt expression of networked global struggles. “Like the South 
African civics described by Mayekiso, the Zapatistas present us not with authentic others 
fighting for a nostalgic past, but with media-savy, well-connected contemporaries finding 
allies horizontally, flexibly, even opportunistically, but effectively” (108).  While this is 
certainly true, Ferguson’s reading of the Zapatista movement remains shallow, and his single 
source for the study is a Los Angeles Times article.   
Additionally, Ferguson believes that his deconstruction of the vertical topography of 
power can add something to movement struggles that is currently lacking.  “It is possible, 
too, that a better understanding of these movements will contribute to the crucial tactical goal 
of forging links and alliances among them, suggesting a beginning to a real alternative form 
of ‘governance’ (87).”  While this should undoubtedly be one goal of intellectual reflection 
on movements, it should not take the place of actual dialogue between movements 
themselves.  Ferguson’s analysis thus risks occluding the fact that South African struggles 
such as the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and Abahlali baseMjondolo have 
consistently situated themselves as intervening in part within a necessarily global scale of 
struggle, reading about struggles around the world, welcoming activists to the country, and 
traveling abroad to gatherings in Latin America, the United States, Europe, and the rest of the 
African continent. The transnational context of South African movements became 
immediately apparent to me in my own discussions with activists who have played an active 
role in the past decade-plus of movement mobilization within these organizations (Interview 
Ashraf Cassiem June 2011; Interview S’bu Zikode August 2013).  Both Cassiem and Zikode 
cite models such as the Argentinean Unemployed Workers Movement and Popular 
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Neighborhood Assemblies, Brazil’s Landless Movement (MST), and the Zapatistas of 
Mexico as struggles they have been in constant dialogue with, whether indirectly or directly. 
The overlaps in experience between South Africa and many other parts of the world is rightly 
identified by Gillian Hart in her most recent study of the ongoing post-apartheid crisis.   
South Africa is an extreme but far from exceptional embodiment of forces at play in 
many regions of the world: (1) massive concentrations of wealth alongside the 
mushrooming of ‘wageless life’ (or what an administrator of the Bundesbank calls 
‘populations with no productive function’; (2) oppositional politics that are assuming 
a multiplicity of forms: the Tea Party in the United States (US), explosive Hindu 
nationalism in India, widespread anti-Muslim and xenophobic sentiments in much of 
Euro-America, the re-emergence of fascism in Austria and other parts of Europe on 
the one hand—and, on the other, the uprisings in the Arab world, the Occupy 
movement and the anti-austerity movements in Greece, Italy and Spain; and (3) 
official efforts at containment ranging from liberal biopolitical interventions targeting 
specific populations (often in the name of security) to increasingly common police 
brutality and rampant militarism (2014: 5). 
 
South African struggles also have a lot to offer the broader global conjuncture of 
upheaval, unfurling since 2011, in that many of the problems these movements have revealed 
have arguably been prefigured in South Africa over the past 15 years2.  A comparative 
analysis of uprisings can therefore illuminate aspects of the global conjuncture that are 
common across specific contexts, while creating a dialogue between movements that might 
help to decenter and de-fetishize the state in the manner that Ferguson encourages.  In 
exploring the particular dynamics of uprisings such as the Arab Spring, European anti-
                                                
2 Legassick argues that all the internal conflicts within South African movements have arisen due to struggles 
over organizational finances.  This is clearly an important factor in the various splits that have occurred within 
different groups with access to meager resources, governed by poor people who are often forced to chose 
between providing for their immediate subsistence needs and continuing to struggle for a broader cause.  Every 
conflict that I’ve seen in social movements I think has been over finance and over the people responsible for 
handling the finance being accused of misusing it.  And that was the case earlier in the AEC when I was first 
involved in 2000-2003, there was a guy called Peter something who was accused, then it was Ashraf, then it 
was Mzonke who ran off with the container which War on Want paid for.  I don’t think War on Want has 
handled the AEC situation well because it has kind of forced Ashraf and the rest of them back together again. 
I’ve lost contact with the Anti-eviction movement since last year, so I don’t know what’s happening now, but 
they’re not very visible, I suspect they’re paralyzed, maybe I’m wrong, but anyway, it’s finances that are a 
cause of these splits” (Interview June 25, 2013).  In what follows in this chapter, however, I chose to focus on 
the fracturing theme of racialization as an underexplored element contributing to the demise of many of the 
most visible global movements. 
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austerity struggles, and Occupy Wall Street, I argue that the common theme of race emerges 
as a divisive factor contributing to the decomposition of many of the most recent uprisings.  
As a paradigmatic site of racial divisions, South Africa, both historically and in the 
purportedly ‘post-apartheid’ present, offers a useful comparison to explore a central but too 
often ignored element of neoliberal rule in the “threat of race”.  The persistence of 
xenophobic attacks against African migrants is explored through a racialized lens of anti-
Blackness, alongside the response of Abahlali baseMjondolo to the threat of violence against 
those deemed as racially and nationally Other in the shack communities of South Africa.  
Neoliberalism and the Global Threat of Race 
This is why every attempt to defend the rights and liberties of the latest victims of 
state repression will fail to make substantial gains insofar as it forfeits or sidelines the 
fate of blacks, the prototypical targets of the panoply of police practices and the 
juridical infrastructure built up around them.  Without blacks on board, the only 
viable political option and the only effective defense against the intensifying cross 
fire will involve greater alliance with an antiblack civil society and further 
capitulation to the magnification of state power (Sexton 2010: 48). 
 
 In his attempt at grappling with the confluence of racism and neoliberalism, The 
Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism, David Theo Goldberg outlines three 
periods of anti-racist struggle since the advent of modern racism.  The first period began with 
the momentous—but now conveniently forgotten—event of the Haitian Revolution, and gave 
rise to the abolitionist movement of the nineteenth century.  The struggle to overcome 
slavery thus remained primary in this initial period of anti-racist struggle.  The second period 
was defined by anti-colonialism in the former colonies and the civil rights movement in the 
United States, and lasted approximately from the 1920s to the 1960s.  The final period of 
anti-racist struggle, according to Goldberg, was led by the demands of the anti-apartheid 
movement in South Africa, and gave birth to multicultural initiatives in Europe and the 
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United States.  This period lasted from the 1970s until the 1990s.  The above periodization 
begs an obvious question: what defines the anti-racist struggles of our contemporary 
moment?  Is there such a struggle, and if so, what are its parameters?  If not, what are the 
consequences of the marginalization of anti-racism as a mobilizing framework? 
 One clue to these questions can be found in the strengths and weaknesses of 
Goldberg’s own analysis.  On the one hand, he is careful to point out how the anti-colonial 
struggles in the second phase of anti-racist movement gave way to the rise of the postcolony.  
“In the worst cases, these are withering, debilitating, and abandoned spaces rather than 
conditions promoting economic independence, demographic upliftment, and the promise of 
human flourishing” (16).  The uneven geography of global racism is therefore upheld in the 
contemporary moment by the failure of such spaces to significantly transform the conditions 
of their oppression.  On the other hand, by framing the anti-apartheid activism as parallel to 
an equally important rise of multiculturalism in the third phase of anti-racist struggle, 
Goldberg remains blind to the ways in which multiculturalism in fact has operated primarily 
as an instrument of colorblindness.  After celebrating its achievements, however, he does 
recognize the potential dangers lurking behind the appealing sound of multiculturalism. “In 
the worst cases, though, multiculturalism has served as a form of appeasement for those 
increasingly left behind as well as convenient public relations and advertising modalities for 
corporate interests” (17).   
 This last point is crucial for our attempt to grapple with the persistence of racism as 
one of the paradigmatic framing devices through which a neoliberalism undergirded by a 
form of biopower that continues to articulate with, rather than displace, sovereign power, is 
able to separate those who should live from those who must die.  In Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s 
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formulation, “racism is a practice of abstraction, a death-dealing displacement of difference 
into hierarchies that organize relations within and between the planet’s sovereign political 
territories” (2002: 16).  The ability of racism to persist beyond each sequence of anti-racist 
struggle Goldberg explains by the fact that “in the wake of each of these broad antiracism 
social, political, economic, and legal mobilizations, antiracism gave way to the dominant 
trend of antiracialism” (19).  Antiracialism—in contrast to antiracism—is structured around 
the desire to eliminate race as an analytical category of meaningful analysis. By refusing to 
engage in the process of racial categorization, antiracialism portends to continue the struggle 
of antiracism.  But it does so in a manner that prevents the deployment of any racial 
categories, for fear of reifying and bringing to life something that has no biological merit.   
 Perhaps a worthy goal, it is at best an unrealistic program in a world where the 
realities of racially coded differences that are never divested from specific hierarchies of 
power clearly persist.  As Gilmore explains, “If race has no essence, racism does.  Racism is 
singular because, whatever its place-based particularities, its practitioners exploit and renew 
fatal power-difference couplings” (16).  Thinking against Paul Gilroy’s own attempt to think 
Against Race in the twenty-first century, Grant Farred argues “The desire to think beyond 
race is, however, a double-edged sword.  It marks the ambivalent process of mobilizing 
against racism and yet working within—and against—established racial categories.  Race, 
and racism, is, for this very reason, not only dialectical, it is epistemologically foundational. 
It constitutes the very architecture within which the debate about race takes place: race 
cannot be transcended” (2004: 51).  The celebration of multiculturalism by Goldberg, 
therefore verges on gutting his own critical project of one of its most powerful theses: “While 
curiosity and exploitability have lingered throughout the histories of racial extension and 
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remain resonant variously within racial reference and mobilization today, it is threat that has 
assumed overriding contemporary significance in racial matters, absorbing the other two 
largely into its orbit…Threat undercuts the possibility of…mediation, delimiting engagement 
to the violence of incarceration or the instrumentalities of incapacitation” (29, my emphasis).   
 The movements that have defined our global conjuncture since at least 2011 have 
arguably failed to grapple with this persistence of the threat of race, a constitutive feature of 
the otherwise commonly recognized neoliberal assault.  As a result, many of the struggles 
that emerged in recent years suffered significant setbacks in the course of their evolution.  
Others were easily hijacked by conservative forces deploying racism as a divisive, 
diversionary tool used to bring about a return to the status quo. 
Occupy: 99% or the White Middle Class? 
So I live in Roxbury, a little bit over that way. And we have a lot of issues, in our 
community that face black, Latino and Cape Verdean people of Roxburry, 
Dorchester-Mattapan.  We respect the movement that you’ve done, and so far are in 
agreement with much of what you have to say.  But I’d like to ask a question to the 
crowd.  Is this movement, a movement for white people?  Some of you may know, 51 
people have been murdered this year, much of which has been happening within a 
two-mile radius from which I live…I want to talk to you a little bit about the banks.  
Bank of America, right around the corner.  Many people know about Bank of 
America.  How many people know about the slave trading and Bank of America’s 
involvement and being named in a reparations law-suit, because the Bank of America 
was one of the banks that directly profited from the slave trade, the trade of my 
people…I want to expand a little bit about some of the issues this group is talking 
about…if you look at any of the unemployment rates for white people, it’s double 
that for black people…Why I come here today, because normally I organize in my 
community, I wouldn’t attend an event like this.  I wouldn’t come and address a 
group of people that I see, the majority, don’t look like me, may not share some of my 
personal concerns.  I made it a point to come down here to address these issues with 
you, and encourage you to not only occupy this space, but to occupy other spaces. 
And one of the reasons that the black movement of working class and poor people has 
not linked with the movement of white working class and poor people is that often, as 
black people I can say, we don’t think that white people give a damn about what 
we’re going through…so I say that what you went through the other night, I give you 
kudos for that, but I’m telling you it’s a drop in the bucket compared to what my 
people have been dealing with in this country for far too long…Help us clean up the 
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hood, help us bring attention and energy to the issues that have been long ignored, 
because when we talk about this 99%, I will submit, that no people have suffered in 
this country like my people. When I say my people, I mean all people of color 
(Jamarhl Crawford, speech at Occupy Boston, October 12, 2011). 
    
 When the Occupy Wall Street movement emerged in late 2011, its division of the 
United States into an elite 1% and an exploited 99% was celebrated as a powerful framing 
device.  The idea of a ruling 1% seemed to capture the general disgruntlement with a 
financial sector that managed to continue turning profits at a time when many ordinary 
businesses were forced to close their doors.  Thousands of people posted ‘selfies’ online 
while holding a sign that read “I am the 99%” followed by a brief description of personal 
battles with school debt, exorbitant health care bills, or unemployment.  The commonality of 
this exploited 99% seemed undeniable in the face of bankers who controlled both the 
economy and the political system.  But very quickly the monolithic nature of the 99% began 
to run aground as divisions emerged both within the occupy encampments and between those 
identifying as occupiers and those who never joined the movement but were subject to an 
extra-economic violence arguably more threatening than debt and unemployment. 
 Perhaps the most important division that emerged within the Occupy movement was 
posited as that between ‘legitimate’ Occupiers and those deemed ‘illegitimate’.  In camps 
from Zucotti to Los Angeles, middle class suburban families and college students carved out 
a space for legitimate concerns to be expressed, while confining the homeless, drug addicts, 
and other urban vagabonds attracted to occupy for a variety of reasons to a supposedly 
illegitimate encampment, spatially siphoned off from the ‘real occupiers’. Zucotti occupier 
Craig Hughes brought together his concerns about this division within occupy in a pamphlet 
entitled “Occupy Zucotti: Social Struggle and Planned Shrinkage.”  In November 2011 he 
expressed his disgruntlement about a growing trend.   
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Stories abound from and about homeless youth at the park about being policed and 
marginalized by some working group participants and protest gatekeepers who 
presume the intentions of others present.  Some vocal activists have argued that 
dealing with issues of poverty in the park have sidetracked all other work.  Some have 
made unfortunate comments about poor and homeless people—arguments conflating 
homelessness with ‘substance abuse,’ and ‘substance abuse’ and homelessness with 
morally reprehensible behaviors; arguments conflating ‘mental health issues’ with 
disruption and violence’; arguments implying that formerly incarcerated people and 
the homeless are problems to be dealt with instead of comrades and allies, or potential 
comrades and allies.  Some organizers have strategized ways to cut service provision 
in the park in order to disperse poor people (2012: 4-5). 
 
While class was clearly a dividing line along which this fracture within the Occupy 99% 
began to grow, race was an equally obvious framing for distinguishing the legitimate activists 
from those who were deemed to be the source of additional problems.  “That most of those 
being blamed are people of color and many of those doing the blaming are white is an 
obvious fact that points to just a couple of the numerous ways that racism and white privilege 
are evincing themselves” (7).  Even more striking than this division within Occupy itself is 
Hughes’ conclusion based on participant observation that this dynamic revealed an 
underlying and defining similarity between Occupy and the right-wing Tea Party movement.  
Both were largely middle class white movements, disenchanted with the fact that 
neoliberalism, an ideology of self-help that neither group initially disagreed with, had failed 
to deliver the goods despite their hard work.  “Much of the struggle at Zucotti Park and 
similar protests elsewhere is about not becoming ‘the poor’ and decisively not about ending 
poverty.  Like the Tea Party, much of this movement is about not loosing the relative 
privilege that some have and not about ending that privilege all together” (21). 
 Occupiers were soon met with force by local police departments, carrying out a 
coordinated intimidation campaign to reclaim occupied space from the public.  Horror stories 
flashed across every major cable channel of police pepper spraying innocent occupiers in 
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Zucotti and student occupiers in Los Angeles.  The image of a swat team sent to evict occupy 
activists in Chapel Hill, North Carolina quickly went viral, as citizens were shocked to see 
innocent looking white youth forced to the ground with military grade weapons pointed at 
their skulls.  And yet, the justified outrage expressed in the face of such police repression 
also revealed a relative silence in the face of ongoing, mundane violence the police commit 
on a more regular basis against poor communities of color throughout the country.  In a rare 
moment of truth telling on cable news, MSNBC hose Lawrence O’Donnell captured the 
systemic nature of such police violence in a commentary responding to an early incident of 
unjustified police repression of Occupy Zucotti protesters.   
This weekend, a few troublemakers turned a peaceful protest against wall street greed 
into a violent burst of chaos.  The trouble-makers carried pepper spray and guns and 
were wearing badges… Every day in America police are too tough, every day in 
America police cross the line and abuse citizens...Every day in America police get 
away with that.  White America was shocked at what they saw police doing to 
Rodney King.  Black America would have loved to have been shocked by what they 
saw police do to Rodney King but Black America only could have been shocked if 
what the police did to Rodney King was something completely alien to their 
experience, was something they couldn’t imagine doing to their community.  There’s 
a Rodney King every day in this country, and Black America has always known that 
(2011).  
 
Sure enough, one week before the incident of police brutality that triggered O’Donnell’s 
tirade, the state of Georgia had executed Trayvon Davis.  Davis was an African American 
man convicted of a crime that he arguably did not commit.  His defense argued that seven of 
the original nine witnesses who testified against him in 1989 had since altered or recanted 
their testimony.  Despite this, Davis was put to death.  Five months later in a suburb of 
Sanford, Florida, African American teenager Trayvon Martin was shot dead at the hands of a 
local self-appointed neighborhood watch vigilante, George Zimmerman.  Martin was not in 
the process of occupying Wall Street or protesting the government.  Martin was not even 
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engaged in a defiant act of any kind.  Arguably, Trayvon Martin was shot simply for being a 
black male in the wrong place at the wrong time.  One year later in mid-2013, his killer was 
acquitted of any wrongdoing and allowed to go free.  
 As a preliminary response to the patently divergent experiences of violence and 
death-dealing between predominantly white college students in Occupy and black and brown 
youth within and outside the movement, some occupiers of color attempted to generate a 
critical conversation. In a piece titled “A Critique of the Occupy Movement from a Black 
Occupier,’ Emmahunn Rahim Ali Campbell argued that Occupy had inspired a generation of 
activists to social change, and that such an achievement could not be dismissed so easily.  
However, Campbell continued,  
It is also the case that people of color do not have a space in this movement as it is 
currently oriented.  Despite its horizontal structure and consensus-based actions, it is 
still led by white middle-class youth.  These individuals, whose very social reality as 
white people, allows them close access to institutions of capital and the power that is 
closely associated with these institutions, cannot afford and will be unable to continue 
this movement without a full acknowledgement, critique, and dismantlement of white 
privilege within its ranks.  As it currently exists, the Occupy movement is 
hypocritical in its anti-racist stance (2011: 50). 
 
Despite Occupy’s ability to highlight some of the most glaring detrimental effects of the 
concentrated financial power of the 1%, its inability to link struggles across class and race 
lines proved to be a major weak point.  In this failure, it revealed perhaps the major 
underbelly of radical attempts at social change in the United States over the past century 
since the breaking up of the multi-racial populist movement.  The current age of 
neoliberalism has proven to be no exception to the refusal of movements to grapple seriously 
with the processes of racialization that are constitutive of the very couplings of difference 
and power that Gilmore identifies.  In his own attempt to highlight such issues, geographer 
Clyde Woods was appreciative of much of the mainstream critique of neoliberalism that was 
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in part represented by the Occupy Movement.  “Yet,” he argued, “the scholarship on 
neoliberalism is peculiarly silent on the global significance of the forms of hegemony that 
have been worked out in the United States.  Internal racial regimes can no longer be treated 
as incidental to global processes” (2007: 48).  A side-stepping of the centrality of “the threat 
of race” in the contemporary neoliberal moment has arguably weakened the attempt to create 
a new society, and foreclosed the opportunities for encounter between otherwise segregated 
communities that the occupation of public space by Occupy activists presented briefly. 
“Ignoring the transformation of regional and racial regimes allows proponents and critics of 
neo-liberalism to also freely ignore their own complicity in a wide variety of domestic racial 
projects that undermine democratic institutions and constituencies: massive social spending 
cuts, segregated education, welfare reform, gentrification, the prison-industrial complex, 
employment discrimination, and electoral disenfranchisement, among others” (ibid). 
Europe: From Anti-Austerity to Migrant Menace 
With utter uniformity, riots by the popular youth in the ‘suburbs’ (the banlieues—a 
word which, like faubourgs in the past, refers to the huge working-class and poor 
areas of our spruce towns and cities, the dark continent of our megalopolises) are 
provoked by the actions of the police.  The spark that ‘lights a prairie fire’ is always a 
state murder.  Just as uniformly, the government and its police not only categorically 
refuse to accept the slightest responsibility for the whole affair, but use the riot as a 
pretext for reinforcing the arsenal of the police and criminal justice system.  As a 
result of this view of things, the banlieues are spaces where one finds juxtaposed a 
contemptuous lack of interest in such hopeless zones on the part of the public 
authorities and heavy, violent, repressive incursions.  All this on the model of ‘native 
quarters’ in colonial cities, black ghettos in the American belle époque, or Palestinian 
reservations on the West Bank (Badiou 2012: 18). 
 
The state is an extraordinary machine for manufacturing the inexistent—through 
death (the history of states is essentially a history of massacres), but not exclusively 
so.  The state is capable of manufacturing the inexistent by imposing a figure of 
identitarian normality, ‘national’ or otherwise.  Now, especially in Europe, this issue 
of identity has become an obsession.  A sort of cultural racism, which in fact conveys 
the fear of the ‘middle classes’—querulous profiteers from the imperial dynamic—of 
being reduced to the inferior status of ‘people from the banlieues’, poisons the 
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situation and even ends up clouding the minds of once admirable and courageous 
intellectuals (Badiou 2012: 71). 
 
 The global ramifications of a necessarily racialized neoliberalism were similarly 
highlighted in the wake of European anti-austerity struggles that evolved coeval with the 
Occupy movement and were equally inspired by the precedent of the Arab uprisings. An 
initial round of impressive square occupations—most prominent in Spain and Greece—
articulated with a denunciation of the entirety of the political class. Many of the ‘indignados’ 
in Spain decided to boycott elections as an unviable solution to the profundity of the 
economic and political crisis they faced.  In Hardt and Negri’s analysis, this represented a 
deep desire for greater democracy, something the established political institutions could no 
longer offer. “So many of the movements of 2011 direct their critiques against political 
structures and forms of representation, then, because they recognize clearly that 
representation, even when it is effective, blocks democracy rather than fosters it.”  (2012: 
29).  And yet the ability of the movements themselves to accurately ‘represent’ or even 
incorporate their respective country’s most marginalized members also proved quite weak. 
 In the wake of electoral defeats in Greece, Italy and Spain, as either right-wing or 
technocratic and supposedly ‘neutral’ governments came to power, the movements faced a 
crisis of faith and began to dwindle in numbers.  Following a decline in numbers, a similar 
discourse emerged demarcating legitimate from illegitimate protestors.  On June 30, 2011 
public sector workers across Britain spearheaded a one-day general strike.  Hundreds of 
thousands of protestors took to the streets in downtown London to voice their concerns about 
the increased austerity measures of the British state, denouncing everything from pension 
cuts to diminishing teacher salaries, spikes in university tuition and the thinning of the 
National Health Service.   While the one-day strike was initially seen as a sign of strength of 
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the movements even in Britain, the government went on to pass austerity measures 
regardless.  Soon thereafter, from August 6 to 11, riots broke out across the country.  The 
immediate impetus for the rioting was the police murder on August 4 of Mark Duggan in 
Tottenham.  Duggan, like Trayvon Martin, was a young black male, targeted by police for 
being armed and dangerous.  Despite conflicting accounts of this narrative, and the state 
changing its story multiple times, an inquest into his killing eventually found no wrong doing 
at the hands of the police. 
 Regardless of the findings, the community response to Duggan’s killing clearly 
revealed an underlying rage amongst communities of color, youth, the unemployed, and 
those with a criminal background—the groups most prominent in the riots—in British cities 
(Trott 2013b: 543).  While rioters attacked indiscriminately, looting stores and burning 
buildings and cars in their own neighborhoods, a few commentators tried to give voice to the 
expressions of rage.  In a live interview on BBC, Darcus Howe, a nephew of the Trinidadian 
Marxist CLR James, was attacked by reporters for having participated in ‘riots’ in the past 
that seemed emblematic of the 2011 riots.  Howe responded by referencing the historical 
parallels in the face of community discontent with structural racism, arguing that these riots 
revealed a desire for justice amongst young communities. “Where were you in 1981 in 
Brixton? I don’t call it rioting, I call it an insurrection of the masses of the people. It is 
happening in Syria, it’s happening in Liverpool, it’s happening in Port of Spain, Trinidad, 
and that is the nature of the historical moment… Have some respect for an old West Indian 
Negro and stop accusing me of being a rioter” (Darcus Howe, on the BBC, 9 August 2011). 
 But British civil society proved largely deaf in the face of such calls for 
understanding the experiences of rioters as part of a broader search for justice.  There were at 
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least three possible politicized understandings of the riots.  The riots could have been read as 
political simply as a response to a specific political context of neoliberalism, a declining 
welfare state and a corresponding rise in racialized containment; they could have been 
understood as political in the sense that rioters became objects of a range of political 
strategies of policing that deployed the full repressive apparatus of the state together with a 
media discourse of supposedly rampant criminalization; or they could have been politicized 
by understanding the protagonists as expressing an underlying political subjectivity, 
attempting to tackle the state head-on while revealing the underlying ethics of a commodified 
society3—loot or be looted (Trott 2013a and Gilroy 2013. For parallel analyses, see Al-
Bulushi 2011, The Invisible Committee 2009, and Guy Debord 1965). None of these 
interpretations could gain much traction in Britain however.  The violence and looting in the 
riots combined to discredit the events and paint them as horrific examples of licentious 
consumerist desires and anarchistic destructive impulses.  This inability to connect the 
political context of the June 30, 2011 general strike with the rioting of youth one month later 
would prove emblematic of the division that emerged in continental movements over the next 
few years.   
 In his attempt to deploy a class analysis of the contemporary global conjuncture of 
movements, Slavoj Zizek draws from Marx’s 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte in order to 
parallel our current moment with that of the failed French movements of 1848.  In this text 
Marx is at his most conjunctural, carefully attuned to the specificities of class formation.  
                                                
3 As Paul Gilroy (2013) argues, “In a post-secular celebrity-obsessed culture that conceives of selfishness as an 
innate virtue, the rioters’ greed and gratification, though undesirable, misplaced, and criminal, were also 
morally insufficient to make them truly deviant.  We can see that their pursuit of gratification is in fact a 
mainstream attitude common to corrupt bankers, expenses-fiddling politicians, and others seeking the addictive 
thrill of acquiring something for nothing”(556).  “1981 & 2011: From Social Democratic to Neoliberal 
Rioting,” South Atlantic Quarterly. Vol. 112, No. 3: 550-558. 
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Understanding 1848 required a reformulation of the traditional economistic class analysis.  
The 1848 movements began with the massacre of the proletariat, and thus the remainder of 
the period concerns a battle over control of the state, and a slow devolution of the republic.  
The bourgeoisie decides to give up its political power to the Bonaparte monarchy in order to 
maintain its economic power.  On the bottom of the social ladder, the peasantry and the 
lumpen proletariat are unable to represent themselves in Marx’s formulation.  This is in part 
due to their spatial dispersion, and in part the product of the fact that neither group can 
constitute a class capable of exerting political power.  Both the peasantry and the lumpen 
proletariat end up siding with Bonaparte because he is able to use the proposal of universal 
suffrage as a platform to win them over against the interests of the bourgeoisie.  In this sense, 
political agents do not always map directly onto economic classes as their adequate 
representers. 
 What might a similar reading look like today?  The first thing that Marx’s text on 
1848 provides us with is a sense of the class struggle as a ‘concrete universality’, according 
to Zizek.  It operates as a concrete universality in the sense of an overdetermination, such that 
the heterogeneity of the class struggle, as Marx in part argues, operates to demonstrate the 
determining nature of class above all other identitarian mediums of struggle such as 
feminism, racism, etc.  The overdetermined nature of class struggle is captured by the fact 
that “a single political agent can represent different social groups; a class can renounce its 
direct representation and leave to another class the task of securing the politico-juridical 
conditions of its rule” (19). 
 The task that faced Bonaparte in 1848 was how to represent the interests of an 
otherwise contradictory amalgamation of antagonistic social forces.  In other words, how can 
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a single actor ever hope to adequately represent in one body the interests of the bourgeoisie, 
the working class, and the peasantry, when it is clear that such interests are necessarily 
antagonistic, constitutive of a class struggle when viewed from the economic relations of 
capitalism?  For Zizek, this is an impossible feat, but one that is often temporarily 
accomplished through the uniting of competing factions around hatred for an Other.  “The 
standard way of disavowing an antagonism and presenting one’s own position as the 
representation of the All is to project the cause of the antagonism onto a foreign intruder who 
stands for the threat to society as such, for the anti-social element, for its excremental excess.  
This is why anti-Semitism…embodies the zero-level (or the pure form) of ideology, 
establishing its elementary coordinates: the social antagonism (‘class struggle’) is mystified 
or displaced so that its cause can be projected onto the external intruder” (23).  One way of 
comprehending the rightward shift in European movements from class struggle to anti-
immigrant paranoia, then, would be to posit it as a contemporary expression of anti-
Semitism.   
 However, today’s anti-Semitism is clearly not targeting Jews, but rather operates on 
the visceral level of phenotype; one must be perceived immediately as racialized Other in 
Europe in order to warrant categorization as enemy of the state.  We are therefore reminded 
of the objection Frantz Fanon makes in the face of Sartre’s attempt to use the experience of 
the Jew as paradigmatic of all forms of racism; for Fanon, the experience of the black man is 
clearly much more adequate because the Jew can escape his Jewishness as he walks down the 
street.  Such an outlet is impossible for those of a darker skin (Fanon 2008).  Thus the 
paradigmatic experience of immigrants in Europe following the initial euphoria of the 2011 
anti-austerity protests became one of walking the streets in fear of being identified.  Like the 
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post-9/11 slogan deployed in the New York City Subway and throughout the airports of the 
United States, Europeans were encouraged to be vigilant: “if you see something, say 
something.”  Zizek recounts this experience vividly: 
Imagine a scene from a dystopian movie depicting our society in the near future: 
ordinary people walking the streets carry a special whistle; when they see something 
suspicious—an immigrant, say, or a homeless person—they blow the whistle, and a 
special guard comes running to brutalize the intruders…What seems like a cheap 
Hollywood fiction is a reality in today’s Greece.  Members of the Fascist Golden 
Dawn movement are distributing whistles on the streets of Athens—when someone 
sees a suspicious foreigner, he is invited to blow the whistle, and the Golden Dawn 
special guards patrolling the streets will arrive to check out the suspect.  This is how 
one defends Europe in the Spring of 2012 (14). 
 
 But how could such a radical shift in the emancipatory agenda of the anti-austerity 
movements take place?  For Zizek this was possible because so many of the movements that 
were born in 2011 were principally responding to a decline in relative benefits accrued to 
capitalism’s middle class.  Part of what characterizes contemporary capitalism is a demotion 
in status of many workers, what Zizek refers to as the “proletarianization of the lower 
salaried bourgeoisie”.  This strata of workers are still remunerated at higher rates than the 
working class proper, and therefore accrue a ‘surplus-wage’.  And yet many of these same 
workers faced impending doom with the onset of the 2008 economic crisis.  The meager 
remaining benefits of their middle class status now at risk, many of them took to the streets in 
protest.  University students who hoped to gain access at least to this surplus wage, if not the 
professional prestige of yesteryear, suddenly found themselves saddled with debt and without 
prospects of any decent employment.  Amidst such a situation, the right-wing movements 
penetrate easily to recruit new members to their cause.  It is not necessarily the bankers that 
are to blame, they proclaim, but those evil immigrants who stole the few remaining jobs we 
had left in this country! And thus, just as in 1848 Bonaparte was able to unite the peasantry 
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and lumpen classes with the ruling class, today such movements are able to bridge the 
antagonistic gap between the class interests of the dwindling middle class and the ruling class 
bankers. “Foreign immigrants are today’s Jews, the main target of the new 
populism…today’s small farmers are the notorious middle class” (24).  The Middle class is 
ambiguous for Zizek because on the one hand it is a-political and wants a return to pre-
revolutionary normalcy “to be left to work and live in peace, which is why it tends to support 
authoritarian coups” (ibid).  On the other hand, because the middle class can be framed as a 
“threatened patriotic, hard-working moral majority—[they] are the main instigators of 
grassroots right-wing populist movements” (ibid). 
 If Zizek is critical of the European movements for remaining confined to the middle 
class sectors in danger of losing access to a surplus wage, he has even less enthusiasm for the 
popular sectors of British society involved in the riots.  There is nothing positive or even 
political to be found in the riots of August 2011 for him.  “The student protests against 
university reforms in the UK, for example, were clearly different from the UK riots of 
August 2011—that consumerist carnival of destruction, a genuine outburst from those 
excluded from the system” (12).  In characterizing the riots in Britain as exemplary of 
capitalist consumption, Zizek undermines any possibility of recovering a political project 
from such events.  In so doing, he becomes complicit in the very anti-immigrant hysteria he 
is at pains to unpack through a theory of a declining middle class. 
Although the UK riots of August 2011 were triggered by the suspicious death of 
Mark Duggan, it is generally accepted that they expressed a deeper unease—but of 
what kind?  Similar to the riots in the Paris suburbs in 2005, the UK protesters had no 
message to deliver.  The contrast with the massive student demonstrations of 
November 2010, which also turned violent, is clear.  The students had a message—
the rejection of the government’s higher education reforms.  This is why it is difficult 
to conceive of the 2011 riots in Marxist terms, as indicative of an emerging 
revolutionary subject; much more appropriate here is the Hegelian notion of the 
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‘rabble’—referring to those outside the organized social sphere, prevented from 
participating in social production, who are able to express their discontent only in the 
form of ‘irrational’ outbursts of destructive violence, or what Hegel called ‘abstract 
negativity’ (53). 
 
For Zizek there is a surprisingly direct parallel to be drawn between the lumpen proletariat 
and peasantry classes in Marx’s account of 1848, who are unable to represent themselves and 
must be represented, and the rioters of 2011.  By confining them to the terrain of ‘non-
society’, Zizek condemns the rioters’ acts to an illegible, meaningless space of 
(self)destruction.   Unfortunately, the irony in his analysis is that while on the one hand he 
laments the fact that the anti-austerity protests remained confined to the middle classes, on 
the other hand he is unable to give any sense of valorization, and in fact reserves his harshest 
critiques, for those members of the working class for acting out in a fashion he cannot 
comprehend.  While concerned by the rise of right-wing anti-immigrant hysteria throughout 
the continent, Zizek is unable to point to the inability of formally ‘organized’ groups to link 
up with the communities that rioted as a principle cause of the loss in momentum for the anti-
austerity struggles.  The fact that the riots in Britain were instigated by yet another incident 
of police brutality directed against racialized youth seems to be meaningless for Zizek.  
Instead, he openly mocks those social commentators who sought to provide any such 
contextualization for the rioters’ actions.  But, as Paul Gilroy has demonstrated, “the official 
statistics on unemployment, street stops and searches, and school exclusions told a different 
story about the institutionalization of racialized inequality, prejudice, and discrimination” 
(2013: 555). 
 So why this obvious lacuna in Zizek’s analysis, precisely at the moment when the 
groups ignored by the anti-austerity protestors and made victim of the right-wing backlash 
that followed in their wake, decided to take action in the streets of Britain?  Zizek’s own 
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important attentiveness to the anti-capitalist, class struggle basis of the 2011 movements also 
unfortunately clouds his interpretation of struggles that mobilize racialized populations.  
Despite emerging from an important critique of multiculturalism, his attack on what he 
perceives to be identity politics elides the concrete forms of organization and political 
expression that are arguably present in the 2011 British and 2005 French riots.  The Invisible 
Committee offers one model for thinking this through: “Not making ourselves visible, but 
instead turning the anonymity to which we’ve been relegated to our advantage, and through 
conspiracy, nocturnal or faceless actions, creating an invulnerable position of attack.  The 
fires of November 2005 offer a model for this. No leader, no demands, no organization, but 
words, gestures, complicities” (2009: 113).  Unfortunately, very few of the protagonists 
behind the global spring movements were able to capture this sense of dynamism amongst 
racialized communities in rebellion, and too often ignored their contribution to struggle, at 
the expense of the liberatory vision of the new round of struggles.  The Arab Spring proved 
no exception. 
Libya: Anti-Blackness and “African Mercenaries” 
 Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation on December 17, 2010 in the provincial town 
of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia led to a national protest that culminated with President Zine El-
Abidine Ben Ali resigning from office on January 14, 2011.  Inspired by the Tunisian 
precedent, protests quickly spread to Yemen and Egypt in late January. The protests grew in 
Cairo’s Tahrir square until Hosni Mubarak was overthrown on February 11.  Valentine’s day 
was named a national day of protest in Bahrain, and on February 15, 2011, the Arab Spring 
arrived in Libya.  Three days later, the anti-Qaddafi forces already controlled most of 
Benghazi, the country’s second-largest city after the capital Tripoli.  Because the events were 
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transpiring so rapidly, it was difficult for the media to cover the daily developments while 
also providing an adequate geo-political history that contextualized each conflict within its 
own specific national dynamics.  Progressive American news outlets like Democracy Now! 
therefore simply went along with the general idea that each struggle represented a popular 
demand for more democracy in countries where a single leader had held power for far too 
long. The movements were characterized as anti-authoritarian in nature, rejecting the 
silencing of dissent in each context.  And yet Libya represented a special geopolitical case: 
while Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain and Yemen were all ruled by pro-Western regimes, Libya’s 
Colonel Muamar Qaddafi had for most of his four decades in power taken a strong anti-
imperialist stance.  It wasn’t until 1999 that Qaddafi began to make overtures towards the 
West, in part as an effort to lessen the harsh sanctions imposed on his country for its 
supposed role in the Pan Am Lockerbie bombing.   
 Regardless of the fact that Qaddafi was no longer a stalwart anti-imperialist, the 
political positions his government took continued to emphasize Pan-Arabism and Pan-
Africanism as part of a broader project to unite developing countries economically and 
politically in order to improve their bargaining power in the face of persistent Western 
hegemony.  In this regard Qaddafi followed in the footsteps of leaders such as Frantz Fanon, 
Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, all of whom were early advocates of a United States of 
Africa, modeled in part on the European Union. Qaddafi had drawn up a formal proposal for 
greater African unity in 1999, and this document became the basis for the transition from the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU), formally launched in 2002 
at a continental summit hosted in Durban.  Part of the new framework of the AU announced 
in Durban included a Peace and Security Council designed to manage Africa’s conflicts 
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internally, and a Pan African Parliament intended to signal a shift towards explicit political 
sovereignty on a continental scale (Horace Campbell: 133).  It was certainly a surprise, then, 
when South Africa, then a temporary member of the United Nations Security Council, voted 
in favor of UN resolution 1973 calling for the establishment of a No-Fly Zone over Libya in 
order to assist the forces attempting to overthrow Qaddafi’s government.   The resolution was 
notably silent about the violent crackdown on protestors in Yemen and Bahrain, an 
inconsistency in UN policy that led Germany along with South Africa’s BRICS partners—
Brazil, Russia, India and China—to abstain from the vote.  The government of Jacob Zuma 
later became extremely critical of the way in which the NATO-led operation quickly 
exceeded the bounds of the UN No-Fly Zone resolution.  This led certain leaders within the 
ANC to admit error in having supported the initiative from the beginning.4 
 Without question, then, South Africa’s vote represented a low-point in Pan-Africanist 
politics and the dream of a united Africa.  As Horace Campbell argues, critiquing the NATO 
intervention did not necessitate a whole-hearted endorsement of Qaddafi’s own repression of 
the protests or of his policies in general, which are extremely mixed and at times 
contradictory. “The response of Gaddafi to these demonstrations was of great concern, but 
soon it became obvious that the forces of counterrevolution were busy seeking to exploit the 
political development of the social forces in Libya.  When Nicolas Sarkozy emerged as the 
champion of the ‘uprisings,’ it was instantly clear that the British and the French were up to 
mischief” (9-10). Unfortunately, the worst of what was transpiring in Libya still lay buried 
beneath the celebratory news stories of a supposedly dignified people’s revolt transpiring in 
Libya.  
                                                
4 See South Africa’s Mail and Guardian article, “Zuma lashes NATO for ‘abusing’ UN resolutions on Libya,” 
June 14, 2011. http://mg.co.za/article/2011-06-14-zuma-lashes-nato-for-abusing-un-resolutions-on-libya 
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  Very soon after the initial uprising against Qaddafi, rumor began to spread that his 
government was deploying “African” militias to defend the government.  This quickly 
devolved into a racialized discourse deployed against all dark-skinned individuals residing in 
the country.  While a few reports highlighted the fact that more than a million African 
migrants made their living in Libya, almost none pointed to the fact that the Libyan citizens 
included recognizably black communities.  Glen Ford of The Black Agenda Report was one 
of the few journalists who remained consistently attentive to the hyper-racialized dimensions 
of the anti-Qaddafi movement.  
Numerous reports from migrant workers who escaped from rebel-held areas indicate 
hundreds of black Africans have been lynched, including black Libyan citizens.  A 
Turkish oil worker related an especially horrific account to NPR: ‘We left behind our 
friends from Chad. We left behind their bodies,’ he said. ‘We had 70 or 80 people 
form Chad working for our company.  They cut them dead with pruning shears and 
axes, attacking them, saying you’re providing troops for Gadhafi.  The Sudanese, the 
Chadians were massacred.  We saw it ourselves (2011). 
 
The manner in which the anti-Qaddafi movement was couched explicitly against his 
government’s long-standing Pan-Africanist positions and his willingness to provide refuge to 
a variety of guerrilla movements from sub-Saharan Africa was only grasped in fleeting 
reports in the Western press.   
The town of Tawergha, disproportionately comprised of many dark-skinned Libyans, 
represented one important example of the extent to which the anti-Qaddafi forces conflated 
their own struggle with a corresponding purging of the country of a “black African menace.”  
Tawergha was occupied by Qaddafi’s forces as they moved closer to rebel-occupied Misrata 
in their battle to re-gain sovereignty over the country.  The rebels announced that the town 
was occupied by “African mercenaries” fighting in support of Qaddafi’s government.  By 
September 2011, the town had been cleansed of its original inhabitants, turned into a ghost 
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town.  In December a journalist from the BBC visited Tawergha and issued the following 
report: “The possessions of the people who lived here are scattered about, suggesting 
desperate flight...Buildings show the scars of heavy bombardment, some are burnt-out shells, 
some are just abandoned.  The town is empty of humans, apart from a small number of 
Misratan militiamen preventing the return of the town’s residents.” (quoted in Campbell: 
168).  The chair of the Commission of the African Union, Jean Ping, expressed outrage on 
behalf of African countries at the alarming extent to which anti-blackness seemed to 
represent a core component of the rebel movement.  “Blacks are having their throats slit.  
Blacks are accused of being mercenaries.  Do you think it’s normal in a country that’s a third 
black that blacks are confused with mercenaries?  There are mercenaries in Libya, many of 
them are black, but there are not only blacks and not all blacks there are mercenaries.  
Sometimes, when they are white, they call them ‘technical advisers’” (quoted in Campbell: 
166-167). 
“Xenophobia” in South Africa’s Slums: ‘The Anger of the Poor Can Go in Many 
Directions’5 
 
Yousuf Al-Bulushi: I’m wondering how the current round of global movements from 
Arab Spring to Occupy--and now what we’ve seen with Brazil and Turkey’s 
incredible movements--how that cycle of movements and specifically the political 
conjuncture they’re responding to relates to the situation in South Africa? I know that 
Firoze Manji and Sokari Ekine6 tried to reflect on the Arab Spring from an African 
perspective in one of their edited collections, and to re-situate the Arab Spring within 
a broader African Awakening—I’m wondering if you see something similar in South 
Africa, if that has purchase, and generally what the relationship is between all those 
other movements happening around the world and what we see in South Africa. 
 
                                                
5 This is a slogan popularized by Abahlali.  It represents their own intervention into comprehending the 
xenophobic attacks that periodically occur in South African shack communities against migrant populations 
from neighboring Africa.  It should also be read as their insistence upon adequate forms of autonomous 
organization in poor communities.  Without such political structures, independent of moneyed interests and 
established political apparatuses, the anger of the poor can veer down a variety of inadequate and politically 
regressive paths. 
6 See (2011) African Awakening: The Emerging Revolutions. Nairobi: Pambazuka Press. 
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Martin Legassick: Well, all these movements are products of the particular situation, 
which is the crisis of capitalism which set in about 2008, which is a financial crisis, 
but underneath it you know is a crisis of accumulation…which governments have 
then tried to resolve by spending more or making cuts and by imposing austerity on 
the working class.  So you see two different trends.  In the poorer countries, which 
include the poorer countries in Europe like Greece, you’ve had these huge 
movements…I mean, there are specific causes in each one; in Turkey it was some 
park or something, but they’re products of, or a reaction to this capitalist crisis there. 
In Europe, unfortunately what we’re seeing is the strengthening of extreme right-
wing—the Woolwich bombing gave a lease of life to the EDL [English Defense 
League] in Britain. In Sweden, the riots in Stockholm also have fueled the ultra-right; 
France the same thing.  It’s a very worrying sign.  Although…and it reflects the lack 
of leadership in the working class.  In Britain, for example, there’s huge cuts being 
made and there’s local resistance to them, but there’s no really organized resistance to 
those cuts on a national scale.  And the trade union leaders of the Labor party are 
absolutely useless.  So South Africa reflects the same thing—the protests reflect the 
squeezing of the economy globally (Interview, June 25, 2013).   
 
 It is perhaps fitting that South Africa’s ANC cast its vote in favor of the NATO 
presence in Libya that would facilitate the rise to power of a rebel movement plagued by 
anti-blackness and a xenophobic attitude to migrants.  After all, South Africa had recently 
experienced its own racialized hysteria in the face of a growing population of migrants from 
across Southern Africa.  In May 2008 a series of pogroms across the country targeting 
Mozambicans, Somalis, Zimbabweans, and other African migrants left 62 people dead, and 
forced anywhere from 80,000 to 200,000 others to flee their homes (Neocosmos: 117).  In an 
image that harkened back to the violent period of transition from apartheid to democracy in 
the early 1990s, some immigrants were even ‘necklaced,’ a process that involves dousing a 
tire with gasoline before wrapping the tire around a victim and setting it alight.  While 
shocking, these attacks on migrants were in fact representative of a consistent and growing 
trend throughout the country that precedes 2008 and has persisted to the present day.  Most 
shocking for the Southern African region was the fact that many of the migrants hailed from 
countries that historically had risked so much in their decision to provide the armed wing of 
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the African National Congress, Umkhonto we Sizwe, with shelter and training grounds in the 
fight against apartheid.   The attacks seemed to shatter the myth of a post-apartheid ‘rainbow 
nation’ governed by the idea of ‘Ubuntu’, a Nguni term intended to express the inherently 
communal ethos “I am because we are.”   
 In Durban, these attacks were largely limited to a few core areas, including the 
informal settlements of Bottlebrush and Cato Manor.  Part of the discourse that drove the 
paranoia around a migrant menace had its roots in a fear over migrants ‘stealing’ not only 
jobs, but also women, from South African citizens.  Within the context of social movement 
struggles around housing rights, the accusation also commonly arose that ‘foreigners’ had 
gained ownership over public housing through corrupt means.  An activist from the 
Johannesburg based Anti-Privatization Forum voiced this concern explicitly, claiming that 
Zimbabweans and Mozambicans had “become rich” by corrupting ANC officials, “stealing 
houses,” and even “marrying our women.” (Field notes, July 27, 2012).  Abahlali 
baseMjondolo consistently spoke out against such xenophobic attacks on migrant 
communities, and were therefore successful in minimizing violent attacks in their own 
communities in Durban.  But the salience of the xenophobic discourse in slums at large was 
undeniable, and persists into the present day. 
 The fear over job loss makes sense from a strictly economistic reading of xenophobia, 
but the articulation of this concern with the patriarchal drive to “protect our women” requires 
a bit more analysis.  The patterns of unemployment and slum formation in South Africa were 
in large part driven by a gendered pattern in the changing nature of social reproduction 
throughout the country.  Because the city was largely restricted to African males under 
apartheid, the reproductive work of homemaking and childrearing was outsourced to the rural 
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Bantustans.  As the benefits of urban citizenship declined along with a stagnating apartheid 
economy by the late 1970s, women were also forced to enter the workforce by migrating into 
the city and establishing a home in peri-urban slums.  This pattern boomed in the late 1980s 
and has continued up until the present.  As unemployment rose, men were often emasculated 
as they were decreasingly able to raise the funds sufficient to pay for ilobolo, or bridewealth.  
Marriage rates have therefore plummeted over the past decades, “down to less than half of 
the 1960 levels, so that today only 3 of 10 South African adults are married” (Hickel 2014: 
107).  As Mark Hunter has argued, these corresponding changes in the broader political 
economy of South Africa and the intimate spaces of social reproduction combined to 
exacerbate the HIV/AIDS crisis throughout the country.  The slum has since become a 
central site of both poverty and HIV/AIDS. 
The 1980s reconfigured expectations, emotions, dreams, and intimate relations that 
for generations had been profoundly shaped by the joint but contested project of 
ukwakha umuzi (to build a home).  Living in an umjondolo [shack] came to symbolize 
precarious economic circumstances and life without marriage—and this was true in 
townships where backyard shacks mushroomed as much as in informal settlements 
themselves.  These shifts are what I refer to as the changing political economy and 
geography of intimacy.  And they coincided with the introduction of the deadly HIV 
virus in the 1980s, which would come to be disproportionately found in informal 
settlements (Hunter: 86). 
 
Poor South Africans thus lashed out at foreigners not only for stealing their jobs but also for 
supposedly being able to access “their” women, whom regular citizens could no longer afford 
to marry.   
In response to a question I posed to him about the relative decline in organized social 
movements in South Africa since 2004, life-long activist and scholar Martin Legassick had 
the following to say about the idea that rebellion in the slum can go in many different 
directions: 
 
 
 79 
For a start, there are still social protests going on.  For example in Wallersteen…a 
township or a shack settlement set in the northern suburbs, it’s where the Irene 
Constitutional court is. Anyway, they have been up in arms, you know, the usual sort 
of Toyi Toying, burning tires, fires etc. etc.  But its very poise because that was 
partially protest against the government, but it was partially against Somalis.  And 
there’s been reports that there were 200 Somali shops demolished.  I mean, that’s a 
very interesting statistic because it shows that…if there are 200 Somali shops in 
Wallersteen, I mean that must be the majority of the shops there. I’m surprised there 
are as many as 200 and it shows how foreigners are taking over the township shops 
and that’s inevitably going to produce antagonisms. You know like in the old days 
when the Jews were the sort of money grubbers and traders and all that. So that’s the 
problem with these social protests, they can go either way.  (Interview: June 25, 
2013) 
 
Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the murder of Abahlali activist Nkululeko Gwala in 
Cato Crest, Durban in June 2013, an Ethiopian shopkeeper was also murdered.  While the 
two incidents appear to be disconnected in this latter case, it demonstrates the dual paths that 
the rage of the poor can travel down: either address government and the multinational and 
subnational representatives of neoliberalism, or target those amongst you who are even more 
precarious, dark-skinned, and visibly or linguistically ‘Other’ in the context of your everyday 
environment.  And as Legassick implies with his paralleling of xenophobia in South Africa to 
the European attacks on Jewish communities, the ruling classes have the most to gain from 
finding a convenient scapegoat in subaltern communities for the poor to unleash their anger 
upon.   
 In the South African context, this misdirected rage operates along both racial and 
ethnic lines.  Despite our initial attempts to de-center the scale of the nation-state, it is clear 
that race couples with nationalism in a xenophobic drive to eliminate supposed outsiders.  
The ANC-led state has been a principle instigator of anti-foreigner sentiment, and has 
consistently been involved in round-ups of dark-skinned migrants.  “Indeed, every year, the 
South African Human Rights commission reports on state agencies harassing and detaining 
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so-called ‘illegal aliens’: people being apprehended by the police for being ‘took dark’ or 
‘walking like a black foreigner’” (Gibson 2011: 191).  And yet a good argument can be made 
that xenophobia is a misnomer when applied to the pogroms in South Africa.  In the case of 
the May 2008 attacks, a third of the victims turned out to be locals, full South African 
citizens.  Further, the only people capable of being deemed a foreigner in South Africa 
appear to be black people.  No white person, immigrant or citizen, has been attacked for 
lacking the qualities of a proper South African.  So xenophobia in this context is really a 
replacement term for rampant anti-blackness, internalized amongst the black poor and 
deployed as an outlet for the expression of rage in the confined spaces of urban slums where 
battles over territory and limited employment opportunities are fought out with the highest 
stakes.  Reformulated, then, the periodic expressions of xenophobia by the poor and 
government alike reflect a broader problem about the persistence of apartheid-era racism into 
the present.  “The question is to what degree post-apartheid South Africa remains a victim of 
‘White South Africa’s’ Afrophobia, and to what degree is that Afrophobia expressed in the 
violence against African ‘foreigners’?” (Gibson 2011: 192). 
 In an attempt to give meaning to these kinds of attacks that have plagued the country 
at least since the end of apartheid, the Southern African Migration Programme conducted a 
broad-based attitude survey of people in the country.  The study found that Whites were the 
most xenophobic, followed by Coloureds, Africans and finally Indians; but all groups 
expressed high levels of xenophobia.  People who spoke Afrikaans were by far the most 
xenophobic among the different linguistic groups of the country.  The middle class was the 
least xenophobic, while upper and lower classes expressed high levels of xenophobia.  
Between the two, the lower class tended to be the most explicitly xenophobic.  Supporters of 
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the Democratic Alliance, the main, strongly neoliberal opposition to the African National 
Congress, were more xenophobic than ANC supporters.   
 While these are all interesting findings, “these data are still not very helpful in terms 
of constructing a xenophobic profile” (Neocosmos 2010: 124). In order to do that, one needs 
more qualitative engagement at the community level to understand the formation of 
xenophobia and what drove its manifestation in the form of outright violent attacks.  Michael 
Neocosmos (2010) argues that the role played by community level leadership structures was 
key in this regard.  Linking the resentment against migrants at the level of the slum to 
structural shortcomings of post-apartheid freedom, Neocosmos made a remarkably consistent 
finding with my own research that consistently found that slum dwellers linked housing 
shortages with migrant complicity in corruption.  “RDP houses7 which were built to house 
the poor and distributed to South Africans are then sometimes sold to foreign nationals, 
giving the impression that South Africans are still waiting for housing while ‘foreigners’ live 
in government provided housing” (128).  This often plays out through the following resentful 
comments by everyday shack dwellers: “Even I don’t have a RDP house, but go to 
Madalakufa you’ll find foreigners owning houses which they have bought from South 
Africans…Government is fighting against us, employers are fighting against us and 
foreigners are fighting against us, that is why we fight against them because they are nearer; 
they don’t support us in our struggle” (HSRC 2008, 29, 30, 38, 45)” (ibid). 
 Neocosmos claims that people resort to xenophobia, then, in the absence of access to 
the powerful structures that they may also blame, and in the absence of an adequate 
                                                
7 “RDP houses” is the common term for the public housing the ANC government has built since 1994.  RDP 
refers to the Keynesian, redistributive economic plan called “Reconstruction and Development Programme” 
released in 1994, quickly eclipsed by the more neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
unveiled in 1996 after much World Bank consultation (Bond 2000). 
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leadership structure that could channel community anger towards a productive outlet of 
political organization.  Unfortunately, in such a context, “leadership is allowed to wander 
into the hands of unscrupulous leaders” (129). Existing structures of community leadership, 
characterized by patrimonialism, informal gangsterism, and political party lackeys, were 
forced to lead the battle against migrants in order to maintain credibility in their communities 
in the face of a rising tide of xenophobic sentiment.  A report commissioned by the United 
Nations International Organization for Migration and carried out by researchers at the Forced 
Migration Studies Programme at the University of Witwatersrand, therefore argued:  
 “The xenophobic violence in most affected areas was organized by the…parallel 
structures or by some self-serving members of formal institutions who capitalized on 
residents’ feelings, fears and negative attitudes towards non-nationals…the study found that 
in most affected areas, the attacks on foreigners were organized and led by different local 
community leadership structures and/or known influential groups” (132). The principal 
instigators of the violence were therefore often the same figures struggling to maintain the 
status quo that benefitted them. Xenophobia, rather than anti-neoliberal critiques of the ruling 
ANC, proved a productive outlet to let off steam in this context for the same figures that 
received even meager trickle-down benefits as a result of their leadership position. 
 Our overview of the different case studies of global struggles indicates that a critique 
of neoliberalism does not necessarily imply an understanding of racialized inequalities.  
Race, migration and neoliberal imperatives all combine to produce cheap labor, a lifeline for 
surplus populations, and convenient scapegoats that divert attention away from elite 
constituencies that benefit from the persistence of the status quo.  The spatial concentration 
of inequality and xenophobia in the particular place of the slum in South Africa highlights 
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the manner in which the city and its numerous urban peripheries have become a central 
flashpoint for antagonism and struggle in the twenty-first century (Zibechi 2012: 189-266).  
Mike Davis therefore argues for a re-centering of the urban periphery as paradigmatic site of 
urban livelihoods for over a billion squatters.  “Indeed, the suburban zones of many poor 
cities are now so vast as to suggest the need to rethink peripherality.  In Lusaka, for example, 
the outlying shantytowns house tow-thirds of the city’s population—leading one writer to 
suggest that ‘these compounds are called ‘peri-urban’ but in reality it is the city proper that is 
peripheral’” (2006: 37). In Durban  Abahlali baseMjondolo was among the first 
organizations to identify the importance of the slum as the paradigmatic site of social conflict 
in post-apartheid South Africa.  The group linked the xenophobic attacks to the broader 
issues they were struggling against by contrasting the slum communities of Alexandria 
(Alex) where many xenophobic attacks occurred, with one of the richest communities in 
South Africa, Sandton, where Ferraris, Porsches and Lamborghinis are common modes of 
transport.  “Let us be clear. Neither poverty nor oppression justify one poor person turning on 
another. A poor man who turns on his wife or a poor family that turn on their neighbors must 
be opposed, stopped and brought to justice. But the reason why this happens in Alex and not 
Sandton is because people in Alex are suffering and scared for the future of their lives. They 
are living under the kind of stress that can damage a person” (Abahlali 2008).  After 
providing a context for the shocking attacks by elaborating on the precarious material reality 
facing inhabitants of shacks, Abahlali is careful to identify the real beneficiaries of 
xenophobia in South Africa.  “The perpetrators of these attacks must be held responsible but 
the people who have crowded the poor onto tiny bits of land, threatened their hold on that 
land with evictions and forced removals, treated them all like criminals, exploited them, 
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repressed their struggles, pushed up the price of food and built too few houses, that are too 
small and too far away and then corruptly sold them must also be held responsible” (Abahlali 
2008). 
 Unfortunately it was relatively common amongst other social movements in the 
country to identify ‘foreigners’ as contributing to poor South Africans’ impoverishment.  
This occurred even in the most discursively radical groups where neoliberalism was attacked 
daily, and class exploitation was highlighted as the central axis around which struggle had to 
develop.  As the history of the labor movement has already demonstrated, too often class 
struggles can mutate to become nationalistic and xenophobic in orientation, re-directing the 
anger of the poor against other exploited and marginalized communities rather than at 
economic bosses and political rulers.  “The pictures on television of gangs in Alexandra 
wearing Anti-Privatization Forum T-shirts, were also an indication of a depressing failure of 
the politics of some social movements.  The absence of alternatives was precisely why 
xenophobic violence took the form of a seemingly unstoppable ‘tsunami’ that only petered 
out when engaging in it started to become too risky for perpetrators” (Neocosmos: 140).  The 
Anti-Privatization Forum was one of the strongest coalitions of groups in Johannesburg 
highlighting the negative ramifications of the ANC’s neoliberal turn through the privatization 
of municipal services, and yet some of their members also reproduced xenophobia within the 
struggle.   
Abahlali baseMjondolo therefore contributed an important intervention in a largely 
xenophobic society where government, elites, and even some social movement participants 
were actively feeding the generalized hysteria about the threat of racialized “outsiders”.  
Because of the prior work Abahlali was able to do in incorporating migrants into their local 
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chapters, and in emphasizing that there is no such thing as an illegal human being—“An 
action can be illegal. A person cannot be illegal. A person is a person where ever they may 
find themselves” (Abahlali 2008)—none of the communities in Durban with an Abahlali 
presence experienced xenophobic attacks (Neocosmos: 147).   
This was possible in part due to the historicization of struggle and oppression that the 
movement places front and center in their collective analysis.  “We all know that South 
Africans were welcomed in Zimbabwe and in Zambia, even as far away as England, when 
they were fleeing the oppression of apartheid. In our own movement we have people who 
were in exile. We must welcome those who are fleeing oppression now. This obligation is 
doubled by the fact that our government and big companies here are supporting oppression in 
other countries” (Abahlali 2008).  And while the attacks are situated as in part a nationalistic 
response to people from other countries, Abahlali’s statement, released right in the heat of the 
spreading attacks in May 2008, was careful to capture the core of anti-blackness lying at the 
center of the hysteria.  “Yesterday we heard that this thing started in Warwick and in the City 
centre. We heard that traders had their goods stolen and that people were being checked for 
their complexion, a man from Ntuzuma was stopped and assaulted for being ‘too black’” 
(ibid).  
 The organization moved quickly to provide shelter for migrant communities in order 
to pre-empt any possible divisive attacks in their own shack settlements.  This material 
intervention was coupled with an intellectual intervention through their press release. “We 
condemn the attacks, the beatings, rape and murder, in Johannesburg on people born in other 
countries. We will fight left and right to ensure that this does not happen here in KwaZulu-
Natal.”  The group’s intervention on the terrain of ideas took the form of a call to all South 
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Africans to refrain from attacks, and to instead identify the true enemies of the poor.  They 
were careful to highlight the ever-present danger of a potentially ambiguous expression of 
the rage boiling beneath the surface of impoverished communities.  “We have been warning 
for years that the anger of the poor can go in many directions. That warning, like our 
warnings about the rats and the fires and the lack of toilets, the human dumping grounds 
called relocation sites, the new concentration camps called transit camps and corrupt, cruel, 
violent and racist police, has gone unheeded (ibid).”  The group went further, and linked their 
critique of neoliberalism with a racialized restriction on the freedom of movement.  “While 
goods and services are increasingly ‘freed’ to move across spatial borders, human beings, 
despite their conceptualization by economists as ‘human capital,’ still don’t enjoy such 
freedoms. It is time to ask serious questions about why it is that money and rich people can 
move freely around the world while everywhere the poor must confront razor wire, corrupt 
and violent police, queues and relocation or deportation” (ibid).  In an effort to identify 
capital’s hypocritical spatial erasure of borders for goods with an increase in the policing of 
transnational flows of migrants, Abahlali argued for a similar link between these global 
policies of division and the domestic spatial policies of confinement directed at urban shack 
dwellers, regardless of citizenship.  “In South Africa some of us are moved out of the cities 
to rural human dumping grounds called relocation sites while others are moved all the way 
out of the country. Some of us are taken to transit camps and some of us are taken to Lindela. 
The destinations might be different but it is the same kind of oppression” (ibid).  Lindela is 
the name for an infamous “Detention and Repatriation” facility built by the post-apartheid 
government in 1996 to house undocumented immigrants detained in the area around 
Johannesburg.  In true neoliberal fashion, Lindela is operated by a private company on behalf 
 
 
 87 
of the Department of Home Affairs.  The facility was built in order to free up space in the 
prisons for South African citizens, and has been at the center of controversy, facing 
accusations of corruption and abuse of detainee rights (Klaaren and Ramji).   
The Global Threat of Race and the Decomposition of Struggle 
 The fact that Abahlali highlights the spatial confinement of migrants as something 
that mirrors the persistence of urban apartheid targeting black populations in South Africa is 
crucial to elaborating what appears to be a growing trend in racial neoliberalism.  In a 
broader global environment dominated by color-blindness—the idea that anti-racism should 
consist in simply banishing race as a meaningful category of analysis in understanding the 
world (Bonilla-Silva 2006)—the proliferation of a variety of forms of racism continues to 
operate as a divisive tool fracturing struggles, allowing elite groups to side-step otherwise 
significant challenges to their hegemonic rule.  Yet the dominant readings of global 
neoliberalism, certainly in South Africa, but also around the world, remain locked in a 
stultifying ‘class’ analysis.  As South African white studies scholar Christi van der 
Westhuizen told me,  
I feel very uncomfortable with any sort of notion that we’ve moved beyond race and 
that’s how liberalism, South African liberalism in the way that it’s understood here, is 
like such a limited ideology as well because it insists on this colorblindness. It’s sort 
of like ‘Now we should just judge people on what they do’ you know and as long as 
you provide equal opportunities…then all will be fine, kind of thing. So we’re just an 
equal opportunity society and it’s also around class, of course.  So you don’t have to 
have any corrective measures in terms of race, class, gender, because as long as there 
are equal opportunities you’re fine, which is as we know, it’s ridiculous…So for 
me…it shows you the extent to which we still have to work through race in this 
country, I mean that’s….because  if it’s so difficult to bring up, much like the 
centerpiece of power or one of the centerpieces of power, whiteness, to bring it to the 
fore and say let’s look at this critically, if it’s so difficult for you to do that, you 
know, twenty years into the democracy and it’s almost like people are trying to 
mislead themselves, they’re trying to deceive themselves and other people by trying 
to like pretend that race is not relevant anymore and we’re seeing actually an 
increased use definitely of race in political discourses in the past few years. And 
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because we haven’t worked through race, we haven’t thought through it. (Interview 
June 30, 2013) 
 
If colorblindness remains dominant in South Africa8, a society that lived through the horrors 
of apartheid, then it is unsurprising that at a more global level the intertwining of regimes of 
racializaiton and neoliberalism remains underexamined. While Zizek argues that the 
contemporary crisis that generated the 2011 uprisings dictated that the revolts would be 
comprised by a middle class now losing its hold on even the meager surplus wages of a post-
Fordist economy, this analysis is still largely devoid of the centrality of race.  As David 
Roediger argues, “To set race within social formations is absolutely necessary but to reduce 
race to class is damaging” (8). In many places, a battle to defend what Du Bois called “the 
wages of whiteness” might operate as a more appropriate lens through which we can grasp 
what Zizek’s “middle class” has been rebelling against.  “The pleasures of whiteness could 
function as a ‘wage’ for white workers.  That is, status and privilege conferred by race could 
be used to make up for alienating and exploitative class relationships, North and South.  
                                                
8 When we sat down to speak in Cape Town, van der Westhuizen, author of White Power and the Rise and Fall 
of the National Party (2008), had just returned from a white studies conference in Johannesburg.  To her 
dismay, even in this space intentionally organized to create one of the few spaces in the country for scholars to 
discuss the centrality of whiteness and race generally as a persistent theme in South Africa, color-blindness 
reared its ugly head. According to Westhuizen, two keynote speakers for the conference, Sarah Nuttall and 
Ferial Haffajee, both challenged the very idea of the gathering, implying that any discussion of race reproduced 
racism. Westhuizen notes, “Sarah Nuttall was actually a keynote and she had a prepared speech; she was going 
to speak on consumption and whiteness that was going to be her topic.   Then Ferial spoke.  Ferial dissed the 
whole conference saying, ‘You shouldn’t be here, I shouldn’t be here, this shouldn’t be discussed, etc etc.’ and 
then Sarah Nuttall…she basically then said, ‘we’re not ready to have this conversation now.  We shouldn’t be 
talking about whiteness’… People were very upset, me included, because I thought a whole lot of assumptions 
were being made actually about what I’m going to be presenting in my paper, there’s some sort of assumption 
or there’s some sort of supposition here that I, with these other people, that I’m there to prop up whiteness, to 
reproduce whiteness, you know. My whole professional career I’ve been totally doing the opposite cus I’ve 
been… I’m not particularly popular in a great number of circles, white circles, because of the positions, public 
positions that I’ve adopted, you know. So I just felt extremely offended by that whole thing and actually I stood 
up in the Q and A session and I also said to them, ‘you know, I take offense at the assumptions being made here 
about the papers that are due to be presented at the conference that haven’t been presented...These kinds of 
comments can be made at the end if they were indeed true, but to pre-empt every single paper at the conference 
and put me, I mean, I just felt like, put me into this, to put me in a box, as some sort of weird racist that’s come 
there to talk about how wonderful white people are (laughs) you know?” (Interview June 30, 2013). 
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White workers could, and did, define and accept their class positions by fashioning identities 
as ‘not slaves’ and as ‘not Blacks’” (13). 
 In the South African context, the race-class debate has raged since at least 1972, when 
Harold Wolpe published his article “Capitalism and Cheap Labor-Power in South Africa” in 
an attempt to define the relationship between racial confinement of surplus populations to the 
Bantustans and a broader capitalist economy.  The central argument of Wolpe in 1972, one 
that was modified in a collaborative analysis with Martin Legassick in 1976, and again 
updated in the 1980s after engaging with Stuart Hall’s work, was that the spatialized racial 
confinement policies of apartheid—in the form of rural Bantustans—allowed the apartheid 
state and its allied capitalist institutions to exploit migrant labor from the Bantustans at below 
the cost of reproducing that same labor.  Social reproduction was outsourced to the 
Bantustans, as women and families were largely confined to these autonomous, and 
eventually (in some cases) fully sovereign entities.  Here the Althusserian concept of 
articulation was crucial in that it allowed Wolpe to claim that pre-capitalist relations persisted 
into the capitalist present in South Africa, articulating otherwise separately conceived modes 
of production. 
 While important and productive in its attempt to grapple with the relationship 
between apartheid racial imperative and the broader necessities of capital, this initial 
formulation of this argument was arguably a bit clunky.  John Pickles and Daniel Weiner 
claim that “radical political economy has…tended to homogenize South Africa’s rural 
population.  In this view, rural people have become classless victims of apartheid.  Important 
social and spatial variations within Bantustans, as well as within white agriculture, have 
tended to be overlooked (1991: 14).  The negative ramifications of Wolpe’s early 
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formulations mirrored a broader “urban bias” in the anti-apartheid struggle more generally, 
whereby the trend towards proletarianization in the cities within South Africa was 
emphasized as productive for class struggle, while the pre-capitalist rural spaces of the 
Bantustans were too often written-off as unproductive sites for revolutionary movement.  As 
Pickles and Weiner elaborate, “this urban bias results in part from the significance of urban 
and industrial struggles, particularly during the post-Soweto (1976) period, but can also be 
traced to theoretical positions regarding the functions of rural areas and people in 
contemporary South Africa” (ibid).  The persistence of an urban bias in post-apartheid South 
Africa is an important theme examined in the following chapter.  For now it is sufficient to 
point out that this analysis of the relationship between race and class tended to privilege class 
in a manner that saw heightened racial differences as a mere marker of a prior mode of 
production. 
 In her own attempt to re-visit the race-class debate for insight into the contemporary 
South African conjuncture, Gillian Hart deploys Stuart Hall’s re-reading of Wolpe as a way 
of insisting upon the persistence of racialization as an ongoing process in the post-apartheid 
moment, one that cannot be reduced simply to economic determinants. “Instead, it needs to 
be shown how race comes to be inserted historically, and the relations and practices that have 
tended to erode and transform—or to preserve—these distinctions through time, not simply 
as residues or holdovers, but as active structuring principles of the present organization of 
society and the forms of class relations” (2007: 89).  In this regard, Stuart Hall’s 
conceptualization of race as “the modality in which class is ‘lived’, the medium through 
which class relations are experienced, the form in which it is appropriated and ‘fought 
through’,” becomes important as a means to analyze many of the bottlenecks contemporary 
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struggles have faced (ibid).  “For racism is also one of the dominant means of ideological 
representation through which the white fractions of the class come to ‘live’ their relations to 
other fractions, and through them to capital itself” (ibid).  For Hart, such a realization entails 
examining the terrain of the popular for insight into the power struggles within the ANC that 
led to Jacob Zuma replacing Thabo Mbeki at the helm of the party, and then later the country 
as a whole.   Zuma was arguably able to discredit Mbeki by latching on to the rising 
discontent throughout South Africa at the failures of post-apartheid liberation.  He 
accomplished this through deploying an alternative notion of nationalism and the liberation 
project that already existed in the popular imagination, and was therefore able to paint Mbeki 
as part of an ANC elite that was educated—unlike most of the South African poor—and 
didn’t participate on the ground in the liberation struggle.  In critiquing the notion of 
neoliberalism as simply entailing what David Harvey terms an “elitist class project” (2005), 
Hart claims that resistance cannot and will not necessarily follow in the line of the pure 
economics of exploitation.  Rather, it also depends at least as much on everyday, popular 
notions of what constitutes a nation, and the meaning of liberation (2008).  
 In the absence of a more broad-based emphasis upon race in South Africa, the 
vacuum of analysis regarding the lived reality of racialized inequality and violence has been 
filled by populist groups such as the newly formed political party, the Economic Freedom 
Fighters (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of this group). Gillian Hart’s emphasis upon the 
popular as a central terrain of contestation over political meaning has therefore only gained in 
relevance.  The ANC’s largely refuses to address the persistence of racism in South Africa 
through more than piecemeal programs, directed more at developing a black bourgeoisie than 
alleviating the difficulties facing the black poor.   
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 More generally, the South African experience of extreme forms of racialized 
dispossession—in a context where the white population is a numerical minority (less than 
10% today), but has nevertheless managed to maintain if not enhance most of its privileges—
might operate as a model for understanding the evolution of racialized divisions in struggles 
elsewhere. Even the historically marginalized Afrikaner communities have benefitted from 
the post-apartheid transition.  “Afrikaners have been a chief beneficiary of the post-
secularization of race.  They are inheritors of post-apartheid largesse, cashing in on the 
extension of privileges of apartheid to all whites…The surging Afrikaner middle class—once 
South Africa’s poor white problem of Triomf legacy—provides many of the middlemen for 
its current tourist trade.  Neoliberalism’s racial secularization turns out to fuel some of the 
very same people apartheid’s racial sacralization was supposed to uplift” (Goldberg: 315-
316).  Most shocking is the extent to which anti-blackness dominates the popular mindset, 
penetrating the imaginaries of black subjects themselves, used as a weapon against non-
citizen Africans in the periodic but ongoing xenophobic attacks.    
 But the extent to which the persistence of the racial threat is a specifically neoliberal 
phenomenon defining our contemporary conjuncture must also be brought into question.  
Goldberg identifies but then sets aside the obvious tension between his formulation of the 
neoliberalization of race on the one hand—as a necessarily economic imperative—and his 
(above-cited) formulation of the threat of race, as something that supersedes both curiosity 
and exploitation, on the other hand.  “Threat for the most part seeks distanciation of one sort 
or another, not engagement, whether spatially or symbolically, materially or rhetorically 
enacted.  But the other side of threat entails also the group—the ‘population’—seen as 
threatening is the one actually threatened: with alienation, intimidation, incarceration, 
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marginalization and externalization of one kind or another, ultimately with extinction” (29).  
The threat of race clearly extends beyond the parameters of the capitalist imperative of 
exploitation.  Goldberg’s analysis is therefore one that veers in the direction of that reading 
of biopower as something that re-articulates with sovereign power rather than merely 
displacing it.  As Michel Foucault puts it, “Given that this power’s [biopower] is essentially 
to make live, how can it let die?  How can the power of death, the function of death, be 
exercised in a political system centered upon biopower?  It is, I think, at this point that racism 
intervenes” (2003: 254).  Contemporary racism operates as the persistence of the drive to 
make die or let live, in a broader era supposedly defined by the imperative to make live or let 
die. “The juxtaposition of—or the way biopower functions through—the old sovereign power 
of life and death implies the workings, the introduction and activation, of racism.  And it is, I 
think, here that we find the actual roots of racism” (258). 
 It makes sense, then, that the debate on the relationship between precarious inclusion 
(what some have termed “differential inclusion”) and surplus exclusion must take place on 
the specific terrain of slum communities in a South African context (this theme is explored 
further in chapter 3).  Simultaneously spatially incorporated into the post-modern metropolis, 
but socially excluded from many of its potential benefits, shack dwellers are forced to walk 
the tightrope between the fruits of urbanity and the ever-present threat of premature death as 
a marker of the fatal pairing of power and difference. Indeed, “by centering attention on 
those most vulnerable to the fatal couplings of power and difference signified by racism, we 
will develop richer analyses of how it is that radical activism might most productively exploit 
crisis for liberatory ends” (Gilmore: 22). It is not a surprise that in the course of eking out a 
living in such a context, the anger of the poor can indeed go in many different directions.  
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And yet arguably, absent an interrogation of the persistence of the threat of race in the 
purportedly post-apartheid present, movements in South Africa and around the world will 
continue to be plagued by internal fissures, making themselves vulnerable to repression or 
co-optation at the hands of populist and conservative attempts to restore the status-quo.  
Before examining the specificity of the relationship between precarity and race in South 
Africa, I now turn to the question of how the ANC-led state itself has responded to the 
persistence of apartheid urban geographies and the renewal of social protest from below.  
Like the various forms of movement protest and uprising examined above, the following 
account of the post-apartheid state is also embedded in a transnational, horizontal topography 
of power that operates at multiple scales, from the local to the global, without fetishizing any 
particular one as the paradigmatic site of the exertion of power. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEVELOPMENT:  
A PROMISED LAND CALLED CORNUBIA 
  
After more than fifteen years of caution, as the statistics of persistent inequality, 
poverty and unemployment become ever more embarrassing, the ANC and the state 
are turning once again to the idea of development, under the concept of a 
‘developmental state’, as the way out of their difficulties. 
 Ben Turok, Development in a Divided Country, 30-31 
 
Social plans and the militarization of the urban peripheries are two sides of the same 
attempt to control populations outside the reach of the state. 
 Raul Zibechi, Territories in Resistance, 191 
 
The fact that we want to work with clean government in fact doesn’t take away our 
autonomy; it’s not giving our power back…It’s an attempt to hold the government 
accountable. I hold the new government accountable, but that doesn’t mean that…you 
want to take over the government or that you will replace the government. 
 S’bu Zikode, Interview, August 2, 2013 
 
Autonomy means Abahlali will speak to its members, through a collective decision, 
free from individuals’ influence and external forces.  Autonomy means free from 
being molded and controlled from outside the movement, by individuals within the 
academia research or NGOs or even from the State.  Autonomy means Abahlali 
maintaining its own philosophy that is Abahlali’s, that is the living politics that is 
opposed to all kinds of other politics and other forces… But autonomy doesn’t mean 
that Abahlali cannot engage with those that are seen to be their enemies. Abahlali will 
engage with the State.   
 S’bu Zikode, Interview, August 2, 2013 
 
 
Abahlali and the Birth of Cornubia 
 The first public action of the group that would later become Abahlali baseMjondolo 
was to take to the streets in frustration on March 19, 2005.  Blocking the N2 freeway running 
adjacent to their Kennedy Road shack settlement for four hours, about 750 shack dwellers 
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demanded land in the city so they wouldn’t have to remain cramped on a precarious hillside 
next to the largest municipal dump in the country.  Six months later in September, the 
movement formally launched under the name of Abahlali by mobilizing 5,000 shack dwellers 
to march against the local ANC councilor. They demanded that he step down because of a 
failure to provide their community with a sense of permanence through services, land and 
housing (Pithouse 2005).  
By the end of the year, Durban mayor Obed Mlaba announced that the municipal 
government would build a major low-income housing development in the Northern part of 
the city.  The development—later called Cornubia—was intended to provide between 15,000 
and 20,000 low-income housing units at a range of prices.  Some would be provided free of 
cost, similar to the so-called RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) homes the 
government had been building throughout the country.  Other homes would be built for those 
earning above a certain threshold, initially R1500/month (at the time, the equivalent of 
$230/month), and would be allocated with a bond (the South African term for a mortgage).  It 
was therefore intended to be a mixed-income housing project, one that was supposed to 
address the legacy of apartheid geography that still plagued all South African cities.  The 
development would not, however, be located near the heart of the city center, where many 
shack communities, including Kennedy Road, were located.  Instead it would be based next 
to an edge city called Umhlanga, a predominantly white, middle and upper class beachfront 
community that had taken off in part as a product of white flight from the city core after the 
fall of apartheid (Verwey 2005).  
 The announcement by Mayor Mlaba should be read as part of the broader 
developmental state strategy that the ANC increasingly argued it was adopting during the 
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first decade of the new millennium.  This larger project, I argue, must be situated at the 
conjuncture of two forces: first, it can be read as a response to the movements like Abahlali, 
agitating from below in increasing numbers since Mandela stepped down from the 
presidency in 1999; second, Cornubia and the ANC developmental state project should also 
be situated as part of a global rise in state capitalism, culminating with South Africa joining 
the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries in 2010, in the wake of the 
global crisis of 2008 that represented a significant blow to the hegemonic neoliberal project.  
There is also a specifically African context to the re-emergence of the developmental state 
project.  The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) spearheaded by former 
South African president Thabo Mbeki is just one example of an extremely problematic 
continental attempt at articulating neoliberal ideology with a more developmental platform 
intended to address the specificities of economic governance in Africa (Sahle 2008). In this 
chapter, I discuss the post-World War II development project, contextualizing it within a 
specifically African colonial context.  While neoliberalism remained dominant in the 1990s, 
the developmental state gained renewed purchase in a context of rising domestic and global 
inequality by the 2000s.  By historicizing and spatializing the local developmental state in 
Durban, we can identify the rise and fall of capitalist strategies of planning and movement 
co-optation.  Finally, the chapter assesses the Cornubia project on its own terms.  It seeks to 
answer the following questions: How has the state responded to the new movements in South 
Africa?  What forms of governance have emerged as a method of placating or appeasing the 
poor, and are they fulfilling movement demands or merely re-directing their energy while 
reproducing the central problems driving poverty and inequality in the country? 
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Development(s) 
 Development is a central part of any capitalist society and can be divided into two 
distinct but interlinked processes: capital-D Development and small-d development.  The 
latter, development, represents the in-built imperative for capitalism as a global system to 
grow quantitatively and qualitatively, extensively through space and intensively through 
time.  This imperative grew parallel to the outset of global capitalism with the arrival of 
European conquerors to the New World in 1492. The former, Development, represents the 
explicit strategy of containment and state-by-state incorporation into the world capitalist 
economy.  The Development project is generally framed as having been launched following 
the second world war.  The contingent processes of reconstruction in Western Europe, the 
rise of the Cold War between first and second worlds, and the decolonization of the third 
world combined to drive the United States and the transnational institutions of capitalism to 
launch a Development project in the third world geared in large part towards preventing the 
spread of socialism (Hart 2009; Chari and Verdery 2009; Sachs 1992). 
 Perhaps the most devastating critiques of the Development project came from the 
work of Arturo Escobar (1995) and James Ferguson (1994).  Their analyses progressed by 
paying particular attention to the way in which development operated as a normative 
discourse that exceeded the supposedly centralized power of the state, and by drawing from 
Foucault’s (2008) analysis of socialism’s failure to develop a genuinely alternative art of 
government from that of the capitalist societies to which it was often opposed.  The latter 
contribution was particularly important as it highlighted the manner in which state 
redistribution of wealth following World War II was not merely a capitalist strategy to fend 
off the influence of the Soviet project.  Rather, many newly independent socialist-identified 
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countries throughout Africa sought to promote national development as a model of post-
colonial success, but were often limited both by the normative nature of their productivist 
orientation as well as their top-down programs of implementation and structural impediments 
rooted in the dynamics of global uneven development.   
When thinking of the specificity of the African continent’s experience with 
development, we should be careful to highlight the overlaps and divergences with the 
dominant critiques of the Development project.  For instance, the project on the continent 
arguably preceded World War II9.  The 1920s, 1930s and 1940s witnessed a range of anti-
colonial revolts throughout the continent (James 1995).  France and Britain in particular 
responded to these uprisings with a placating program of development (Cooper 2002).  
Britain passed the “Colonial Development and Welfare Act” in 1940 whereby part of the 
surplus extracted from the colonies would be put towards infrastructure, service provision, 
education, and housing for the colonized populations.  After experiencing a parallel wave of 
revolt and labor strikes, France passed similar legislation in 1946 entitled the “Investment 
Fund for Economic and Social Development.”  Thus, “Both Great Britain and France thought 
they would regain control through their new concept, ‘development’…Developmental 
colonialism was in part a response to the narrowing grounds on which a convincing case 
                                                
9 For a parallel analysis of the planner state as emerging prior to World War II, see Antonio Negri’s 1967 essay, 
“Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State,” pp.23-52 in (1994) Labor of Dionysus, by Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri. In this essay, Negri argues that the Keynesian revolution which led to the mid-century welfare 
state had to be contextualized as the proper response by capital to the 1917 October Revolution and the 1929 
global crisis perpetuated by worker struggles from below.  Thus, the Planner State in Negri’s work might be 
read as another theory of the Development project, but one that reverses the relationship between capital and 
labor by pointing to Development as a project that sought to harness working class autonomy towards the 
development of capital, rather than allowing it to continue along its threatening path of destruction.  For a 
parallel analysis applied to the supposedly socialist countries, see CLR James’s (1986) State Capitalism and 
World Revolution, where he argues that the Soviet Union under Stalin had developed a form of ‘state 
capitalism’ that sought precisely to make a similar intervention as Keynes’ Planner State.  Here the aim was to 
contain rather than support forms of working class resistance such as the powerful council movement of the 
Soviets. 
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could be made for the exercise of state power over people who were ‘different’” (Cooper 
2002: 36-37).  Furthermore, while the meaning of development has become somewhat 
muddied today, at the time of independence in Africa, it was strongly correlated with the 
project of nation-building elaborated by Frantz Fanon.  “Development became the 
centerpiece of the construction of a nation, through giving the rural poor majority (in 
particular) access to the benefits of modernity and industrialization” (Neocosmos 2010b: 
535).  As an important contrast, Neocosmos reminds us that not all states adopted a 
developmental platform.   “The states which were mere extensions of imperialism from an 
early state (e.g. Zaire, Gabon) were never developmental” (Neocosmos 2010b: 536).  Slowly, 
state politics subsumed civil society, becoming more authoritarian, and less developmental in 
the African context. “By 1980 the collapse of the old neo-colonial-statist form of 
development meant the collapse of the developmental state on the continent” (ibid). 
 In South Africa, however, the earlier continental drive to mobilize development as a 
placating strategy deployed against anti-colonial movements instead morphed into a policy of 
separate development with the ascendancy to power of the apartheid government in 1948 
(Cooper 2002: 53-58).  Thus, in many respects South Africa unmasked the brutal reality 
behind the general colonial project of Development.  France and Britain promoted the idea 
that patient Africans—through Development—might one day become just as civilized as 
their European patriarchs.  In South Africa, by contrast, Development brought real material 
benefits to the white minority through mineral-induced economic growth combined with 
state redistribution programs of general welfare, education and housing, while it 
simultaneously disenfranchised and underdeveloped the non-white majority.  The apartheid 
government managed its reliance upon non-white labor by allowing a certain percentage of 
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workers into segregated and dilapidated peri-urban townships close to mines, factories, and 
urban service economies.  Simultaneously, it confined the surplus majority of Africans to 
quasi-sovereign tribal homelands that would be entirely responsible for their own 
populations’ well-being.   
Planning Durban  
Some scholars have pushed back against a common analysis of post-apartheid South 
Africa that has argued for a simple transition to neoliberalism with the ANC’s ascendancy to 
power.  Bill Freund (2013), for example, avoids wholeheartedly endorsing this framework 
because, since its rise to power, the ANC has also placed a high emphasis on tackling urban 
issues that affect South Africa’s most impoverished citizens.  In this vein, it is important to 
recognize that the post-apartheid ruling party was successful in expanding local government 
to include edge cities potentially outside their purview in order to increase the pool of 
revenue they could draw on to redistribute wealth throughout the city. The ANC has 
therefore had to traverse a complex divide between its historical roots and in some respects 
ongoing organization along the lines of a social movement on the one hand, and its desire to 
govern that frames it as a hegemonic political party. The eThekwini Municipality (Durban) is 
perhaps the best case in point, where boundaries were redrawn to capture potential white 
flight and to demobilize the power of traditional rulers who governed the peri-urban sections 
of Bantustans (see figure 1.0).  In Durban, the apartheid government mandated that the 
KwaZulu Bantustan be extended to include peri-urban settlements. This extension 
incorporated townships like Umlazi, today home to roughly 400,000 residents, the second 
largest township in the country after Soweto.  The 1996 and 2001 extension of the Durban 
municipal boundaries (see figure 1.0) would incorporate the southern township of Umlazi, 
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and the northern edge city of Umhlanga—the precise community that the Cornubia housing 
development is seeking to harness to provide jobs to low-income housing recipients.  
Umhlanga had developed as a site of white flight, principally from the previously all-white 
downtown parts of the city (Freund 2002, Padayachee and Freund 2007).  This process 
paralleled the similar pattern occurring throughout the United States following desegregation, 
when wealthier white communities moved to the expanding suburbs and state funds were re-
allocated to support the burgeoning peri-urban and suburban neighborhoods in order to 
preserve white privilege.  And yet, unlike the United States, the ANC was able to 
successfully expand the spatial boundaries of municipalities in order to preempt the 
emergence of upper class, largely white tax havens operating outside the confines of the 
major cities (Cameron 2004). 
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Figure 1.1  Durban pre-1994; Durban today (eThekwini).   
Source: Bill Freund, The African City, p. 187 
In more than one sense, Umhlanga symbolizes the typical features associated with the 
globalized city: a sharp division between a cut-off and protected right and growingly 
unwanted and irregularly supported poor, an obsession with security, and the hunger 
of capital for exploitation of new land for constructing houses and commercial 
property.  The architectural models used are eclectic and international with little or no 
use of any South African indigenous building forms.  While the expansion of 
Umhlanga served to decenter Durban, as in many international examples, the 
gentrification option is however also present in the form of upgrading the wealthiest 
part of the older inner suburbia of Durban.  The stereotyped view of Africa assumes 
that the entire continent is simply cut out of these trends typical of richer nations and 
banished to some outer hell by globalization.  In reality, the example of 
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Durban…shows that these new divisions also form within Africa itself (Freund 2007: 
191). 
 
 Durban was unique in the broader African trajectory of urban planning due to “its 
successful development of a large community of professional urban managers and technical 
specialists following the English model” (Freund 2002: 186).  This basic bureaucratic and 
technical infrastructure for an urban developmental state dates back to the 1940s decade of 
transition to apartheid, (Freund 2013).10 The city’s very existence is owed to its historical ties 
to Johannesburg and the Witwatersrand region where much of South Africa’s minerals are 
found.  Durban became the port city of choice for exporting these minerals, and grew solely 
as a product of the minerals boom that began in the 1880s.  Industrial agglomeration effects 
occurred, allowing for a sizeable textile and car manufacturing industry to emerge alongside 
the port.  The spatial outsourcing of the developmental needs of non-whites to the townships 
and Bantustan authorities, however, meant that rural Zulu authorities in the province of Natal 
did not provide any of the same developmental services to which white South Africans were 
entitled.  Prior to the minerals boom that led to Durban’s growth as a port city, however, the 
most important income generator in the region was the sugar cane business, first launched in 
                                                
10 In a way, Freund’s 2013 argument that the modern developmental state in South Africa is being built on the 
ruins of the 1940s developmental state initiated by the apartheid government problematizes my central claim in 
this chapter: that the developmental state in contemporary South Africa should be read as a response to the new 
social movements which have emerged in the country since 1999.  However, I don’t see the two arguments as 
being in contradiction for two reasons: first, one can accept my argument in this chapter about the 
developmental state emerging as a response to contemporary movements using at least two different sets of 
theories: the primacy of resistance (Hardt and Negri) or the double movement (Polanyi).  I am not particularly 
concerned about which of these two theoretical framings one uses to interpret the findings I present in this 
chapter.  While the primacy of resistance makes the claim that working class resistance simultaneously precedes 
and calls into being new forms of capitalist exploitation and its corresponding structures of state power, the 
double movement is a claim for cyclical periods of state redistribution and relative calm, followed by a period 
of greater emphasis upon the free market, which generates greater degrees of inequality and in turn greater 
numbers of social protest. John Pickles first raised some of these issues on the relationship between Polanyi and 
Negri at a panel examining Polanyi’s work at the 2012 AAG conference in New York.  No one in the audience 
of geographers was able to engage this important intervention, and it remains clear that more work should be 
done in this area, perhaps using South African or other case studies as empirical examples to flush out the 
theoretical stakes. 
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the area in 1843.  Britain had abolished the slave trade a few decades earlier, but the 
Mauritius model of importing labor from India proved a fruitful alternative in Durban by 
1860. As in the Americas, native resistance to agricultural labor played a key role in the 
eventual decision by colonial authorities to rely upon imported labor (Pithouse 2009).  To 
this day, the province remains home to more than half the country’s 1.3 million citizens 
classified racially as “Indians,” and Durban itself is 24% Indian (well above the national 
2.5%).   
 In the late 19th century a number of the largest colonial sugar cane landholders in the 
area combined to form Tongaat Hulett.  Tongaat would go on to become the largest sugar 
cane company in the region, and remains the largest landowner in Durban to this day.  With 
the transition to a more globalized post-apartheid economy, Tongaat sought to diversify its 
holdings by embarking upon a property development component that has grown rapidly.  
Coeval with the property arm of the firm developed a spatial planning division—The 
Tongaat-Hulett Planning Forum.  The Planning Forum has sought to influence the long-term 
spatial planning of city officials in order to harness public planning towards the firm’s private 
interests.  The Cornubia housing development was launched adjacent to Umhlanga as an 
unofficial public-private partnership between Tongaat and the eThekwini Municipality, and 
has so far mirrored precisely these dynamics of deploying public resources towards private 
benefit.  And yet we must remember that the perpetuation of Tongaat’s influence upon local 
government occurred at a time when Durban flouted the broader neoliberal trends by 
expanding the purview of local government rather than contracting it.  These trends of a 
parallel expansion of public-private partnerships—thought to be paradigmatic of neoliberal 
governance—alongside the growth of a strong state government involved in economic and 
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spatial planning as well as the redistribution of wealth through social programs—come 
together to lay the groundwork for the renewal of a developmental state discourse in post-
apartheid South Africa.   
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the demise of developmental thinking worldwide as 
the neoliberal political-economic platform became hegemonic and was seen by many as 
unchallenged in a post-Cold War era.  As previously discussed, parallel to its abandonment 
as an explicit project emerged a strong critique of the development discourse (Crush 1995). 
South Africa’s first majority-rule government took power under the ANC at the same time as 
these sweeping changes were taking place world-wide.  Despite the legacy of broadly 
progressive politics within the anti-apartheid movement, this global conjuncture led the ANC 
to quickly shift from a largely Keynesian macroeconomic plan under the Reconstruction and 
Development Program in 1994 to a heavily neoliberal economic framework under its Growth 
Employment and Redistribution plan by 1996 (Makhulu 2010, Marais 2011, Bond 2000).  
Certain early critiques of the transition to post-apartheid society therefore denounced it as a 
total adoption of neoliberalism (Bond 2000, Desai 2002, Klein 2007).  For some, this meant 
that the old idea of the developmental state was now simply an anachronism.  “The 
developmental state of the 20th century,” argues Michael Neocosmos, “has been 
fundamentally and irretrievably transformed along with the collapse of development as a 
state project in Africa, under the twin pressures of hegemonic globalized neo-liberalism, and 
the popular struggles of the 1980s and 1990s” (2010: 538). And yet, despite the plethora of 
examples of ANC adoption of neoliberal policies, by the early 2000s it became clear that in 
fact the ANC model of development was perhaps better understood as a mixed, hybrid form 
of political economy, where standard neoliberal politics blended with a more developmental 
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oriented state11.  This situated South Africa within a broader multi-polar moment (Sahle 
2010) of the first decade of the 21st century, where thinkers from China, Africa and Latin 
America—some of whom were even being incorporated into the World Bank itself—saw the 
resurgence of the developmental state as challenging both the neoclassical model and the 
theories of underdevelopment (Fine 2010). One of the key recent findings of theorists who 
have been following its rise, fall and resurgence is that “the life of the developmental state is 
no longer confined to the nation-state but has been extended to the local or sectoral 
developmental state”(ibid, 108). The city of Durban is a perfect setting to examine a scaled-
down developmental program within a broader neoliberal context.   
 Durban offers a unique example of an African city that blends models of 
development, with a strong history of explicit urban planning coexisting alongside a broad-
based informal economy (Padayachee and Freund 2002).  Just as South Africa as a whole 
challenges the deployment of neoliberalism or development as mutually exclusive categories, 
the city of Durban provides us with a correction for the monolithic categories of the global 
city of the developed North and the megacity of the underdeveloped and chaotic South. With 
its equal mix of formal and informal economies, planned and unplanned city-making 
processes, “Perhaps coming to grips with Durban is a way to start bringing two kinds of 
literature together in order to enrich our picture of what is happening to cities generally in the 
contemporary world” (Padayachee and Freund 2002: 3). 
BRICS, State Capitalism and a Changing World System 
  In March 2013, Durban played host to the Fifth BRICS Summit that brought together 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.  When South Africa joined the BRICS 
                                                
11 Within this broader conjuncture, it is important to note that James Ferguson has engaged in an unstated re-
examination of his earlier rigorous critique of development (see my discussion of Ferguson’s recent work in 
Chapter 4).   
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countries in 2010, it represented an important step towards a more complete South-South 
integration of the Latin American, Asian and African continents within this alternative global 
alliance.  The BRICS countries—most particularly China—are often presented as 
paradigmatic examples of a growing form of state capitalism.  This trend led The Economist 
magazine to dedicate an entire issue to the phenomenon in early 2012, out of concern for 
what it meant for the long-standing tradition of liberal capitalism.  
State capitalism is on the march, overflowing with cash and emboldened by the crisis 
in the West.  State companies make up 80% of the value of the stockmarket in China, 
62% in Russia and 38% in Brazil.  They accounted for one-third of the emerging 
world’s foreign direct investment between 2003 and 2010 and an even higher 
proportion of its most spectacular acquisitions, as well as a growing proportion of the 
very largest firms: three Chinese state-owned companies rank among the world’s ten 
biggest companies by revenue, against only two European ones.  Add the exploits of 
sovereign-wealth funds to the ledger, and it begins to look as if liberal capitalism is in 
wholesale retreat…The Chinese have a phrase for it: ‘The state advances while the 
private sector retreats.’  This is now happening on a global scale (Wooldridge 2012).   
 
 The concern expressed here by writers in The Economist represented a Western 
recognition that the era of triumphant neoliberalism and the supposed “End of the Nation 
State” (Guehenno 2000) had never fully come to fruition.  What is more, following the 2008 
crisis stimulated by the housing collapse in the United States, neoliberal orthodoxy was 
everywhere under question.  Despite the response of austerity in Europe and the West, many 
other areas of the world were bulking up their state and its corresponding nationalized firms 
and social welfare programs.  As the authors of the special report in The Economist argued: 
“Trotsky always insisted on the impossibility of ‘socialism in one country’.  The same logic 
applies to state capitalism.  State-capitalist powers inevitably look outward as well as inward.  
China is the world’s biggest exporter as well as its biggest energy consumer.  Russia and the 
Gulf states are energy superpowers.  But they are also conscious that they are newcomers in a 
global market that was created by America and Europe.  So they frequently stick together, 
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striking deals among themselves and forging ever closer ideological links” (The Economist 
2012).  
The Durban conference presented precisely such an opportunity for further 
entrenchment of a South-South alliance as one alternative to the post-Washington Consensus.  
The conference attendees initially proposed to create a $50 billion BRICS New Development 
Bank that would begin to challenge the hegemony of the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank as the hegemonic international financial institutions.  They ultimately agreed 
to a $100 billion fund.   It also launched a BRICS think tank that will play a central role in 
elaborating the precise nature of the BRICS developmental state model, and penned a 
“BRICS Multilateral Infrastructure Co-Financing Agreement for Africa” intended to 
facilitate the co-financing of infrastructure projects by BRICS countries throughout the 
African continent.  In a keynote address to the newly launched BRICS think-tank, South 
African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, 
argued against the view of some critics that the new alliance represented a collection of 
“‘sub-imperialist’ countries that are joining the club of traditional powers.  These critics talk 
of what they call a ‘new scramble’ for Africa, comparing the growing interest on our 
continent by BRICS countries to late 19th century when European colonial powers partitioned 
Africa among themselves” (2013: 6).  Nkoana-Mashabane claimed that sub-imperialism was 
not a category that could be applied to the BRICS alliance because Wallerstein’s center-
periphery model no longer mapped onto the more properly globalized context that BRICS 
nations faced. The minister went on to cite Paolo Freire, Frantz Fanon, W.E.B. Du Bois, 
Immanuel Wallertstein, and Amartya Sen in a speech that argued for BRICS as a unifying 
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project because their countries shared “a history of struggle against colonialism and 
underdevelopment, including the spirit of Bandung” (7).   
Others were much more skeptical of the prospects emerging from this body that was 
claiming it represented a re-ordering of geoeconomic global structures (Cowen and Smith 
2009). “While we recognize the importance of developing the infrastructure of our continent, 
the example of South Africa is a case in point,” argued Fatima Shabodien, a feminist political 
activist with ActionAid South Africa.  “Infrastructure without a defined redistributive 
mechanism does not do much for poor.  Yes, it may grow businesses, but how does it lift 
people out of poverty?  It is a cold comfort to the South African poor that they live in the 
African country with the most developed infrastructure on the continent while struggling to 
access water, electricity, decent housing and quality education for children” (2013: 14).  And 
if the model of South African infrastructure couldn’t be exported as a poverty-alleviating 
project, Patrick Bond went further in denouncing the entire BRICS program as being in 
collusion with imperialism.  “South African, US, European, Australian, and Canadian firms 
have been joined by major firms from China, India and Brazil in the region.  Their work has 
mainly built upon colonial infrastructural foundations—road, rail, pipeline and port 
expansion—for the sake of minerals, petroleum and gas extraction.  BRICS appears entirely 
consistent with facilitating this activity, especially through the proposed BRICS Bank” 
(2013: 69).   
Yet this new alliance of middle-income countries should not be viewed simply from 
the perspective of the conquering of foreign resources under the guise of developmentalism.  
Most critics positioned BRICS as cooperating with Western imperialism, or as part of a 
multilateral global project that presents its own project of sub-imperialism.  But few analysts 
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captured the importance of BRICS within a broader context of a shift in global hegemons. 
Bond highlighted the danger that BRICS interest in Africa would present in the face of 
increased US military presence on the continent, especially through AFRICOM.  But this 
militarism should also be situated within an overall decline of US power, something 
Immanuel Wallerstein has been arguing since the mid-1970s.  While the US enjoyed a brief 
period of global hegemony for two decades following World War II, it soon ran up against a 
global crisis that Wallerstein analyzed as in part a product of the success of the anti-colonial 
struggles.  “When the cumulated Third World pressures, most notably Vietnam, were added 
on, a restructuring of the world division of labor was inevitable, involving probably in the 
1970s a quadripartite division of the larger part of the world surplus by the U.S., the 
European Common Market, Japan, and the U.S.S.R.  Such a decline in U.S. state hegemony 
has actually increased the freedom of action of capitalist enterprises” (2000: 99). 
Following the 2013 Durban conference, Wallerstein re-assessed the decline of US 
hegemony within the context of the rise of the BRICS countries, arguing that a multi-polar 
structure of eight to twelve powers indeed seemed to be filling the vacuum left by “the post-
hegemonic decline of U.S. power, prestige and authority” (2013).  For Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri, however, a similar decline of US hegemony is best captured by the collapse 
of the Project for a New American Century, encapsulated in their own terms as “a failed coup 
d’état” over the global power structure. Drawing from the US State Department’s Richard 
Haas, they make the claim that Wallerstein’s assessment of an emerging multipolarity is still 
based on an outdated model that privileged nation-states as lying at the center of the global 
political economy.  In its place they put forward the idea of “a form of network power, which 
required the wide collaboration of dominant nation-states, major corporations, supranational 
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economic and political institutions, various NGOs, media conglomerates, and a series of 
other powers” (2009: 205).  This represents a world dominated by what Richard Hass calls 
“non-polarity”, and Hardt and Negri term “Empire”.  The call to examine empire’s world of 
non-polarity, however, does not operate with quite the same relative erasure of the nation-
state that is often leveled at them as a critique, especially from geographers (see, for example, 
Sparke 2005: 239-312).  The world of non-polarity should not necessarily be read as the 
product of a shift towards what they termed earlier—borrowing from Deleuze—as a 
geopolitically “smooth space” of global empire12.  Rather, drawing from Saskia Sassen, 
Hardt and Negri understand the de-nationalizing trends in the contemporary interregnum 
between imperialism and Empire as operating at multiple, striated geographical scales. “The 
emerging global order, she argues, is forming not only outside of nation-states, but also, and 
more important, within them, initiating a process of the ‘denationalization’ of certain 
components of the nation-state that makes them increasingly oriented toward global agendas 
and systems.  The global is within the national, in other words, just as much as the national is 
within the global” (223).  Cities thus become a crucial site for re-thinking the processes of 
globalization: not simply as concrete instantiations of an abstract theory of the global, but as 
a denationalizing scale with its own concrete dynamics linked up to processes that transcend 
the national or regional.  “Sassen thus proposes reading the emergent global political and 
institutional order in terms of assemblages in which ‘the nation-state and interstate system 
                                                
12 Even this reference has been mis-read by geographers, however.  Deleuze’s concept of smooth space should 
be read not as absent differentiation, but as horizontally heterogeneous power against the state’s own vertical 
homogeneous power.  A geographical elaboration of the relationship between deterritorializing smooth space 
and reterritorializing state spaces remains to flushed out fully.. David Harvey attempts to capture something like 
this in his distinction, drawing from Giovanni Arrighi, between the “territorial” and the “capitalist” logics of 
power (2003: 27).   Stuart Elden (2005 & 2006) also tries to begin such a conversation.  But both Harvey’s and 
Elden’s analyses are ultimately found wanting, leaving us with the need to provide further examination of the 
relationship between geography and Empire, and a more rigorous theoretical engagement with Hardt and 
Negri’s overarching project. 
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remain critical building blocks but they are not alone, and are profoundly altered from the 
inside out’” (ibid).  
 The heterogeneous processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization (Arnold 
and Pickles 2011: 1618) that occur within globalization must therefore be situated as flowing 
not only from the outside in but also from the inside out.  In South Africa, this has meant that 
the developmental state program has in fact been displaced from the national to the local 
terrain of government.  Thus municipalities, especially the eight major metropolitan areas of 
Buffalo, Cape Town, Ekurhuleni (Johannesburg), eThekwini (Durban), Johannesburg, 
Mangaung (Bloomfontein), Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane, are tasked with 
implementing both regional economic plans and with redistributing wealth through public 
housing and adequate service provision.  Often, city administrations adopt a platform of 
developing their municipality into a “world city” (McDonald 2008) capable of attracting 
global flows of investment, tourism, and prestigious summits like the one Durban hosted for 
the BRICS countries.  The city-scale is thus partially able to transcend the national-scale in 
leaping immediately to the global through such a world city platform.  The danger here is 
that the developmental plan will not only be subsumed under the demands of neoliberal 
globalization, but that the local developmental initiatives of each municipality will evolve 
independently of a surrounding rural countryside, still home to roughly four out of every ten 
South Africans 
This spatially bifurcated nature of the developmental state in South Africa is perhaps 
most obvious when the local state is assigned the task of dealing with the problem of slums.  
Most of the shack dwellers that have set up a home in the precarious areas of informal 
settlements over the past thirty years are the product of a rural-to-urban migration patterns 
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whereby Africans continue to move from the “traditional homelands” known as Bantustans 
into the forbidden quarters of the formerly white apartheid city (see Figure 1.1).   
 
Figure 1.2 Apartheid’s Rural Geography of Homelands 
Source: © MATRIX Michigan State University 
Urban Informal Settlements: The Growth of Shack Communities 
While they are an old phenomenon dating to the arrival of Dutch settlers in the 
Western Cape, urban informal settlements first began to experience exponential growth with 
the repeal of the influx control laws.  These laws, dating most prominently to the 1923 Native 
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Urban Areas Act, intended to allow a limited number of Africans access to white cities to 
provide labor, while the majority would be confined to peri-urban townships and the 
countryside.  After coming to power in 1948, the apartheid government passed a series of 
measures intended to make non-white access to the city even more restricted, while 
physically confining a majority of the African population to rural Bantustans (Figure 1.1).  A 
series of pass laws severely restricting the freedom of movement of non-white populations 
were repealed in 1986, in an effort to prolong the apartheid government’s hold on power by 
realizing one of the central demands of the anti-apartheid struggle.  Instead, it led to a 
dramatic peak in rural-to-urban migration with Africans setting up shacks in any open land 
they could find on the outskirts of the city or even within its very heart.  In 1984 
approximately one million shack dwellers lived in Durban, and by 1988, two years following 
the repeal of influx control, this number had skyrocketed to roughly 1.7 million (Pithouse 
2009: 33). 
 Part of the specific dynamic fueling the growth of shack communities in Durban was 
the on-going war between the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party 
throughout the entire province of Natal in the 1980s and early 1990s.  Often when violence 
peaked in the countryside or the surrounding peri-urban areas, entire communities were 
displaced and took up new homes in a shack community further within the heart of the city.  
“But not all shack dwellers were political refugees,” argues Richard Pithouse.   
For example, the new shacks could enable the reunification of families split apart by 
the migrant labor system.  This included families where women domestic workers 
had been living in their employer’s outbuildings.  Shacks also enabled people fleeing 
rural poverty to access the opportunities of the city.  Some shack dwellers had been 
evicted from white farms, while others were in flight from abusive conditions on 
those farms.  The settlements also provided an important safety net for people—
especially women, teenagers and sometimes even children—fleeing abusive 
relationships.  They created living space for newly formed urban households and as 
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many as half the residents of new settlements were already urbanized.  Sometimes 
these were people who had grown up in township houses, and in many other instances 
they were people who had previously been living in backyard shacks in townships 
(ibid). 
 
We should therefore read the growth of shack communities initially as a broader part of what 
urban theorists of informality have begun terming “insurgency,” (Miraftab 2009) and “quiet 
encroachment” (Bayat 1997).  As “social nonmovements,” these processes represent largely 
successful attempts by poor people to improve their lives by acting largely individually and 
outside the parameters of formal organizations and state institutions. These actions often 
occur outside the dominant legal parameters of a given society.  “These nonmovements are 
not based in ideology, nor on organized demands, nor are they coordinated as such.  However 
the collective effect of these disparate actions is to shift the locus of control away from 
planners and privileged interests and towards those at the margins” (Ballard 2014: 8). 
 On the other hand, it is important to note that there were also a number of examples 
of organized land invasions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as a part of official movement 
attempts to rapidly destabilize a crumbling apartheid regime (Gigaba and Maharaj 1996).  
Many informal settlements were also born through such formally organized movement 
processes.  Nonetheless, recognizing the key role played by what urban theorists term 
insurgency and quiet encroachment as a crucial method that poor people relied upon to 
improve their lives is important because it is a process too often occluded by the dominant 
categories deployed to understand marginalized communities.  “Precisely because of this 
largely silent and free-form mobilization, the current focus on the notion of ‘civil society’ 
tends to belittle or totally ignore the vast arrays of often uninstitutionalized and hybrid social 
activities which have dominated urban politics in many developing countries” (Bayat 1997: 
55). 
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Spatial Justice, the Rural-Urban Divide, and Post-Apartheid Housing Policy  
 Rural landlessness was a key driver of this rural-to-urban migration in South Africa, 
conceived here as a nonsocial movement.  If the apartheid government was successful 
because of its ability to draw upon a long legacy of centralized despotism in the cities and a 
decentralized despotism in the countryside, then the anti-apartheid struggle and its eventual 
ANC government both suffered from a lack of attention to the legacy of this spatially 
bifurcated structure of power.13  The focus has remained largely on urban areas, both as sites 
of potential economic growth and as the principal areas in need of redistributive 
developmental initiatives.  Housing policy has been no exception.  The two central pieces of 
policy in the arena of housing have been the 1994 White Paper on Housing and the 2004 
Breaking New Ground.  While the evolution of housing policy appears to point to an overall 
progressive shift within the ANC, broadening the lens of analysis to include the lack of 
continuity between successive administrations, the low availability of land for housing 
developments, and urban policy as a whole allows us to recognize why efforts to develop a 
truly progressive approach to housing in the country have fallen short.   
 The 1994 White Paper on Housing reflected the extent to which market-based service 
delivery was to penetrate ANC policy over at least the next decade.  The document enshrined 
key principles such as the right for all South Africans to “a permanent residential structure 
with secure tenure, ensuring privacy and providing adequate protection against the elements; 
and potable water, adequate sanitary facilities including waste disposal and domestic 
electricity supply” (Tissington 2011: 59).  The manner in which the state proposed to realize 
                                                
13 Mahmood Mamdani’s Citizen and Subject (1996) remains the central point of reference for this formulation.  
It requires extensive ongoing engagement, with an eye to how the situation in South Africa may have changed 
since the book’s release.  Despite my heavy debt to Mamdani’s framework, readers familiar with his work may 
already begin to sense certain points of distanciation from his ideas.  I take up the relation between my own 
study and Mamdani’s in the conclusion. 
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such admirable goals was largely market-based.  Rather than the state building homes and 
transferring ownership to individuals below a certain income, or renting them out at a heavily 
subsidized rate, the plan was to incentivize private developers to enter the state-subsidized 
market for low-income housing while providing future home-owners with the start-up capital 
to access the credit and resources that would enable them to purchase a home within this 
subsidized market.   “The intention was to deliver a ‘starter house’ (sometimes consisting of 
building materials, where the subsidy only covered land and servicing costs), which 
beneficiaries would add to and consolidate over time.  This incremental way of achieving the 
right to housing was related to a key assumption in the policy that beneficiaries would be 
able to access loan finance, which would be spent on improving the house” (Charlton and 
Kihato, quoted in Tissington: 61). 
 Already by the end of Mandela’s presidency, this market-based logic had evolved 
slowly by moving beyond the provision of starter materials towards a more comprehensive 
promise of delivering completed homes.  As a result of being placed lower down on the list 
of national priorities, the homes that were built were often located on the urban peripheries, 
where cheaper land was available, but where corresponding services such as roads, 
electricity, water and sanitation were not readily available, as originally promised in the 1994 
White Paper.   Additional complaints were raised by housing occupants who were concerned 
by the dramatic increase in transportation costs for them to commute from distant urban 
peripheries into the city core where job opportunities were more abundant.  The crucial issue 
of spatial justice was clearly neglected by an overly technocratic approach to housing 
delivery.  “The location and density of affordable housing makes a significant difference to 
the overall costs and benefits of housing to South African society over time and that housing 
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that is well-located in urban centers, even though it financially costs much more to build, 
(due to higher land prices) actually has more benefits for society and costs less over time than 
does much cheaper housing on the periphery” (62).  Indeed, many people who have received 
a state subsidized house (commonly referred to as an “RDP house”, named after the 1994 
Reconstruction and Development Programme) since the end of apartheid eventually sell their 
homes or decide to rent them out illegally, while choosing to remain in more centrally 
located informal settlements. As one consultant working on Cornubia for the eThekwini 
department of housing told me, “There is often times resistance from people that are living in 
the far south to be relocated here because they live in squat camps because they can find 
work closer to where they’re living.  Or they’ve got a social structure that they’re reliant on 
and they prefer to go with it” (Fedaya Ebrahim, Interview, August 2013).   
While the overall delivery numbers might appear impressive, the location, quality, 
and size of the homes were all problematic, while the manner in which the homes were 
delivered reflected a technocratic approach that was compartmentalized off from the central 
issue of land reform in the countryside.  Thus, while the ANC boasted of approving the 
construction of 3 million low-income homes by 2007, the criticisms of the policy’s short-
sighted, segregated approach to housing are raising a number of important issues, the most 
glaring of which is arguably unfulfilled promise of land reform.  “The government often 
notes that the backlog is increasing due to rapid urbanization, amongst other factors.  It 
currently estimates the backlog at around 2 million units” (Tissington: 61).  The steady 
growth in a housing backlog, therefore, threatens to undermine any of the temporary gains 
that housing construction and subsidies have achieved to-date.  
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 A decade after the government penned its original White Paper on Housing, South 
Africa was witnessing a massive “rebellion of the poor” with some of the highest rates of 
urban unrest in the world (Alexander 2010).  In this context, the National Department of 
Housing (later renamed the Department of Human Settlements) signaled a comprehensive 
shift in policy with the announcement of its “Breaking New Ground” report in 2004.  Part of 
BNG’s shift included a recognition by the ANC that local government should take the 
initiative away from the private sector with regards to developmental initiatives.  The reasons 
for the shift to local government were arguably multiple and complex. 
According to Charlton and Kihato, the reasons for this include a combination of the 
following: a move towards the creation of a strong local state more generally after 
1999; the political imperative of local government councilors to gain greater 
influence over a visible aspect of state delivery; the need for spatial and 
programmatic alignment with integrated development planning (particularly with 
respect to the delivery of bulk services); reaction to the negative perceptions of the 
white construction industry; a concern for getting the best deal for beneficiaries 
through maximizing the value of the subsidy and perceptions of poor construction and 
abuse by private developers; the withdrawal of private sector actors from low-income 
housing delivery due to tightening environmental regulations; delays in township 
registration and transfer of title deeds; and increasing financial risk.  Some saw this 
shift to state control of housing delivery as a positive move that would reduce the 
interest of the private sector in housing and enable a strong, development-orientated 
local state.  Others, however argued that the shift was due to the fact that private 
developers had struggles to make profits from low-cost housing projects and wanted 
to be free of such obligations (64). 
 
The new BNG policy emphasized a need for government to focus more on quality than 
quantity, while paying greater attention to the process of home allocation rather than the 
mere ends of delivery.  This was supposed to entail a greater participatory role for 
community members most directly affected by housing initiatives, while seeking to go 
beyond the allocation of a set number of homes towards the total eradication of slums by the 
year 2014 (66).  Ten years later, the problem of slums not only persists, but has grown in 
each major metropolitan area of the country.  The slum eradication language of BNG was 
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adopted from the United Nation’s own Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
(Huchzermeyer 2011: 23-46).  The MDGs were clearly targeting slums for eradication with 
the idea of providing alternative accommodation for people forced to live in shacks.  
Unfortunately, the language of slum eradication was adopted by governments around the 
world, including South Africa, in a manner divorced from the eventual allocation of housing 
to those whose slums had been eradicated! 
 The BNG document also aimed to better integrate the diverse aspects of city planning 
within the new approach to housing.  Economic development, employment, and spatial 
planning would now be considered alongside housing so as to avoid some of the 
shortcomings of the earlier approach to housing delivery.  Arguably the two key innovations 
in policy included in the BNG revolved around the emphasis upon local government as the 
lead actor in delivery and the recognition of in situ upgrading as a valid approach to new 
housing construction.  The primacy assigned to local government is intended to represent a 
shift away from a supply-driven approach where the private sector fills a market gap in low-
income housing with a demand-driven approach where municipal governments actively plan 
the spatial layout of housing initiatives while paying attention to the qualitative nature of 
housing requirements in their specific locales.   The emphasis upon in situ upgrading entailed 
“the recognition and permanent incorporation of informally developed neighborhoods into 
the city” (Huchzermeyer 2011: 69).   
In situ upgrading has long been a central demand of a number of the social 
movements organized around housing issues, including Abahlali.  Longtime Abahlali leader 
and spokesman S’bu Zikode, most recently rearticulated this demand in an address to the 
Department of Human Settlements national meeting on upgrading informal settlements in 
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Cape Town.   “There are some cases when residents of a shack settlement might choose 
relocation to a nearby and well located site chosen with and not for the residents,” admitted 
Zikode.  “This might happen if, for example, people are living on a dangerous site such as a 
river bank or a site with which they are not comfortable, such as a graveyard.  However in 
most cases people prefer in situ upgrading to relocation” (2013).  Yet the fact that BNG 
incorporated movement demands for a marginalization of the profit-motive and a recognition 
of the need for in situ upgrading in its new policy has born little practical fruit in the actual 
implementation of housing developments throughout the country.   This is best encapsulated 
in the city of Durban through the municipality’s flagship housing development for the poor, 
Cornubia. 
Post-Apartheid Housing 2.0? The Case of Cornubia  
Cornubia is located in northern Durban, just beyond the city’s old pre-1994 
boundaries.   The area is now firmly within the post-2001 expanded Unicity, the eThekwini 
Metropolitan Area.  The settlement lies approximately three kilometers inland from the coast, 
and is wedged in between the N2 and M4 highways. The roads serve as natural barriers 
between Umhlanga, a predominantly white middle and upper class community to the south-
east, Mount Edgecombe, a golf course and gated community to the south, and the historically 
Indian township of Phoenix and the Indian community of Verulam to the West and North.  
Located at the intersection of these various communities, and as a development initially 
geared towards the needs of the city’s poorest residents who are almost entirely African, 
Cornubia—at least according to its planners—offers the potential of contributing to a broader 
effort to desegregate South African cities. As part of this effort, the importance of the 
expansion of municipal boundaries to include Umhlanga cannot be overstated.  As I argued 
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earlier, this allows the municipality to capture both the tax base of an otherwise runaway 
white community, while harnessing the location of Umhlanga—the largest shopping mall in 
the entire city is situated here—as part of a broader economic growth pole to provide nearby 
economic opportunities for future residents of Cornubia.   
When Mayor Mlaba first announced plans for the housing development in late 2005, 
he proclaimed that the land required for housing would be obtained based on a mutual 
understanding with the land owner, Tongaat Hulett, the largest sugar cane company and 
property developer in the area.  Initial press reports and statements by employees of Tongaat 
made it appear as though there was already a comfortable agreement between the ANC-
dominated municipality and the property arm of Tongaat that controlled the land, known as 
Moreland until 2010.  “The land is owned by Moreland Developments, part of the Tongaat-
Hulett Group. Moreland is in full support of the project and recognises the land is ‘uniquely 
positioned to make a key strategic contribution to the consolidation and integration’ of the 
area” (Verwey: 1).  And yet it is clear that the relationship between the two organizations 
remained far from cordial as the project progressed.  The main group articulating opposition 
from the start was the Democratic Alliance (DA), the largest opposition party in local and 
national politics.  “The DA's Lyn Ploos van Amstel said she was "outraged" at the plan 
because it had not been put to council. ‘The mayor has bypassed the council and he has to 
know that this plan is going to be controversial as it is going to affect property prices in 
bordering areas,’ she said” (ibid).  The base of the DA is rooted historically in white liberal 
communities who supported the Democratic Party, operating uncomfortably from within the 
apartheid government but against the ruling National Party. In 2000, however, the 
Democratic Party became the Democratic Alliance after it merged briefly with the New 
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National Party, a reconfiguration of the old apartheid stalwart.  Since 2000, it has worked 
tirelessly to dispel the image that it is a predominantly white party, representing the interests 
of a minority group clinging to the vestiges of apartheid-era privileges.  It has been most 
successful, however, in carving out support from Coloured and Indian constituencies 
nationally, dividing the coalition around a broadly defined ‘blackness’ that dated to Steve 
Biko’s Black Consciousness Movement.  The Western Cape has been its strongest support 
base, the very province that contains the least number of Black (“African”) residents. 
 The DA has grown largely through a discourse of individual responsibility and the 
necessity to downsize the supposed nanny state the ANC has created.  It should be 
understood therefore as even more thoroughly supportive of neoliberal policies than the 
ANC.  It also uses the accusations of corruption against many ANC members to claim that it 
would fight for a clean and transparent government.  The reality of their support base, 
however, means that it should be viewed as an even stronger supporter of white capital in the 
country than the ANC, which has also tried hard not to endanger the interests of the many 
white dominated businesses throughout the country.  A number of the most prominent white 
firms departed South Africa after the end of apartheid, moving their headquarters to the 
London stock exchange and in the process gutting the country of a massive source of tax 
income.  Those that remained did so on the condition that the ANC would not adopt radical 
policies geared at nationalizing industries and redistributing land and wealth, particularly 
across race lines.  The ANC has therefore been caught in a bind between cracking down on 
the legacy of apartheid acquired wealth and the continued necessity to rely upon white capital 
as a tax base and as a powerful constituency that tolerates their rule even while it denounces 
them in public.   
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 Tongaat Hulett is precisely one of those firms that acquired its wealth and power in 
the colonial and apartheid eras, and that the DA defends.  So although initial reports on 
Cornubia stated that an agreement had been reached between the firm and the municipal 
government led by the ANC, the reality was vastly different. Public statements proclaimed 
Tongaat Hulett’s support for the project, but in private the organization was panicking.  On 
August 20, 2008, the front page of The Mercury newspaper read “City threatens big land 
grab,” and began an article with the following statement: “The eThekwini Municipality 
yesterday threatened to expropriate 1,200ha of Tongaat-Hulett Developments-owned sugar 
cane fields to fast-track a massive low-income integrated housing development near 
Umhlanga” (Savides: 1).  The issue of land expropriation was already in the public eye, in 
part because of the unresolved nature of the issue in the country, but more prominently 
because of the ongoing land reform taking place in Zimbabwe, reported on in the South 
African and western press as essentially an attack on white people.  But Tongaat 
intransigence had apparently led the city to threaten expropriation.  “It emerged from a report 
presented to the municipality’s executive committee, and elaborated upon at a subsequent 
ANC press conference, that councillors are frustrated by the pace of negotiations over the 
giant development” (ibid). 
 The precise reasons for the lack of progress were revealing; Tongaat was worried by 
the number of low-income homes the city hoped to place adjacent to the middle and upper 
income neighborhoods they had already put so much effort into developing. “According to 
sources close to the negotiations, one of the biggest areas of contention was the 
municipality’s insistence on having 15 000 low-cost houses.  Tongaat-Hulett was insisting on 
a fully integrated development comprising many different land uses, and to do this 
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effectively it was necessary to decide on the number of low-cost houses as the development 
was planned in greater detail” (ibid).  The language of “integrated development” is 
particularly interesting here, because it appears to operate as code for supposed racial and 
class ‘diversity,’ meaning that space in Cornubia would be created for middle and upper 
income homeowners, rather than just low-income people. On the one hand, this is part of the 
trend in public housing to create integrated communities as an ethical project.  Inspired by a 
New Urbanist ideology, the Hope VI public housing plan in the United States operated 
explicitly under this model, with the problematic justification that poor families would 
benefit from being exposed to the supposed work ethic and general high morality of middle 
class families.  On the other hand, from a property developers perspective, the insistence 
upon limiting the number of low-income homes is part of a broader profit-driven strategy to 
not drive general home prices down and to create more room in the overall project of 
Cornubia for off-shoot profit-seeking ventures that Tongaat would be clearly benefit from. 
Karen Petersen, who served as project manager of Cornubia for Tongaat Hulett 
between 2006 and 2012, made it clear to me that the municipal government and Tongaat 
were at loggerheads in the early years of the initiative.  “There were expropriation threats.  
They [municipal government] said, we’re keeping all the best land, you got it through bad 
means, it’s the people’s land” (Interview, July 2013). Petersen acknowledges the historical 
backdrop to the conversation, and the sense that Tongaat acquired its land at a time when it 
was extremely difficult for non-whites, and impossible for Africans living outside 
Bantustans, to own land.  The reference to the “people’s land” harkens back to the Freedom 
Charter adopted by the ANC at the Congress of the People in 1955, and which declared 
triumphantly: “The land shall be shared among those who work it!  Restrictions of land 
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ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who 
work it to banish famine and land hunger.”  The charter even included a provision on land 
rights acquired through occupation, proclaiming “all shall have the right to occupy land 
wherever they choose.”  The ANC is thus able to periodically draw upon this unfulfilled 
agenda of the anti-apartheid struggle, although it is one they have been equally complicit in 
abandoning.  
Tongaat employee Petersen explained why the firm was so worried about loosing 
their land.  “Remember, they were going to expropriate.  This would have been over a billion 
Rand.  Even the agriculture and the sugar cane is worth millions sitting in the middle of the 
city. Our benchmark is 1 million rand a hectare, un-serviced, un-zoned” (ibid).  The open 
reference to the full market value of the land should not surprise us.  The number one 
concern of Tongaat was clearly the profit potential of the land they owned, not the project to 
provide poor South Africans with formal housing.  And therefore, as a means to avoid losing 
the land to expropriation, Tongaat eventually came to the table with an alternative offer: “So 
they started in 2008.  We decided, look, we can’t go through the expropriation, negative 
publicity, damage to the brand, you know the whole thing…Let’s see if we can meet them 
half-way, we know we want to get rid of some land, we know we want to do mixed use and 
mixed income…So we decided to sell it off, the first time we’ve ever done something so 
big…It’s now the single largest real estate transaction in the country” (ibid).  The open 
reference to the desire to off-load land together with the expressed concern about negative 
PR effects that could result as a by-product of forced expropriation represents the fact that 
Tongaat is almost embarrassed to own so much land because the land was acquired by a 
white firm first under colonial South Africa and later under an institutionally racist apartheid 
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government.  Thus Tongaat’s ongoing agenda includes property development precisely as 
one way to off-load some of the land they own so as not to highlight the extreme 
contradiction between the ongoing concentrated wealth held by apartheid-era firms on the 
one hand, and landlessness amongst Africans on the other hand.  While it certainly is a large 
transaction—totaling 659 hectares—the fact that it remains the largest sale of land in the 
country is representative of the incredibly slow pace of land changing hands from the 
historical beneficiaries of apartheid to its historical victims. 
The expressed interest in working on a “mixed-use”—commercial, industrial, 
residential—development is somewhat complicated, given that this could also be interpreted 
as a strategy by Tongaat to generate even more revenue by selling off land to powerful 
commercial and industrial firms that would pay a higher rate for properly zoned land than 
residential developers.  Nonetheless, this is also a central aspect of the Cornubia vision, and 
for good reason.  Cornubia represents an overall shift in the national housing strategy 
following the Breaking New Ground policy of 2004.  Under BNG, “for the first time, 
housing policy enabled a municipality…to quantify its cost and to apply for the relevant 
amount of funding for land purchase, land rehabilitation, introduction of services and 
provision of basic social and economic facilities” (Huchzermeyer 2011: 116).  This 
represented a shift away from the compartmentalized approach to plopping down public 
housing in the urban peripheries as a supposed solution to homelessness and informal 
settlements.  Instead, the new policy was intended to address the fact that human settlements 
required an integrated approach that took into consideration the fact that people chose to live 
in particular areas because of access to services and income opportunities.  Cornubia’s 
mixed-use approach would represent one attempt to provide a number of services and 
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employment opportunities on-site, and should therefore be seen as a positive step in the 
evolution of a national housing policy that understands the developmental concerns of 
economic growth as socially and spatially intertwined with quality of life issues regarding 
formal housing. As Fedaya Ebrahim, a consultant for the Durban municipality’s housing 
department, told me, “previously the poorest in the poor were dumped in any land that they 
could find.  More often than not it was land that was out of the CBD [Central Business 
District] or away from housing, away from economical opportunities, so it created hardship 
for people. Besides just having a housing project, there was no social facilities, no schools, 
no sports facilities, no retail opportunities, things like that.  So Cornubia seeks to address all 
of that” (Interview, August 2013). 
But Tongaat’s representatives within the Cornubia project were not shy about 
admitting where their own interests lay with regards to their informal partnership with the 
municipality.  Not only was it clear from Petersen’s remarks that the profit-motive remained 
the firm’s primary objective, other issues emerged in our conversation that painted an even 
more problematic picture of the organization playing a central role in one of South Africa’s 
flagship public housing initiatives.  Because Cornubia is an unofficial partnership between 
the firm and the municipal government, roughly half the land remains under Tongaat’s 
ownership, which they will prepare for sale to industrial and commercial buyers, as well as 
for middle or upper-income residential developments.  Pointing to the half of Cornubia land 
that was sold to the city, Petersen commented, “This land here isn’t the greatest.  So it started 
off, so we got willing buyer, willing seller…So this land went for 725,000 Rand per hectare.  
It’s not the best, it’s shitty land.”  Petersen was frank in her admission that Tongaat had 
pushed the worst land into the city’s hands, and th
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market rate for the sub-par land intended to be the site of low-income houses for shack 
dwellers.  “Willing buyer, willing seller” is the term the ANC adopted for the land reform 
plan that was never really land reform.  It amounted to a policy based entirely on free market 
principles.  If someone wanted to sell land, and they found a willing buyer, then land could 
exchange hands. Such a policy of land reform is effectively absent any genuine reform. 
Despite the origins of the development in a massive market-rate transfer of wealth 
from the government to a private firm in exchange for “shitty land,” the project’s sheer scale 
and ambitious plan still attracted national admiration.  Cornubia is the “largest greenfield, 
mixed-use, mixed-income project in, we say in the country, but probably in the 
province…It’s a presidential lead project now, and it won the best priority project in 
KwaZulu-Natal.”  The focus on Cornubia results not only from its attempts “to address the 
legacy of apartheid planning,” as Petersen claimed.  It has garnered attention first and 
foremost because it seeks to address the plight of shack dwellers on a massive and all-
encompassing scale.  The years of Cornubia’s birth corresponded with national attention 
given to slums in part because South Africa was preparing to host the 2010 World Cup and 
the government became self-conscious about tourists viewing slums as a blight on an 
otherwise pristine landscape.  The discourse on slum eradication was adopted, and Cornubia 
was initially intended to form a part of that initiative.  As Petersen elaborated, “eThekwini 
has informal settlements, like any other city.  So where were we going to move people?  
Cornubia can form part of the slum clearance program.  It’s part of the whole eradication of 
slums.  2005-2009.  They’ve sort of lost focus now, it’s not really the aim any more” 
(Petersen).    
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Slum eradication is itself an extremely problematic and ambiguous discourse, in large 
part because it often results in wholesale displacement without the provision of alternative 
housing.  The panic in the lead-up to the World Cup even led the province of KwaZulu-Natal 
to pass a “Elimination and Prevention of Re-emergence of Slums Act” in 2007.  The bill 
contained a range of frightening mandates, including: requiring landowners to take a 
proactive role in militarizing their relationship to squatters in order to prevent new slum 
growth; promising to shift slum dwellers to temporary transit camps for indefinite time 
periods, reminiscent of apartheid relocation schemes; and ensuring that municipalities play 
an active role in meeting national rates of slum evictions, without necessarily building proper 
housing for the slum residents being evicted (Huchzermeyer 204-205).  Abahlali 
baseMjondolo decided to launch an all out discursive and legal attack on this proposed 
legislation beginning in 2006.  Provincial government ignored Abahlali’s interventions at 
every step of the process, and eventually passed the bill in June 2007.  The government failed 
to respond to a written critique submitted by the International Labor Research and 
Information Group in Cape Town on behalf of community members living in informal 
settlements in Cape Town, and it ignored an Abahlali delegation sent to the parliament to 
testify on the bill’s problems.  The Premier of KwaZulu-Natal took the decision to enact the 
bill in August 2007, despite additional appeals from Abahlali and a variety of organizations 
they had mobilized around the issue.   
Having already built a strong coalition against the bill, drawing from other shack 
dweller’s organizations locally and around the country, as well as non-governmental groups 
working around legal issues, Abahlali took their case to the constitutional court.  The 
decision the court took in late 2009, more than two years later, represented a landmark 
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victory for Abahlali and shack dwellers all over the country.  In pointing out internal 
contradictions in the bill, as well as inconsistencies with regards to existing constitutional 
rights around housing and evictions, the decision essentially gutted the core components of 
the bill, disabling it in the hands of KwaZulu-Natal administrators as well as other provincial 
officials hoping to enact similar legislation.  The decision was a tremendous triumph for 
Abahlali, and represented one of the few successful models for grassroots-led mobilization of 
middle class expertise while ensuring that those most affected by the legislation remained in 
ultimate control of the battle with the state. 
Cornubia was thus initially framed in this important context, around the most 
ameliorative components of slum eradication.  But as Petersen remarks, despite the fact that 
Cornubia was intended to be a rare example of actual housing provision for the displaced, 
this initial intention has “lost focus now.”  Within the larger context of my conversation with 
her, it became clear that this statement reflected the fact that Cornubia was slowly becoming 
a project geared towards economic growth for the region as a whole, part of a 50-year plan to 
stretch the development northwards all the way up to the new King Shaka airport and 
beyond.  Pointing out the town of Ballito towards the north, 30 km north of Umhlanga and a 
full 45 km north of downtown Durban, Petersen projected that the Cornubia development 
would serve simply as a pilot project of a strategically planned economic zone that would 
“grow all along this corridor, very likely you know in the next 50 to 100 years.”  This 
broader initiative would be clearly geared towards the imperative of business, without any 
clear application to the needs of the roughly 200,000 families in Durban confined to informal 
settlements. And since Cornubia only promised to build approximately 12,500 homes for this 
most vulnerable sector of the city, at best it will make a small dent in the overall problem.   
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Finally, the manner in which the new homes at Cornubia will be allocated is already a 
matter of disgruntlement.  In early 2013, the municipality announced that there never was a 
housing list.  Housing lists are the most common method of public home allocation in the 
country, and are considered relatively fair because priority is allocated according to the date 
your name was added to the list.  Even this process has been rife with accusations of 
corruption, something upon which Abahlali has long insisted.  Petersen acknowledged the 
problem in responding to my query about how the homes at Cornubia were going to be 
allocated.  “You’ve got to be an informal settler where there’s a bit of danger and slides or 
fire or whatever, number one.  And you have to earn under 3,500R.  I think women, there’s 
certain criteria, women, the widowed, there’s pensions, a whole lot of stuff.”  The 
announcement that the housing list was going to be abandoned in favor of this even more 
ambiguous emphasis upon extreme precarity and environmental risk generated great 
resentment among shack dwellers in the city.  Worse yet, the potential for ongoing corruption 
and clientelism seems to have reached a point of open acknowledgement even by the project 
directors: “And obviously it’s politically driven, you know?  ANC says this, IFP says this, 
DA says this, it’s pathetic really.  But the ruling party will win, for sure…I wouldn’t be 
surprised if those informal settlements are all sitting in ANC wards” (Petersen).   
Social Movements and the Developmental State 
The problematic within which movements mobilize in South Africa is clearly far 
more complex than that proposed by anarchists and socialists revolving around a pro- or anti-
statist position.  The situation is arguably not as simple as some movements in Latin America 
sometimes present it: “non-domination” remains a vague and perhaps inadequate goal, at 
least in the South African context, while socialism from above remains infused with a 
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multiplicity of problems such as corruption, authoritarianism, and delivery of development as 
the quintessential modernizing imperative.  Similarly, the progressive project cannot be 
summarized as a battle against the adoption of neoliberalism as the primary enemy.  The 
ANC is arguably an organization that is thoroughly infused with neoliberal logic.  And yet its 
adoption of a developmental state platform in discourse and (limited) practice is perhaps 
better represented as a form of “variegated neoliberalization” (Brenner, Peck, Theodore 
2010) where the project touches down in specific contexts and is altered significantly, 
sometimes running firmly against the grain of its most dominant ideologies.  In this case, 
while the West has been dismantling housing, South Africa has built over 3 million public 
homes.   The evolution of national housing policy has been a positive thing, and it has 
included groups like Abahlali sporadically, inviting them to the table at forums to discuss 
their own vision of public housing in the country.  
The developmental state in South Africa as whole should therefore be framed as 
largely a response to the resurgence of movements from below over the past 10-15 years, 
most commonly problematized as “new social movements” (Gibson 2006, Ballard et al 2006) 
or as a “massive rebellion of the poor” (Alexander 2012). Cornubia can therefore be analyzed 
in part as a response to the movements that have been agitating across the country over the 
past 15 years.  The project has successfully incorporated some of the key critiques and 
suggestions of both movements and progressive policy advocates over the past two decades.   
And yet, one of the central dimensions of BNG policy—that public housing should now be 
constructed based on the principle of in situ upgrading—is completely absent in Cornubia.  
So the claim that the project will be a crucial part of the attempt to desegregate the old 
apartheid city is somewhat dubious.  Rather, as a result of the combined processes of quiet 
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encroachment and explicit collective mobilization, the informal settlements that have been 
penetrating the forbidden quarters of the historically white city are perhaps best suited to the 
challenge of dismantling apartheid’s sticky urban geographies.    
The form of state power in South Africa is therefore not simply one that movements 
merely respond to and are shaped by, as Mahmood Mamdani (1996) argued in the context of 
anti-colonial and post-colonial movements throughout the continent. Rather, state power can 
also be shaped by the forms of movement resistance that confront it from below.  It is 
doubtful whether the ANC would have felt such a strong need to construct a developmental 
state absent the consistent pressure of movements like Abahlali.  This is especially true 
considering that the ANC’s most serious electoral contender, the Democratic Alliance, 
consistently promotes a neoliberal discourse, denouncing any attempts by the ruling party to 
roll out social programs intended to alleviate poverty.  Public housing, in the discourse of the 
DA, operates similarly to the critique issued by Karen Petersen of Tongaat Hulett, who 
claimed that Cornubia’s housing model for the poor is not a project that can endure over the 
long term.  “BNG is good, [it] gives people home ownership.  But it’s unsustainable, it 
encourages a culture of entitlement—you know “give me,”—because nowhere in any of the 
other countries do we have this model.” 
The developmental state in South Africa might also be understood as a response to a 
global crisis of capitalism.  The parallels between 1929 and 2008 prove to be particularly apt 
in this case.  This is a geopolitical crisis, in part representing the decline of US hegemony.  
But it is also potentially a structural crisis, regarding the limits of extending credit 
indefinitely as a way to ensure capital’s incessant need for 3% compound growth.  One key 
shift, both pre-2008 but especially since then, has been the rise of the State capitalist 
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countries.  The rise of BRICS represents both of these tendencies: the geopolitical crisis 
whereby the US is loosing its unilateral hegemony over global capital, and the response by a 
variety of actors to the general crisis of capital, taking the form of rebuilding a strong state—
with certain social redistributive programs—as a vehicle for ensuring the stability of 
capitalist growth rates over the long-term.  Whether this state capitalist, developmental model 
will be sustainable remains under question.  Cornubia is a project that is just now starting to 
deliver houses.  While it represents a progressive shift in terms of overall housing policy in 
the country, the way in which the project advanced proves that the ANC’s approach to 
housing and the redistributive components of the developmental state are still plagued by a 
number of shortcomings, some of which reproduce the very problem they are intended to 
resolve.  None of this should stop us form recognizing that Cornubia can partially be viewed 
as a victory of movements like Abahlali who placed the issue of housing and land at the 
center of the national agenda, and has continuously forced the ANC to develop programs 
geared towards meeting the needs of the most poor in the country. 
Which Developmental State? 
Exactly what developmental model is being adopted in South Africa is constantly 
open to debate.  The Asian tigers are perhaps the most prominent example that is drawn 
from, most often because of their export-led growth (Cravey 1998: 3-5).  China is commonly 
seen as the new model for a developmental state in South Africa and elsewhere, despite its 
own problems with regards to undemocratic institutions, exploitative industries, 
environmental destruction and rising inequality. The agrarian basis for the Asian 
developmental states—where serious land reform preceded the developmental takeoff—is 
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arguably the most neglected feature of a developmental discourse in South Africa.   As 
Gillian Hart explains,  
Small-scale Taiwanese industrialists are a direct product of redistributive land 
reforms in the late 1940s and early 1950s that broke the power of the landlord class, 
transformed agrarian relations, and helped to create the conditions for rapid rural 
industrialization.  The same is true of Mainland China, where spectacular industrial 
growth since the mid-1980s has taken place largely in villages and small towns.  In 
short, redistribution of land and other resources—driven originally by Mao Tse-
tung’s mobilization of the Chinese peasantry in the first half of the 20th century—
underpinned the massive mobilization of low-wage labor in Taiwan and China, 
operating in effect as a social wage.  By the same token, they represent what appear 
as distinctively ‘non-Western’ trajectories of industrial accumulation without 
dispossession of peasant-workers from the land—trajectories that have, since the 
1970s, fundamentally defined the conditions of global competition (2002: 10-11). 
 
The African experience is even more marginal as a source for comparative developmental 
trajectories, despite the examples discussed above of both colonial and post-colonial 
developmental states (Marais 2011: 340-342).  Most important for our discussion, questions 
of social policy are finally rising to the fore of debates regarding the developmental state, as 
education, gender, healthcare, equality, redistribution, reproductive labor, and democracy all 
emerge as crucial components in rethinking the developmental state model (342-343).  
Adequate housing, planned in tandem with broader questions of livelihood, spatial justice, 
and participatory processes, can clearly become a central feature of any strong developmental 
state.  Absent a parallel discussion of land reform, however, the entire discussion threatens to 
reproduce the very problems it seeks to solve.  The example of Cornubia, planned informally 
together with the largest landowner in the area, Tongaat Hulett, risks exacerbating this 
problem.  If the project enriches and is guided by the very constituency that genuine land 
reform might force to cede power—landed white capital—doesn’t it risk at least in part 
reproducing the very problem it seeks to alleviate in landless and precarious black living 
conditions?   
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 Further, the broader model of a developmental state must be re-thought with attention 
to historical and geographical specificities.  Examples from the Asian or European past 
cannot be cut and pasted into an African future seamlessly.   
The social welfare states of the twentieth century shared three definitive features: 
machine-based industrial development, which generated powerful, concentrated 
social forces (chiefly workers’ movements and organization of capital) and efficient, 
relatively predictable state bureaucracies.  In combination, these made possible the 
social compacts that would anchor social-welfare states.  These same features 
eventually characterized the most eye-catching developmental states of the twentieth 
century.  But it is highly doubtful whether they remain a viable basis today.  
Stereotypes of economic development in the south (especially in Asia but also in 
South Africa) highlight the manufacturing sector as an engine of growth and source 
of mass employment.  But the proportion of overall jobs created in manufacturing is 
shrinking—in both the industrialized north and the industrializing south (344). 
 
Most concerning is the fact that the discourse around a developmental state in South Africa 
seems to have adopted the premise of a Development project as a necessary political platform 
without ever gesturing towards the crucial critiques of Development that emerged in the 
1990s and that eventually adopted a post-developmentalist position (Escobar 1992).  Ben 
Turok, a long-time ANC member who participated in the drafting of the Freedom Charter in 
1955 and who remains an MP in the current government, makes no reference to this 
important body of literature in his most recent overview of the topic, Development in a 
Divided Country (2012).  Perhaps the most important nuances in Turok’s study, as well as 
within the overall adoption of a developmentalist discourse in post-apartheid South Africa, 
concerns the recognition of the challenge of constructing a developmental state in a 
democratic context, and the necessity to give more autonomy to local government in the 
elaboration of specific developmental projects.  While the former is an important recognition 
of the differences between the East Asian model of a developmental state and the 
contemporary South African context, the latter adoption of localism probably represents the 
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neoliberal fracturing of national scales more than it does the post-developmental turn to 
debates on place in an effort to give primacy to the local as a site of community autonomy 
(Escobar 2001).  
Arguing that the developmental state needs to be entirely reconfigured in twenty-first 
century South Africa, Marais puts forward the models of Kerala and Porto Alegre as the most 
appropriate parallels to be drawn from.  The local focus is intriguing, and does correspond to 
the ANC’s emphasis upon local governmental autonomy over municipal development 
programs. The democratic and participatory basis of both models also serves as inspiring 
parallels to what Abahlali refers to as their goal of “bringing the state closer to the people”.  
And the broader focus on social justice and autonomy within each model creates space to 
broaden the discussion beyond the imperative of economic growth rates towards quality of 
life issues such as housing. Most important for our purposes, “social movements in Kerala 
and Porto Alegre retained their autonomy from the state (without yielding their influence) 
and were able to help shape and drive processes of democratic decentralization” (355).  
Abahlali has clearly operated with a very similar agenda: insisting upon maintaining its 
organizational autonomy, while refusing to ignore the importance of the state and its 
corresponding developmental initiatives.  But while the actions of the group have clearly 
been influential in the elaboration of initiatives such as Cornubia, their direct participation 
and inclusion in the process, especially in the crucial and controversial step of allocating 
actual homes, has been a neglected feature of the South African experience so far.   
 But perhaps there are also broader questions to be asked of the resurgence of the 
developmental discourse in post-apartheid South Africa.  A more rigorous theorization of the 
state itself, and the possibilities for intervention in the state apparatuses, is largely lacking 
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from the discussion.  Here, attention should be given to historical critiques that identified the 
Soviet Union not as an oppositional socialist model, but rather as the general form of state 
capitalism, and a model for the developmental state broadly conceived (James 1986). In the 
1968 preface to the third edition of State Capitalism and World Revolution, CLR James 
notes: “What is most often overlooked by those who accept entirely or in part the conception 
that the Soviet Union and its related states are fundamentally capitalist is that this analysis is 
an analysis of capitalist society, not Russian society.  The conclusions flowing from this 
analysis have the greatest relevance in understanding the United States as well as the Soviet 
Union, Great Britain as well as Poland, France as well as China, and, of course, the working 
class of all these countries” (xxiv).  Antonio Negri, writing in the same conjuncture, laid out 
a critique of the rise of this general model of a “Planner State,” Keynes’s brilliant method for 
simultaneously harnessing and containing working class revolt as a constitutive part of the 
State-Capital relation, especially following the 1917 Soviet revolution.   
This then, is how we can sum up the spirit of the theory of effective demand: it 
assumes class struggle, and sets out to resolve it, on a day-to-day basis, in ways that 
are favorable to capitalist development.  If we now take a closer look at the problem 
at hand, that is, how the experience of 1929 led to changes in the structure of the 
State, we can see how radical was Keynes’ contribution.  The transformation of the 
capitalist State lay not only in the way its capacity for intervention was extended 
throughout the whole of society, but also in the way that its structures had to reflect 
the impact of the working class (1994: 45). 
 
Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Nielson remind us that the emergence of what Negri terms the 
Planner State coincided with “the age of the ‘developmental state’… ‘Planning’ ceased to be 
only a ‘socialist’ concept.  It became a magical word of the Cold War decades” (2013: 46).   
 A key question facing the South African resurgence of a developmental state today 
concerns the capability of the state to guide from above—even if through a decentered model 
based in specific localities—the process of economic growth together with the social 
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redistribution of wealth.  What will be the continued impact of those forms of resistance from 
below that Keynes sought to harness and contain through an abandonment of strict laissez 
faire theory?  If formal housing projects such as Cornubia are part of one state strategy to 
placate and contain working class resistance, then how do we explain the periodic repressive 
responses by the state to oppositional movements like Abahlali?  In attempting to answer this 
question, we reveal a theoretical impasse between the logics of incorporative inclusion 
through Development and state planning on the one hand, and the exclusionary impulse of 
violent repression on the other hand.  This debate takes us explicitly beyond the boundaries 
of state strategies at movement containment and co-option towards a state that proclaims sole 
authority over the terrain of the political and over the exceptional right to exert force.  This is 
the issue I turn to in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4  
PRECARITY, SURPLUS AND SPONTANEITY: 
THINKING THE SLUM WITH FANON IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The lumpenproletariat, this cohort of starving men, divorced from tribe and clan, 
constitutes one of the most spontaneously and radically revolutionary forces of a 
colonized people.” 
Frantz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, p. 81 
 
In the political-juridical structure of the camp, he adds, the state of exception ceases 
to be a temporal suspension of the state of law.  According to Agamben, it acquires a 
permanent spatial arrangement that remains continually outside the normal state of 
law. 
      Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” pp. 12-13 
 
The manufacture of subjects rather than the genesis of the sovereign: that is our 
general theme.   
Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended, p. 46 
 
You see, I say anybody who doesn’t have access to the means of subsistence is part of 
the working class.  So the poor, the marginalized, the surplus population, they all 
don’t have access to the means of subsistence, and their only possibility for producing 
or subsisting is their labor.  People who are working and employed are the lucky ones 
now in the working class.  So the unemployed in the townships are in a similar 
position to the landless in the Bantustans.   
Martin Legassick, Interview June 25, 2013 
 
In South Africa, to think politically is to think racially. 
Grant Farred, “Shoot the White Girl First,” p. 55 
 
For the eThekwini Municipality, democracy means that they are a law unto 
themselves and can act in total disregard of the rule of law. The poor are 
automatically viewed as criminals even when we act within the law. For those of us 
who have organised to defend the dignity of the poor, democracy has come to mean 
death threats, torture, arrest, violence and assassination. This has been evident in Cato 
Crest in Durban between September 2013 and January 2014. Violence from the ruling 
party is worse in Durban than in other cities, but state violence is everywhere in South 
Africa. The Marikana Land Occupation in East Phillipi in Cape Town has been met 
with state violence just like the Marikana Land Occupation in Cato Crest. 
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Everywhere in South Africa the state is unaccountable to poor people and tries to 
control us with violence. 
S’bu Zikode, “The Poor are Punished for Demanding our Constitutional Rights” 
 
The question asked by Fanon and Biko (and most modern revolutionaries, but 
especially so by African ones and their Diaspora) is the role of politics in the context 
of political formation.  In other words, what should one do when the place of 
discursive opposition has been barred to some people? What should those who live in 
the city but are structurally outside of it do if they do not accept their place of being 
insiders who have been pushed outside? 
Lewis Gordon, “Biko’s Black Consciousness,” p. 87 
 
As the global economy struggles to regain pre-2008 growth levels some theorists 
have renewed debates about a terminal crisis of capital. Others have worked to defy the 
ideology of austerity as both inhumane and inadequate to restoring economic balance. Yet 
few are willing to accept what appears to be a potential long-term outcome of the current 
crisis: long-term unemployment as a central feature of life in many developed and 
underdeveloped countries alike. The surplus populations no longer merely constitute a 
reserve army of labor, but in many places, begin to appear to lie beyond the realm of 
remunerated wage labor altogether (Jameson 2011).  
 A second, more long-term tendency of the contemporary conjuncture concerns the 
unceasing expansion of what has been termed “precarious work,” for those who are lucky 
enough to get work at all. Precarity is commonly used as a term for the changes in working 
conditions within the overall shift from a Fordist regime of accumulation to one premised 
upon flexible accumulation. A decline in long-term contract stability, the rise of labor 
brokers, the imposition of intellectual alongside manual labor, the erosion of workplace 
benefits from healthcare to retirement, and the agglomeration of tasks and skills required of 
the social worker who replaced the mass worker are just a few central facets of this transition 
(see, for example, Harvey 1989; Negri 1988). While much of the original literature on 
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Fordism and flexible accumulation emerged from work that examined the United States, 
Europe and Japan, recent studies of the global South have expanded the term to include non-
work attributes such as the precarious living conditions found in slums. All of these factors 
are characteristic of an increased precarity that is defining our neoliberal age of flexible 
accumulation.  
 How does one take into account these two pillars of our contemporary conjuncture: 
surplus and precarity?  How might we continue to think the question of the political between 
the lines of exclusion and differential inclusion?  This chapter engages these questions by 
grappling with some of the central theoretical debates of the past few decades, and by 
drawing from the empirical examples of historical and contemporary South Africa. 
A Tale of Two Deaths 
Periodically in recent years, and throughout 2013, South Africans and the world as a 
whole were held in suspense at the news of Nelson Mandela’s precarious health.  Every time 
he visited the hospital, even for a routine check-up, news media would appear at his bedside, 
as if simply to remind the public of his imminent departure from the world.  A man 
denounced by an apartheid state and by British and US governments as recently as the late 
1980s as a terrorist threat had certainly achieved a remarkable reversal of his public image.  
While the US still had problems getting Mandela off the terrorist watch list—as recently as 
2008 he required special state department clearance just to allow an officially designated 
‘terrorist’ to enter the US—Mandela was most often publicly proclaimed a global symbol of 
peace and reconciliation.  Such a disjuncture led then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to 
proclaim, “It’s frankly a rather embarrassing matter” (Dewey 2013).  
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The contrast could not have been starker.  Was Mandela still the moral leader of a 
group denounced by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as late as 1987 as “a 
typical terrorist organization”? (Bevins 1996).  When he refused to meet Thatcher on an 
official visit to Britain in 1990 after being released from prison, Conservative Member of 
Parliament Terry Dicks queried: “How much longer will the Prime Minister allow herself to 
be kicked in the face by this Black terrorist?”  (Bevins 1996).  Or was Mandela truly, as 
George H.W. Bush proclaimed at the same time as MP Dicks, “a man who embodies the 
hope of millions,” (Sullivan 2013) someone worthy of the Presidential Medal of Freedom 
bestowed upon him by Bush’s son, George W. Bush, in 2002?   
This controversy behind Mandela’s public representation slowly eroded as the 
decades past, so that by the time of his death at the end of 2013, more world leaders attended 
his funeral than any other in recent memory.  Mandela arguably had at least two public 
images: the pre-1990 freedom fighting, African Nationalist, Communist-aligned leader of the 
armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and the post-1990 patron saint of free market 
democracy, forgiveness and reconciliation represented in the popular film Invictus.  This 
incredible inversion allowed Mandela to become a popularly commodified symbol, claimed 
by all the major corporations in South Africa in their ad campaigns, eventually taking his 
rightful place on what Marx called “the universal confusion and exchange of all things, an 
inverted world, the confusion and exchange of all natural and human qualities,” (Marx 1975: 
379, emphasis in original) in his appearance on each denomination of the South African 
Rand bills.  The South African novelist Zakes Mda most fairly captured this ambiguity at the 
core of Mandela’s legacy.  “I understand the disillusionment of…young people, although I 
do not share their perspective. To me, Mandela was neither the devil they make him out to be 
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nor the saint that most of my compatriots and the international community think he was” 
(Mda 2013). Against such opposing views, Mda offered a reasoned assessment of Mandela’s 
pragmatism, something that at one and the same time offered concrete rewards and 
foreclosed radical possibilities. “I see him as a skillful politician, smart enough to resist the 
megalomania that comes with deification. I do not think the policy of reconciliation was ill-
advised; it saved the country from a bloodbath and ushered in a period of prosperity.  But 
therein lies the rub. The distribution of that prosperity was very skewed. South Africa has 
never been a place of equal opportunity, and that was reinforced instead of changed by 
Mandela's presidency” (Mda 2013). 
Mandela is perhaps best thought of as a figure standing in for a surpassed moment in 
South African history.  If the image of the freedom fighter most closely aligned him with the 
anti-apartheid struggle, then Mandela the politician was representative of South Africa’s first 
transition from 1990-1999.  Once he stepped down from power, he continued to represent the 
moral fabric of the ANC, something all other leaders in the party could never replicate, but 
only hope to benefit from by mere osmosis. The power of Mandela’s image led South 
African President Jacob Zuma to visit him in hospital in June 2013, when it was widely 
reported he was on his deathbed.  The resulting photo-op backfired on Zuma, as it was clear 
Mandela was so far gone as to not even be aware whom he was posing next to.  This led US 
president Barack Obama, in the country on a formal state visit, to proclaim that he didn’t 
require any such photo op. Instead, Obama chose to visit Mandela’s prison cell on Robben 
Island, one of the central symbols of the anti-apartheid struggle, enshrined in history as a key 
site of political tourism during the first transition to democracy in the 1990s.   
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On June 30, 2013, While Obama wandered the halls at Robben Island, pondering 
Mandela’s life-long struggle and his leadership role in the transition to democracy, a small 
community in Cato Crest, Durban, was gathering to commemorate another life.  Nkululeko 
Gwala was shot down in cold blood on the night of June 26, 2013, hit with twelve bullets as 
he walked home to his shack after watching Brazil defeat Uruguay 2-1 in the Confederations 
Cup match televised at a his local shebeen.  Gwala’s life and death arguably represented a 
different moment from Mandela’s impending demise.  His struggle involved a battle for 
South Africa’s second transition.  With formal political equality for all South Africans won, 
and an electoral democracy operating on the principle of one-person-one-vote firmly in 
place, the battle had now shifted to economic rights and the broader project of social justice 
as yet unrealized in the post-apartheid era. And yet the one consistency throughout South 
African history, whether it was the colonial period, the apartheid era, or the first and second 
transitions, appeared to be the disposability of poor Black lives.  After plummeting from the 
low 60s to the low 50s between the early 1990s and the early 2000s, life expectancy has 
slowly begun to rebound since 2007.  This is largely due to the successful effort of the 
Treatment Action Campaign social movement, which has continued to place the issue of 
HIV/AIDS front and center in South African political debate, winning the right to anti-
retroviral treatment.  Absent direct intervention by the sick and poor, this victory may not 
have been achievable. 
Beyond the bounds of health and sickness, Black lives are routinely sacrificed as a 
result of crime, poverty, and even state violence.  As recently as August 2012, the world was 
shocked to witness the South African police force massacre 34 striking platinum miners in 
the town of Marikana, the majority of them shot in the back.  The massacre immediately 
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drew comparison with the Sharpeville attacks of 1960, when apartheid police opened fire on 
a crowd of demonstrators, killing 69 people.  Workers were disappointed with the official 
union, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), and some decided to form a breakaway 
group, the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU).  The owners of 
Lonmin mine, where the strike occurred, reached out to shareholder Cyril Ramaphosa, a top 
ANC leader, to help quell the rebellion. Ramaphosa is said to have willingly obliged, 
encouraging the police to put an end to the strike by any means necessary.  In the wake of the 
massacre, wildcat strikes sprung up across South Africa’s many mines, with workers all 
demanding a corresponding share in the profits of the booming industry.  Soon other sectors 
joined in, including agriculture and the auto industry (Alexander 2013).  In late June 2013, 
just before Gwala’s death, Martin Legassick gave me his own assessment of the national 
balance of forces and how the Marikana massacre had generated a series of internal fissures 
within the labor movement.  
Martin Legassick: There’s two factions in COSATU, …let’s call one the NUM 
faction which is supported by the president, which is very pro-Zuma. And then there 
is Vavi, the General Secretary who has been very critical of the government and he is 
supported by NUMSA.  NUMSA stands for a very radical economic program: 
nationalization of banks, mines, monopolies.  And says the ANC manifesto has got to 
reflect those issues or it’s not going to support them. Now recently this came to the 
surface because of Marikana and because of essentially the strike-breaking role that 
NUM played in the whole Marikana thing which has sort of pushed it into this really 
defensive position and pro-Zuma and pro-government position, which it had anyway, 
but it’s more overt now…So there are real tensions there, and that links back to the 
question that you asked which was what? 
 
Yousuf Al-Bulushi: Mandela’s looming death. 
 
Martin Legassick: So now the question is, how will the NUMSA faction react to 
Mandela’s death? Everybody will try to claim the legacy of Mandela.  DA has been 
already trying to do that.  But whether that will lead to increased support for the ANC 
or not, there’s still a year to go till the elections and it depends what happens, it’s 
unpredictable. 
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Just as Legassick predicted, the wave of anti-ANC and anti-corporate sentiment finally dealt 
a blow to the government’s tripartite alliance between the ANC, the SACP and COSATU in 
December 2013.  Within weeks of Mandela’s death on December 5, the largest union in the 
country, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), announced its 
decision to formally withdraw its support from both the ANC and the SACP, calling for an 
independent worker’s movement. 
And yet, the murder of Nkululeko Gwala, occurring right in the middle of this year of 
revolt, led to no such similar national calls for political transformation in the space of 
informal settlements and everyday life.  Gwala had been active as the Cato Crest branch 
chairperson of Abahlali baseMjondolo. In a meeting I attended on June 9, 2013, Gwala stood 
out clearly as the organic leader of the one hundred shack dwellers who gathered on the local 
soccer field to hold a consultative session with Abahlali’s central leadership. On this cold 
breezy day, shack dwellers were hoping to garner some hope in their struggle against 
displacement in Cato Crest.  Earlier that year they had taken over unoccupied and still half 
constructed rental houses as a protest against their own lack of housing.  After being 
displaced, they squatted on nearby land and built their own shacks.  Police were sent in, but 
refused to take direct action against the community and instead called for Durban Mayor 
James Nxumalo to intervene as a political mediator between force and occupation.  This 
decision by the police signaled a national hesitance in the wake of the Marikana massacre to 
get involved in situations that might lead to more violent conflict between the police and 
protestors.  Mayor Nxumalo arrived to address the shack dwellers, and in March began 
relying upon the mediation of a long-time local community leader named Thembinkosi 
Qumbelo.  At this point, the community had not yet taken a decision to join Abahlali, and 
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while historically the group had visited the area to consult, Qumbelo was not a member of 
the group.  Qumbelo had been active over the years with a variety of different political 
parties and NGOs, including the ANC, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the SACP, and the 
National Democratic Convention (NADECO).  
Community members decided to occupy the local ward councilor’s office, and soon 
thereafter chased him out of his own residence and the area as a whole.  In the wake of these 
actions, Qumbelo was shot dead while watching soccer at a local bar in the area. At this 
point, having mentioned Qumbelo’s past activity with a variety of political parties, it is 
important to note that much of the present-day violence in KwaZulu-Natal is overcoded by 
the historical relationships of violence in the province.  Looming largest is the decades-long 
battle between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC.  The IFP was founded in 1975 
by the chief of the KwaZulu Bantustan, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and remains under his 
leadership today.  The Zulu nationalist politics of the IFP fell directly into the kind of tribal 
divisions critiqued by Mamdani (1996) as the central legacy of the colonial era.  Colonial 
powers used tribal authorities as indirect rulers, and thus often propped up certain tribes at 
the expense of others as a divide and rule strategy.  Under apartheid, the Bantustan system 
was no different, and the relationship between the white nationalist apartheid government 
and figures like Buthelezi was far from conflictual.  Therefore, when the IFP claimed to be 
an African organization fighting for black people, and came into direct confrontation with the 
ANC, most participants in the anti-apartheid struggle saw it as a collaborating instrument of 
an invisible “third force,” that is, the white apartheid security state.  Most of the violence in 
the 1980s and in the period between 1990 and 1994 that constituted the formal transition 
phase from apartheid to democracy took place between the ANC and the IFP.   
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 Heavily steeped in tribal and regionalist politics, however, the IFP nonetheless 
managed to maintain a strong following amongst the Zulu communities of KwaZulu-Natal.  
Enjoying some initial success in the early elections of the 1990s, it has nonetheless slowly 
lost much of its ground since then, most notably with the election of Jacob Zuma as the 
ANC’s first post-apartheid Zulu president in 2009.  After splitting into two groups in 2011, 
with the National Freedom Party breaking off and forming it’s own party, collectively the 
IFP and the NFP won only 4% of the national vote in the 2014 elections, a fraction of its 10% 
peak in the 1994 elections.   
 Despite the steady decline of the influence of Zulu nationalist politics as an 
oppositional force outside the ANC, the discourse of a supposed third force is raised quite 
often at any oppositional movement against the ANC, as though anyone critiquing the ruling 
party is being duped or controlled by an invisible white force, a remnant of apartheid refusing 
to die.  This serves the ANC’s hegemonic project of silencing dissent, and is a scare tactic 
intended to strike fear into the public’s mind by recalling the very real ANC-IFP violence of 
the 1980s and 1990s as supposedly an ever-present threat in the current moment.  This was 
precisely the discourse used to denounce S’bu Zikode and Abahlali when the group first 
emerged in 2005, despite Abahlali’s multi-ethnic makeup and their own explicit articulation 
of an anti-tribalist politics.  The violence directed at Qumbelo—a brief member of the IFP—
can’t be read in isolation from this historical context.  It assists us in comprehending the 
variety of rhetoric thrown around in the lead up to and the wake of the assassination.  At the 
same time, we must avoid falling into the official ANC discourse that merely parallels the 
two contexts when they are clearly different.  It goes without saying that oppositional forces 
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to the ruling ANC are not all mere stooges of, or even historical remnants of, an IFP-white 
alliance.   
 While Qumbelo was never a member of Abahlali, the discourse surrounding his own 
assassination paralleled that of other attacks on AbM as a movement.  AbM is oddly often 
accused of either being controlled by white intellectuals, or being a remnant of the Zulu 
Nationalist IFP, or of being a bunch of Mpondo migrants, a group from the neighboring 
Eastern Cape.  Oddly enough, while there are a few key white intellectuals who work with 
the movement, the most close of these doesn’t even live in Durban, and during my entire stay 
in Durban I never once witnessed their attendance at a single meeting.  This alone should 
lead one to be skeptical about claims of outsider manipulation.  The other claims about the 
organization being either Zulu Nationalist or Mpondo are obviously contradictory, as these 
two groups are often pitted against each other.  In reality, my observations led me to 
conclude that the group was comprised of multiple tribes and linguistic groups.  It is 
explicitly anti-tribal in its political organizing, but it does not shy away from forming 
strategic alliances with traditional leaders or other groups.  It works tirelessly to transcend the 
limitations of tribal, racial, or linguistically specific politics in both its discourse and its 
practice.  This is reflected in its diverse leadership, which has members from different tribal 
groups.  Unfortunately, while a decent portion of the shack communities in Durban are 
indeed comprised of Mpondo migrants from the Eastern Cape, their presence in the city is 
marginal and therefore in need of more concern rather than xenophobic denunciation.  The 
discourse of a Mpondo menace is therefore an openly xenophobic one, and though Abahlali 
does not fit neatly into the Mpondo box, it defends any group accused of such an accusation 
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and recognizes it as a problematic discourse mobilizing the fear of supposed outsiders to 
detract from legitimate criticism of the local government.  
In the months following Qumbelo’s assassination, the Cato Crest shack community 
re-organized, and soon emerged with a new grassroots leader in Nkululeko Gwala.  Gwala 
had been a life-long member of the ANC, once vowing that the only way he would leave the 
organization would be if he died.  But his commitment to the poor led him to denounce the 
pervasive corruption he witnessed throughout the organization, especially at the local level.  
This did not sit well with his superiors, and soon he was formally kicked out of his own ANC 
chapter.  In response, he approached Abahlali baseMjondolo, requesting their assistance in 
mobilizing shack dwellers for the right to land and housing in Cato Crest. Like many other 
shack communities Cato Crest is located extremely near the city center, providing residents 
with greater economic opportunities. 
The June 9 meeting gathered one hundred shack dwellers, and began with the 
traditional round of songs to raise spirits and pass the time as people wandered down to the 
soccer field.  Gwala opened the meeting, introducing the theme of the day—how Abahlali 
baseMjondolo might help in their struggle for houses—and welcoming the delegation from 
Abahlali’s own leadership.  S’bu Zikode spoke next, introducing Abahlali as an organization 
by explaining that it was not an NGO or a political party, but an independent social 
movement run by and for shack dwellers.  TJ Ngongoma followed by speaking about the 
meaning of South African citizenship, and the new constitution that was approved during the 
first transition.  Ngongoma emphasized that much of what Cato Crest shackdwellers were 
fighting for was actually enshrined as rights in the constitution, but remained unrealized in 
practice.  He then explained the procedure for forming a branch of Abahlali, and the 
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inaugural event of hosting a branch launch in a newly affiliated community.  Mnikelo 
Ndabankulu then addressed the crowd on the theme of Abahlali’s ‘living politics,’ a key 
organizational concept that distinguishes the group from any other political entity.  Living 
politics, he said, entailed being engaged directly in the struggle rather than waiting for 
intermediaries to solve problems on your behalf, be they politicians, academics or 
development ‘experts’.  Ndabankulu explained Freedom Day, a national holiday intended to 
celebrate the end of apartheid, which Abahlali annually recognized as “Unfreedom Day” by 
organizing a counter-rally with thousands of its own members from throughout the city.  
Ndabankulu emphasized the importance of what Ngongoma had said about the constitution, 
claiming that the ward councilor representing the ANC probably didn’t even know the 
material in the constitution.  He spoke of a similar gathering at another nearby shack 
community when Lindela Figlan, a former president of Abahlali, had challenged the local 
councilor on the constitution’s contents, revealing the politician’s total ignorance of the 
document.  In response the assembled crowd erupted in laughter. 
 Abahlali uses the South African constitution to explain to shack communities how 
many of the rights they fought for in the anti-apartheid struggle have in theory been won, but 
are largely unrealized or ignored by the ANC in practice.  In this way, Abahlali establishes a 
continuity in struggle from anti-apartheid to post-apartheid movements.  Rather than simply 
saying that the anti-apartheid movement amounted to nothing—which might lead to despair 
or depoliticization—the group emphasizes the economic, social and political rights that they 
did win, enshrined in the constitution.  This tends to give people hope that those rights might 
still be realized in practice by working with Abahlali to pressure the government to uphold 
them while simultaneously mobilizing the community members to organize themselves. 
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 After additional speeches by Abahlali’s General Secretary Bandile Mdlalose and 
President Mzwake Mdlalose, the floor was opened for community members to speak their 
mind and ask any questions.  After three people made statements affirming much of the 
Abahlali speeches, and expressing strong enthusiasm about joining the organization, 
Nkululeko Gwala took the floor.  He spoke about how shack dwellers didn’t respect 
themselves.  Too often, people wanted to keep multiple political options open, and therefore 
would remain members of multiple political parties at the same time.  Alternatively, they 
would join a protest against the ANC in the street, and the next day, attend a rally in favor of 
the ANC in an upcoming election. He demonstrated this equivocation by standing with his 
feet spread far apart, with one foot metaphorically planted in the camp of the ruling ANC, 
and another foot placed within the space of an oppositional movement or political party.  As 
he continued to emphasize the irreconcilable nature of these two positions, his stance became 
wider and wider, until he was essentially paralyzed in a quasi-splits position, unable to go 
lower, but unable to stand up properly without assistance.  This was supposed to represent 
the immobility that results from the inadequacy of a community alliance that refuses to take 
the unequivocal stance of an openly antagonistic opposition. 
Gwala warned people that fighting against the ruling party wasn’t easy, and that 
despite their united enthusiasm in the meeting, they should each take the decision carefully.  
Once taken, no equivocation would be tolerated.  They would have to be willing to oppose 
the ANC unambiguously until they won the right to housing and a dignified life.  More than 
anything else, what he had taken away from his numerous exchanges with Abahlali 
organizers was that the group stood for the idea that the poor needed to reclaim their dignity.  
Dignity was a concept that went beyond the delivery of material goods, although these too 
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were clearly needed.  Dignity entailed recognizing and acting upon the ability of the poor to 
think for themselves, to determine their own destiny, and to engage in a process of grassroots 
planning (De Souza 2006). Abahlali’s central leadership would therefore not take initiative 
on the community’s behalf. Their role would be merely advisory.  The organizational 
principal of community autonomy meant that each specific local struggle had to take 
initiative over the precise course of action appropriate to their circumstances.  Only then 
could they claim to have begun the journey of reclaiming their dignity.  As a closing thought, 
Gwala reminded people that no one would be forced to join the new branch of Abahlali.  
Rather, he insisted, this choice should be made with the utmost level of autonomy and 
commitment to the struggle, something no one should take lightly. 
The community members present then voted unanimously to join Abahlali, and 
insisted upon setting a date to launch their branch.  They proclaimed that in the meantime 
they would again occupy vacant land as a sign of how seriously they took their struggle, with 
or without the support of a recognized group like Abahlali.  Two weeks later, Gwala led the 
group in a protest against the corrupt allocation of public housing.  The group accused the 
local ward councilor, Zanele Ndzoyiya, of having won office through illegitimate means 
according to the ANC’s own internal appointment process rather than the community voice.  
The group’s protest along with these two accusations were widely reported it the local press, 
and Mayor James Nxumalo and the regional head of the ANC, Sibongiseni Dhlomo, quickly 
called a community meeting at Cato Crest to counter their narrative.  At a meeting on June 
26, “Nxumalo’s main message was that ward 101 shack residents should have lower 
expectations. Because “land does not expand”, they would never be able to satisfy everyone. 
Even after buying nearby plots, there would not be enough housing for everyone, so some 
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people would be moved to Cornubia” (ka-Manzi 2013).  Over two thousand community 
members attended the meeting, and the mayor led the crowd in songs that denounced 
Nkululeko Gwala as a traitor, calling for his removal from the area.  Dhlomo, the regional 
head of the ANC, is reported to have “told the 2,000-strong meeting that Gwala was not 
wanted in the area and that he “either leaves the area or the community leaves. He must go. 
He is not wanted here.” In a heated 25-minute speech, which was recorded by a community 
activist and handed to the local Tribune newspaper, Dhlomo said that Gwala should be 
banished and he should “scrub his heels because he is leaving today” (Moore 2013). Dhlomo 
was reported to have addressed the mayor, who hailed from the same hometown as Gwala, 
Inchanga, about an hour outside Durban, telling him to take Gwala back home as soon as 
possible.  Within five hours of this meeting, Gwala’s body was littered with twelve bullets.  
Journalist Faith ka-Manzi summarized the symbolism of the Cato Crest murder as follows: 
“In recent days, as Nelson Mandela continued to struggle for his life and as Zuma entertained 
Obama, a microcosm of the ANC’s degeneration played out here” (ka-Manzi 2013).   
While the shack dwellers of Cato Crest would continue their struggle, occupying land 
multiple times throughout the remainder of 2013—and significantly naming their new 
squatter settlements ‘Marikana’ in an effort to link national struggles—Gwala’s murder, like 
Qumbelo’s before him and the death of an unarmed 17-year old girl named Nqobile Nzuzua 
who was shot by the police in an Abahlali-led Cato Crest protest on September 30 2013, 
would go largely unheeded in the national media and political scene.  Some argue that such 
incidents are the product of a lack of effective organizational leadership within shack 
communities, and that absent such structures, the spontaneity of lumpen classes often veers 
in violent, unpredictable, and reactionary directions (Bond and Mottiar 2013).  These deaths 
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therefore leave us with a number of serious questions. What is the relationship between 
forms of political struggle on the one hand, and an individual’s or a population’s 
disposability?  At what moment are shack dwellers rendered superfluous or eliminable?  Was 
Gwala sacrificed in order to save another portion of the South African population (Mitchell 
2009), or was he part of a broader process whereby populations racialized as Black are too 
commonly subject to an extra-economic violence (Sexton 2010)? How to understand the 
political subjects active in slums in South Africa with respect to the theoretical framing of 
surplus on the one hand, and precarity on the other? 
A Precarious Liberation 
Studies of the global city (Sassen 2006) have brought attention to the concentrated 
power of particular cities within the larger global economy.  While a large percentage of 
manufacturing has been dispersed from the core to the semi-peripheral and peripheral 
countries, power over the flow of goods and information has become increasingly 
concentrated in cities that operate as financial hubs as well as centers of knowledge and 
specialized services.  Thus, “most of the literature on the global city understands the city 
form to be the spatial expression of shifts in the geography and structure of the international 
economy since the 1970s” (Mbembe and Nuttall: 3).   
In response to this discourse that privileged northern cities, a plethora of literature has 
emerged in an attempt to understand the perhaps equally global—even if less powerful—
nature of the megacities of Africa, Asia and Latin America.  Parallel to the focus on 
megacities grew a body of work that attempted to understand all cities as ordinary (Amin and 
Graham 1997, Robinson 2006, 2008).  This approach attempts to see all cities as participants 
in modernity, and highlights the cultural as well as economic and political dynamics that 
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make them work the way they do.  In so doing it attempted to moderate some of the negative 
ramifications the global city approach had upon policy, where many urban planners in the 
South sought simply to ‘catch up’ with New York, London and Tokyo, reproducing the 
economistic and linear narrative of modernization theory. 
Rem Koolhaas has gone even further in suggesting that African cities like Lagos need 
not catch up with any other city but instead might even provide a model for Northern 
“global” city inhabitants.  Specifically, attempts to navigate the precarious existence that has 
come to define post-Fordist urban life (Soja 2000) in cities like New York might benefit a 
great deal from the ways in which everyday inhabitants of Lagos have made their city work 
under extremely precarious conditions for most of its history (Mbembe and Nuttall 2008).  
This framework places the issue of precarity front and center in our analyses of global cities 
of the South. 
The dramatic increase in South Africa’s urban shack dwelling population (Hindson 
and McCarthy 1994, Harber 2011), coupled with the consistently high rates of 
unemployment, would seem to indicate that a large section of the working class has been 
permanently excluded from the realm of formal production and occupies a precarious 
position in relation to not only the work-place but also to living conditions and life as a 
whole.  It is important to note that debates about surplus populations in South Africa are not 
new.  In the apartheid era the Surplus People Project took the issue as central to their study of 
the forced relocations of primarily African communities throughout the country, particularly 
once the economy entered a period of decline in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Writing in 
1983, the authors of a collaborative report on forced relocations and surplus people in the 
province of Natal (current day KwaZulu-Natal) state:  
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As a result of increased capitalization of industry, agriculture and mining relatively 
fewer unskilled workers are demanded by the economy.  The changing nature of 
capitalist development in South Africa has resulted in an increased demand for skilled 
workers, hence an attempt on the part of the ruling class to consolidate an urban 
Black population with a stake in the system, and the determination to rid white South 
Africa of the unproductive, unemployed, disabled and youth.  From surveys and field 
work it has become clear that there are thousands of people who will never gain 
access to employment in urban areas and unless they are prepared to work for R1,00 
per day on white owned farms, where there may still be some work, they have been 
made redundant permanently.  These surplus people will never enter the wage labor 
market under the present economic system (Surplus People Project 1983: xv). 
 
Indeed, the official unemployment rate has increased steadily in the 30 years since that report 
was issued, peaking at around 30% in 2002 before leveling off in the mid 20’s in the decade 
since.  Given this historical precedent and the constantly high rate of the past two decades, 
such numbers do indeed seem to confirm the surplus people’s project contention that these 
groups are no longer best thought of simply as comprising a reserve army of labor (Marx 
1976).  Such a labor reserve is traditionally conceived as capable of being rapidly 
mobilized—either against striking workers or when economic booms take place and 
additional labor power is needed to meet output goals.  Instead, as surplus population 
theorists tell us (Denning 2010), these numbers point to a permanent de-industrializing trend 
whereby a large percentage of the population has been permanently excluded from capital’s 
circuits, forced to rely upon their own ingenuity or the welfare state in order to survive in an 
informal economy.  
In this context, we might use the term precarity to define the overarching condition of 
a supposedly liberated society in contemporary South Africa (Barchiesi 2011). Rather than 
accept as unproblematic the idea promoted by former President Thabo Mbeki that South 
African society is comprised of two economies—a formal one of stable work and an informal 
second economy of precarious living and working conditions—Barchiesi chooses to examine 
the seemingly privileged sector of the unionized first economy in order to highlight the 
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pervasiveness of precarity beyond the supposedly “excluded” sectors. In so doing, he 
confronts the central post-apartheid “technique of rule” that he terms the “wage-citizenship 
nexus”. Challenging the idea that South Africa poses for the rest of the African continent a 
kind of promising future where economic development can provide for basic means of 
survival and generally improved social conditions, Barchiesi adopts and extends Mahmood 
Mamdani’s (1996) critique of the entire line of “South African exceptionalism.” If apartheid 
can be framed as evolving out of a prior British policy of indirect rule that was the model 
for—rather than the exception to—so much of the British colonial project elsewhere, then 
similarly the precarious working conditions that have defined post-apartheid South Africa 
must be understood as largely mirroring rather than escaping the precarious states of life that 
have engulfed so much of the rest of the world. And yet, while engaging in a re-theorization 
of precarity in the post-apartheid moment, Barchiesi is also careful not to sweep away the 
differences that define the particularities of flexible accumulation in an African context. 
“African post-Fordism is more about ‘out of luck’ than ‘just-in-time’ as the future 
uncertainties of informal entrepreneurship are grounded in present assets that depend on 
social networks, chiefly the family, undermined by the same global dynamics that make 
waged work redundant in the first place” (Barchiesi 2011: 204).  
Behind this analysis lies Barchiesi’s central attack on the “wage-citizenship nexus.” 
This term frames his entire study of “liberated” South Africa, and it contains a number of 
different components that are useful in our own attempt to grapple with the political stakes of 
precarity. “First, the work-citizenship nexus is a technique of rule to produce governable 
social subjects by normatively categorizing the attitudes, behaviors, and proclivities 
individuals have toward employment” (Barchiesi 2011: 24, emphasis added). In this 
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framework, the State, and much of the liberation movement even before it seized power, 
aligns its conception of the citizen—someone who is entitled to rights and services—with the 
normative idea of the worker. Not only did the British and apartheid governments of the 20th 
century often eschew welfare in favor of the private sector and the ideal of hard work as a 
solution to all social ills, the African National Congress-led struggle for liberation also often 
normalized work as the central vehicle for liberation. This historical account refuses the 
language of a post-apartheid “betrayal” by the ANC by rooting its contemporary 
shortcomings in a long history of more normative aims centered on the dignity of work.  
The ANC’s abandonment of socialist rhetoric and alignment with macroeconomic 
moderation also highlighted how ambiguous and malleable the discursive relations of 
work and citizenship have been in South Africa’s history to begin with. In few other 
contexts has work provided such a contested point of intersection for profoundly 
dissimilar imaginations of the human and the citizen, from the racial state’s 
disciplinary fantasies, to democratic nationalist protestations of universal rights, to 
ordinary visions of activity liberated from the capitalist workplace. Perhaps the 
inability of resistance to wage labor to hatch unambiguously alternative meanings of 
work can help explain why the massive revolutionary forces energizing twentieth-
century South Africa were in the end, and with relatively little trauma, reabsorbed in a 
postapartheid official imagination that centered citizenship around productive 
economic activity (Barchiesi 2011: 60). 
 
Those who lie beyond the realm of formal work—most of the slum residents in 
Durban and other major cities in South Africa—are therefore not conceived as complete 
citizens. Reciprocally, supposedly only by entering into the pact of wage labor can an 
individual fully realize his or her potential as a citizen in a liberated society. “Second, the 
work-citizenship nexus is also a contested field of signification involving official discourse, 
organized labor ideologies, and workers’ meanings of work” (Barchiesi 2011: 24).  Not 
unlike the Development project, the work-citizenship nexus operates on the diffused terrain 
of a discourse—defined here as both ideological and as “a material and political practice” 
(Barchiesi 2011: 257)—including but going beyond the state institutions to envelop the 
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imagination of the union movement and workers’ own understandings of what it means to be 
a citizen in a liberated society.  
Labor union politics and worker imaginations are both therefore constrained by the 
work-citizenship nexus and the idea that a job will provide fulfillment of the most central 
human needs and desires. Radical intellectuals are often equally complicit in limiting their 
studies of work to the spatial bounds of the factory. “Analyses centered on production 
dynamics are always at risk of essentializing and naturalizing the workplace as the obviously 
primary social locale where workers express and enact desire” (Barchiesi 2011: 199). In his 
critique of this over-emphasis upon life within the factory walls, Barchiesi is clearly 
influenced by the Italian “Autonomist Marxist” (“Operaismo”) conception of the social 
factory, where the productive capacities of workers are seen to be operable far beyond the 
factory walls in the space of everyday life.  This re-positioning of workers then captures the 
extent to which the centrality of the work-citizenship nexus must be deconstructed.  
While the potentially oppositional force of a strong labor movement has certainly not 
disappeared—witness the importance of the recent Marikana massacre in setting the anti-
ANC agenda—it is certainly true that in the past fifteen years a new oppositional force 
emerged from beyond the bounds of the factory in the form of ‘new social movements’.  
Abahlali baseMjondolo is perhaps the most active of these new movements, and it emerged 
from the community setting of shack settlements, rather than from the traditional realm of 
work-place organization.  The dynamics of precarity in the community setting of the slum 
pose a new set of questions that move beyond work-place dynamics and towards the question 
of surplus.  It is at this juncture between precarious inclusion, permanent exclusion and 
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revolutionary possibility that the renewed debates about the relevance of anti-colonial 
theorist Frantz Fanon in South Africa is taking place.  
Fanon in the University, Fanon in the Slum 
A few years ago Mary Gilmartin and Lawrence Berg provided us with an appraisal of 
anticolonial and postcolonial theory in geography, stating: “As geographers both living 
through and working on, issues of colonialism in former British colonies, the writings that 
emanated from the anti-colonial movements around the world continue to inspire and move 
us. From Fanon to Cesaire, from Senghor to Cabral to Achebe, these writings are influential 
partly because they are grounded in experiences of oppression, but also because they contain 
alternative visions, alternative understandings of how the world could be better”(Gilmartin 
and Berg: 120).  And yet, they went on to argue, such an appreciation for the anti-colonial 
cannon was rare in the university.  The dominant trend in geography and academia at-large 
entailed an embrace of post-colonial theory that had split itself off from the anti-colonial 
thought more grounded in struggle.  While not being dismissive of post-colonial theory at all, 
they worried, along with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, that “post colonial theorists 
‘combat the remnants of colonialist thinking’” and that “Through the use of postcolonial 
theory within geography, many British geographers have fallen into the trap that Anne 
McClintock identified over a decade ago: of reorienting the globe around a new binary 
opposition, that of colonial and post-colonial, of center and periphery, of past and present, of 
in Here  and out There”(Gilmartin and Berg: 123).  How did this come to pass, and how 
might contemporary Fanonian-inspired thought and struggle in South Africa seek to rectify 
it? 
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Frantz Fanon’s reception in the US academy is largely still dominated by the political 
and theoretical conjuncture of the 1980s and 1990s.  As Stefan Kipfer (2007) and Cedric 
Robinson (1993) have pointed out, the academic interpreters of Fanon—primarily Homi 
Bhabha and Henry Louis Gates—were in part rooted in specific poststructuralist theories of 
difference, and thus saw Fanon’s explorations, particularly those in Black Skin, White Masks, 
as revolving around the problematic of identity and a corresponding return to essence.  In 
what amounts to a troubled interpretation, here the struggles in which Fanon’s thought and 
ideas were grounded were seen as reflecting an insufficiently critical celebration of violence 
and a corresponding return to an essential identity or pre-colonial experience.  In its place, 
they sought to prop up a Derridean attention to differance. As Bhabha explains: “Unlike 
Fanon, I think the nondialectical moment of Manicheanism suggests an answer. By 
following the trajectory of colonial desire…it becomes possible to cross, even to shift the 
Manichean boundaries.  Where there is no human nature hope can hardly spring eternal; but 
it emerges surely and surreptitiously in the strategic return of that difference that informs and 
deforms the image of identity, in the margin of Otherness that displays the image of identity” 
(Bhabha: 192).   
In a 1994 article titled “The Post-Colonial Aura,”—later expanded into a book—Arif 
Dirlik provided us with an early critique of post-colonial theory. In a controversial 
formulation, Dirlik stated that “the popularity the term postcolonial has achieved in the last 
few years has less to do with its rigorousness as a concept or with the new vistas it has 
opened up for critical inquiry than it does with the increased visibility of academic 
intellectuals of Third World origin as pacesetters in cultural criticism” (Dirlik: 329). Setting 
aside the potentially racist undertones to this argument—something Hardt and Negri are 
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careful to distance themselves from in their own critique of postcolonial thought—it is worth 
taking seriously the philosophical target of Dirlik’s argument.  While he acknowledges the 
difficulty of lumping together seemingly diverse theorists such as Said, Spivak, Guha and 
Bhabha into one uniform category called “post-colonial,” one senses he is really interested in 
attacking a specific strain of thought behind much of postcolonialism.  Philosophically, it is 
poststructuralist concern for heterogeneity and difference that underlies much of the 
postcolonial thinking that he is most concerned with.  His most salient critique, however, was 
that this current sought to destabilize the binaries traditionally associated with Western 
thought, modernity, and capitalism.  And yet, according to him, global capitalism now 
operates in such a way that it necessitates incorporating difference, rather than merely 
excluding it through binary oppositions.  Thus Eurocentrism can only continue to exist by 
adopting and subsuming (and thus transforming) alternative frameworks and traditions. As 
just one example of this Dirlik cites the case of the renewed interest in Confucianism by both 
Chinese and Western scholars.  “In their case, the effort takes the form of articulating to the 
values of capitalism a Confucianism that in an earlier day was deemed to be inconsistent with 
capitalist modernization.  Hence Confucianism has been rendered into a prime mover of 
capitalist development and has also found quite a sympathetic ear among First World 
ideologues who now look to a Confucian ethic to relieve the crisis of capitalism” (Dirlik: 
341). 
A similar formulation is found in David Harvey’s Condition of Postmodernity, 
whereby much of what arrived under the name of postmodern criticism was in fact 
symptomatic of a general condition of late capitalism, dominated by the very same flexible 
accumulation responsible for generalizing the condition of precarity. Hardt and Negri also 
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provide a corresponding critique of this postcolonial celebration of difference: “When we 
begin to consider the ideologies of corporate capitalism and the world market, it certainly 
appears that the postmodern and postcolonialist theorists who advocate a politics of 
difference, fluidity, and hybridity in order to challenge the binaries and essentialism of 
modern sovereignty have been outflanked by the strategies of power.  Power has evacuated 
the bastion they are attacking and has circled around to their rear to join them in the assault in 
the name of difference.  These theorists thus find themselves pushing against an open 
door”(Hardt and Negri 2000: 138).  
Fanon can be read, in contrast, to offer both a different terrain for attentiveness to 
difference and the possibility of grounding anti-essentialism in actual struggles, following 
Sylvia Wynter’s emphasis (2001), through his stressing of the “socio-genic principle” that 
refuses to ontologize the conditions of colonization, dependency, or psychological 
complexes. Fanon instead situates these conditions in the environment of their social 
conditions: the ‘situation’ of colonialism. Furthermore, as Paget Henry has demonstrated 
(2001: 117-143), Wynter’s work, and her engagement with Fanon, avoids the sometimes 
problematic dichotomy—that Dirlik might be accused of reproducing—between a pure 
commitment to the radical political praxis of the Marxist tradition on the one hand, and the 
intellectual emphasis upon anti-essentialism and a renewed attention to difference inherited 
from post-structuralist and post-colonial thought on the other hand. Nonetheless, Fanon’s 
own deployment of the socio-genic principle should be viewed as offering a critique of those 
forms of anti-racism that do not take into account a rising cultural racism, or neo-racism, that 
in fact celebrates rather than simply condemns difference—the post-apartheid government’s 
appropriation of the term “Ubuntu” would be a prime example here.  Such a framing of the 
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problem of racism sidesteps much of the more ambiguous post-structuralist and post-colonial 
celebrations of difference.  This is clear in certain passages in Black Skin, White Masks, 
where he says: “There is a quest for the Black man. He is yearned for; white men can’t get 
along without him.  He is in demand, but they want him seasoned a certain way. 
Unfortunately, the Black man demolishes the system and violates the agreements.  Will the 
white man revolt?  No, he’ll come to an arrangement.  This fact…explains why so many 
books dealing with racism become best sellers (Fanon 2008: 153).”   
He follows a similar line of thought in the essay “Racism and Culture,” in the 
collection Toward the African Revolution, where he argues: “For a time it looked as though 
racism had disappeared.  This soul-soothing, unreal impression was simply the consequence 
of the evolution of forms of exploitation…The need to appeal to various degrees of approval 
and support, to the native’s cooperation, modified relations in a less crude, more subtle, more 
‘cultivated’ direction.  It was not rare, in fact, to see a ‘democratic and humane’ ideology at 
this state…Thus the blues—‘the Black slave lament’—was offered up for the admiration of 
the oppressors.  This modicum of stylized oppression is the exploiter’s and the racist’s 
rightful due. Without oppression and without racism you have no blues. The end of racism 
would sound the knell of great Negro music”(Fanon 1967: 37).  This formulation at once 
introduces us to the intricate terrain of neo-racism (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991), while it 
also identifies a potential double relation to the “zone of non-being” that Fanon discusses as 
both a site of absolute dereliction, and also as the place for the possible emergence of 
something new.  The zone of non-being and the call to enter it, to descend into it, as he says, 
opens the dual possibilities of slumming, as well as a potential passageway to revolution. 
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In contrast to the academic reception of Fanon under the wings of theories of 
difference and anti-essentialism, the contemporary surge in Fanonian scholarship in South 
Africa over the last decade has occurred in a very different situation.  If the 1980s in the US 
represented a singular moment of utter defeat, the 2000s in South Africa were doubly marked 
by “the Pitfalls of South Africa’s Liberation” on the one hand, and the emergence of a 
plethora of movements throughout the country on the other.  This reflection on Fanon has 
also witnessed a corresponding attempt to identify the proper inheritors of Fanon’s thought in 
South Africa, both historically and contemporarily.  
In this context, Gillian Hart draws on Fanon to resist the idea put forward by critics 
like Patrick Bond that the transition from apartheid to post-apartheid South Africa, or from a 
Fordist to a neoliberal state, represents a mere switch from racial to class apartheid.  Rather, 
against the idea of neoliberalism as simply constituting a class project, she insists upon an 
attentiveness to the persistence of race in the post-apartheid moment through “specifically 
racialized forms of dispossession”(Hart 2007: 686).  Hart wants to show that resistance 
cannot and will not necessarily follow in the line of the pure economics of exploitation, but 
rather also depends at least as much on everyday, popular notions of what constitutes a nation 
and liberation.  
This refocus on the parameters of resistance in a post-apartheid South Africa brings 
us back to Fanon’s idea of a “descent” discussed in the preface to Black Skin, White Masks, 
where he states “There is a zone of non-being, an extraordinary sterile and arid region, an 
incline stripped bare of every essential from which a genuine new departure can emerge. In 
most cases, the Black man cannot take advantage of this descent into a veritable hell”(Fanon 
2008: xii).  In Chapter 5 and 6 of the book, especially, Fanon engages in a dialogue with both 
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Cesaire and Sartre, whereby he attempts to go beyond both positions that the two thinkers 
present to him, while at the same time highlighting their important contributions to his own 
project. These chapters are full of references to this “descent,” of which Negritude represents 
one important but flawed example due to its celebration of a Blackness that too often gets 
caught in a mythical past, or merely inverts the racist lens by affirming the categories that 
Europe denigrates.  Nonetheless, Fanon tells us, Cesaire’s work represents one attempt at this 
descent, and he claims that: “When the Black man plunges, in other words, goes down, 
something extraordinary happens.” (Fanon 2008: 174)   
In these chapters he seems to tell us that in place of an insufficient Negritude, but also 
in place of Sartre’s universalizing class analysis, something like “Black consciousness” 
might stand out as an alternative. “Still regarding consciousness, Black consciousness is 
immanent in itself.  I am not a potentiality of something, I am fully what I am…My Black 
consciousness does not claim to be a loss. It is” (Fanon 2008: 114).  This particular passage 
is crucial in the South African context, where, as Andile Mngxitama, Amanda Alexander and 
Nigel Gibson (2008) have shown, Steve Biko would read Fanon and go on to establish the 
Black Consciousness Movement that in the 1960s and 1970s would fill the political vacuum 
of an exiled ANC and SACP, while also challenging the remnant white normativity of those 
movements by tackling the paternalism of white allies in the anti-apartheid struggle.  The 
definition of Blackness that Biko deploys is a similar example of an anti-essentialist and 
political framing of racial categories in that it applies to Africans, Indians and the Coloured 
community alike.  But it does not merely accept this grouping of non-whites as constituted 
through racism, but rather distinguishes the idea of non-whites from Black consciousness as 
an affirmative political project that parallels Fanon’s own insistence upon affirmation. Biko 
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says: “Being Black is not a matter of pigmentation—being Black is a reflection of a mental 
attitude…From the above observations therefore, we can see that the term Black is not 
necessarily all-inclusive; i.e. the fact we are all not white does not necessarily mean that we 
are all Black…If one’s aspiration is whiteness but his pigmentation makes attainment of this 
impossible, then that person is a non-white…Black people—real Black people—are those 
who can manage to hold their heads high in defiance rather than willingly surrender their 
souls to the white man” (Biko 1978: 48-49).  As Eunice Sahle notes in her assessment of the 
anti-racist tradition in South Africa, Biko’s conception of Blackness opened up space for 
broader political alliances in the anti-apartheid struggle.  “The new notion of Blackness 
provided an important mobilizing ideology for the oppressed. In addition to broadening the 
category of Blackness, he created a significant ‘political opportunity structure’ for Africans, 
Indians and Coloureds to create organizational networks committed to the dismantling of the 
racist apartheid system”(Sahle 2012: 17). 
Alongside the figure of Steve Biko as an historical inheritor of Fanonian thought and 
praxis in South Africa, Achille Mbembe has identified the writer, actor and playwright Bloke 
Modisane, an original founder of Drum Magazine and the author in exile of the 
autobiography Blame Me On History (1987). In the opening lines of this text, Modisane tells 
us of the experience of watching his community of Sophiatown destroyed at the hands of an 
apartheid state bent on total separation of the population into racial districts: “Something in 
me died, a piece of me died, with the dying of Sophiatown…In the name of slum clearance 
they had brought the bulldozers and gored into her body, and for a brief moment, looking 
down Good Street, Sophiatown was like one of its own many victims; a man gored by the 
knives of Sophiatown, lying in the open gutters, a raisin in the smelling drains, dying of 
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multiple stab wounds, gaping wells gushing forth blood; the look of shock and bewilderment, 
of horror and incredulity, on the face of the dying man” (Modisane 1987: 1, quoted by 
Mbembe in 2011 talk). 
  Modisane’s reflection upon the destruction of his built environment as a destruction 
of his self, parallels the slum conditions inhabited by Abahlali members where the actual 
built environment of such zones of non-being offer both a path into nothingness, but also the 
raw material for the potential production of other lives and futures.  Sophiatown, Modisane’s 
home, is a good example of this in that, despite its poverty and suffering, it also produced 
tremendous cultural and theoretical works of art such as DRUM magazine and township jazz, 
all while making up a part of the striated space of apartheid.  Here we must navigate the 
tension between the zone of non-being as what Frank Wilderson—drawing from the work of 
Orlando Patterson—has referred to as social death (Wilderson 2007: 28), and the zone of 
non-being as a space of already existing alternatives to the given which require 
intensification through the non-hierarchical process of political organization articulated by 
Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth.  Navigating this tension is precisely what the shack 
dwellers of Abahlali are seeking to do in articulating their organizational relationship to 
intellectuals in their elaboration of the concept of “living politics.”  This practice of living 
politics is one that forces intellectuals to engage with their project on a horizontal plane of 
participation rather than through paternalistic guidance.  The representation of their spaces as 
zones of non-being, while accurate in terms of the utter squalor of squatter life, can also lead 
to the idea that intellectuals and militants must lead the inhabitants of such areas in the 
struggle.  At the same time, the call by Fanon for intellectuals and development experts to 
descend into the zone of non-being can lead to an unhelpful and voyeuristic practice of 
 
 
 173 
slumming.  Here shack communities can be put on display for slum tourism stops, 
incorporated into capital’s exploitative circuits through a process of differential inclusion 
(Mezzadra and Nielsen 2013).  They can also become sites for biopolitical savings programs, 
geared towards collectivizing the poor’s entrepreneurial capabilities.  Cato Crest in Durban 
was in fact the site of precisely such a program under the leadership of the transnational 
Shack Dweller’s International organization.  
Both potential pitfalls in relation to their inhabitation in the zone of non-being are 
taken up by the shack dwellers in their reflection on Fanon’s work in an attempt to insist that 
the path to the new does indeed lead through the zone of non-being. Yet they insist this path 
must be one that forestalls any deviance into the paths of social death or slumming 
articulated above. As we will see, Fanon had these problems firmly in mind in his own 
reflections, and his advice to intellectuals and political militants is entirely compatible with 
the shack dweller attempts to maintain their organizational autonomy in relation to 
collaborative projects with intellectuals through a practice of living politics14.  
From Non-Being to the New: Spontaneity and Beyond  
In chapter two of The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon discusses the “Grandeur and 
Weakness of Spontaneity.”  The chapter, like the book as a whole, represents Fanon’s 
attempt to assess the different class forces at play in the anti-colonial revolts of Africa, 
parallel to Marx’s class analysis of the events of 1848 in France roughly one hundred years 
earlier. Fanon was an official member of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), but 
he also travelled and spent time in many different African countries throughout the 1950s, 
witnessing the plethora of struggles on the continent seeking self-determination. This 
                                                
14 See Sahle 2014 for a parallel reflection, drawing on Gramsci, Biko, and the neglected role of South African 
women such as Fatima Meer who struggled as both liberation fighters and intellectuals. 
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experience allowed him to provide a diagnosis of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
different struggles for national liberation and their attempts to forge a national consciousness 
distinct from their prior identity as mere territorial extensions of Europe.  Impressively, this 
1961 study foreshadows precisely the problems of post-independence that would only 
become clear to others in retrospect.  Most particularly, he targeted the nascent African 
national bourgeoisie, predicting it would betray the popular classes who sacrificed so much 
in their various struggles against European colonizers.  
Fanon believed the African national bourgeoisie held specific interests that bound 
them to centralized political parties that would ultimately stunt the liberatory power of the 
anti-colonial movements.  His critique of political parties foreshadows the decision by groups 
like Abahlali to break with the ANC and other formal political organizations and to abstain 
from voting.  “The formation of the nationalist parties in the colonized countries,” Fanon 
states, “is contemporary with the birth of an intellectual and business elite.  These elite attach 
primordial importance to the organization as such, and blind devotion to the organization 
often takes priority over a rational study of colonial society.  The notion of the party is a 
notion imported from the metropolis”(63-64). Interested more in their own survival than in 
genuine societal transformation, the national political parties can easily become conservative 
impediments to revolutionary change.  Indeed, S’bu Zikode asserts that the ANC plays 
precisely this roll in Durban. “The ruling party has worked hard to make sure that housing is 
only allocated to its members and their friends and families and to exclude those who are 
critical of them as a punishment. Evictions are political; only those who are not loyal 
members of the ruling party are having their homes illegally destroyed without court orders” 
(2013).  
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Just as Marx saw the French bourgeoisie giving up its commitment to republican 
political power in order to allow Bonaparte to save their economic power, Fanon sees the 
national bourgeoisie in newly independent countries as sacrificing the radical political goals 
of the anti-colonial revolutions in order to maintain their limited economic power as lackeys 
for Europe in a neo-colonial arrangement.  Where, then, would genuine transformation 
emerge from, if not from the mouthpiece of the independence parties?   
Marx’s own assessment of the revolutionary potential of 1848 sought out amongst the 
potentially radical groups a class that was capable of representing itself.  As Edward Said and 
other post-colonial scholars never tired of reminding us, this unfortunately entailed 
denouncing the peasantry as too disjointed and unable to represent itself due to its spatial 
dispersion.  Similarly, Marx saw the lumpen proletariat classes of France as too easily 
manipulated by Bonaparte.  It is from The 18th Brumaire that many orthodox Marxists get 
their classic lines about the lumpen as the “refuse of all classes”(1916: 75).  For him, only the 
proletariat, concentrated in urban settings and already used to cooperating for capital under 
single factory rooftops, was capable of representing itself at that historical moment.   
Fanon’s diagnosis, like Marx’s, attempts to identify precisely that class which is 
capable of representing itself.  But unlike Marx, he views the urban proletariat and their 
workers unions as relatively conservative forces.  “It has been said many times that in 
colonial territories the proletariat is the kernel of the colonized people most pampered by the 
colonial regime.  The embryonic urban proletariat is relatively privileged. These elements 
make up the most loyal clientele of the nationalist parties and by the privileged position they 
occupy in the colonial system represent the ‘bourgeois’ faction of the colonized 
population”(Fanon 2004: 64).  Thus the urban proletariat under colonialism not only would 
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shy away from the most radical forms of action in the interest of protecting their relatively 
privileged wages, they also eluded a form of self-representation by allowing the equally 
conservative national parties to act politically on their behalf.  
Fanon instead looks to the peasantry and the lumpen classes in the transition from 
colonialism to independence as those classes most likely to provide the radical edge needed 
to drive the struggle forward.  All over Africa Fanon witnessed forms of spontaneous 
struggle, often but not exclusively violent, that emerged outside the grasp of the formal 
models of organization represented by the political parties and worker unions.  The response 
of these traditional Left organizations was often to denounce these events as extremist. 
“Insurrection disorients the political parties.  Their doctrine has always claimed the 
ineffectiveness of any confrontation and their very existence serves to condemn any idea of 
revolt.  Certain political parties secretly share the optimism of the colonists and are glad to be 
no part to this madness which, it is said, can only end in bloodshed”(Fanon 2004: 79).  
Against this model, Fanon saw this period of spontaneous revolt as an initial stage that had to 
be celebrated by those members of society who truly hoped to overthrow the colonial model, 
both in its original form and under its later, neo-colonial guise.  But he also saw that the 
revolts would reach a point where they would bring on a horrific crackdown by the 
colonial/state forces trying to restore order.  At this point, they reached a kind of breaking 
point, beyond which a pure, immediatist spontaneity could go no further.  “It soon becomes 
clear that this impetuous spontaneity, which is intent on rapidly settling its score with the 
colonial system, is destined to fail as a doctrine”(Fanon 2004: 85). The second stage of the 
struggle, then, had to bring about an encounter between those actors experienced with and 
seeking to provide organization, and the peasantry classes of the countryside as well as the 
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lumpen classes gathered along the urban peripheries.  For Fanon, this encounter was made 
possible by those militants who had abandoned urban politics (in the form of political 
parties), and who now “rediscover politics” (Fanon 2004: 86) in the recognition that the 
people’s army needs organization and education if it is to triumph. 
This may seem like a re-introduction of a traditional Leninist model of organization, 
one that cannot help but clash openly with the form of spontaneous revolt Fanon has just 
been advocating as part of the initial stage of struggle.  But here he adds a crucial caveat that 
often goes unnoticed.  For Fanon, the encounter between urban militants and intellectuals 
who have abandoned their political parties, and the rural and peri-urban forces is one that 
must be premised upon a total humility and re-education for the urban militants and 
intellectuals themselves.  Such an encounter can only succeed if  “the colonized intellectual 
who is lucky enough to bunker down with the people during the liberation struggle” does not 
come simply bearing the gift of knowledge to the marginalized masses, but instead comes 
with a humility that recognizes the necessity to learn, more than the necessity to educate 
(Fanon 2004: 12, my emphasis).  “Involvement in the organization of the struggle will 
already introduce him to a different vocabulary. ‘Brother’, ‘sister’, ‘comrade’ are words 
outlawed by the colonialist bourgeoisie because in their thinking my brother is my wallet and 
my comrade, my scheming….This colonized intellectual, pulverized by colonialist culture, 
will also discover the strength of the village assemblies…In such a context, the ‘every man 
for himself’ concept, the atheist’s form of salvation, is prohibited” (Fanon 2004: 12). 
Clearly, in this context, the urban militants and intellectuals who choose to abandon 
their political parties in favor of direct action with the more marginalized sectors of their 
society must learn more from these sectors than they can possibly share, both in terms of 
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everyday modes of social interaction that attack a privileged individualism, as well as in 
terms of alternative models of organization.  The interaction between the two sectors is one 
that takes place along the lines of a horizontal encounter.  Finally, and perhaps most 
crucially, the encounter must lead not to a re-instantiation of hierarchical models of struggle 
if it is to succeed, but must instead develop into an education that produces only more intense 
modes of self-determination.  “The more the people understand, the more vigilant they 
become, the more they realize in fact that everything depends on them, and that their 
salvation lies in their solidarity”(Fanon 2004: 133).  It is in this sense that Fanon understands 
the lumpen and peasantry classes in a colonial and neo-colonial context as the only classes 
capable of self-representation.  
While we must be careful not to merely cut and paste a model of struggle that was 
written for a specific colonial conjuncture into a contemporary context, the lessons of Biko 
and Fanon are surprisingly applicable for post-apartheid movements operating within the 
zones of non-being typified in slums.  Abahlali has drawn upon the legacy of Biko’s 
expanded, de-nationalized notion of Blackness in their own attempts to forge solidarity and 
alliances across historical African-Indian divisions in Durban, as well as in an attempt to 
support the struggles of non-South African migrant workers who have come under repeated 
attack in periodic pogroms.  In addition, their position is one that straddles the urban and the 
rural, as many shack dwellers are recent migrants to the city from rural areas (Interview S’bu 
Zikode August 2, 2013; Interview Siya James June 27 2013; Zibechi 2010).  While they 
attempt to penetrate the heart of the forbidden post-apartheid city (Cato Crest comes closest 
to the central business district), they are most often still relegated to the urban peripheries 
that Fanon identifies in his analysis as the home of the lumpen classes under colonialism.  
 
 
 179 
Finally, Abahlali has adhered to Fanon’s stinging critique of intellectuals and political parties 
as vanguards, instead affirming their autonomous capacity to think and act democratically.  
They demand recognition for their own “University of Abahlali baseMjondolo,” even as they 
claim that the only classrooms of this “university” are comprised of the spaces of shack 
settlements writ-large.  That is, they insist upon their own ability to articulate profound ideas, 
relevant to contemporary struggles for social justice, and upon grounding those ideas not 
exclusively in written texts but also in the living politics of their own everyday struggles for 
survival in their shack communities. As Bandile Mdlalose, General Secretary of Abahlali, 
argues, “Normally it is seen that the poor are poor in mind and that everything needs to be 
thought for us. But poverty is not stupidity; it is a lack of money. And we always remind 
people that the same system that made the rich rich has made the poor poor. We are still 
fighting to insist that there should be nothing for us without us. No one has a right to make 
decisions for us while we still have a mouth and mind to use” (Quoted in Sacks 2013).  
 And yet, in all of this, they do not seek to withdraw from society in order to form an 
exclusive shack-dwelling commune.  Like Fanon, they recognize the importance of an 
encounter with “professional” intellectuals and militants, in addition to groups struggling in 
other areas and in other contexts.  But for Abahlali the encounter with such individuals and 
organizations must take place on an equal ground whereby the autonomy of their 
organization is respected as a vehicle for moving from non-being to the new.  While this 
movement towards the new certainly appears to start in a place overdetermined by the logic 
of superfluous exclusion on the one hand, and precarious inclusion on the other, it clearly 
does not end up in either place.   
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Riots and the Delegitimization of Precarious Protesters 
The protests led by Nkululeko Gwala in Cato Crest were initially characterized by the 
local newspaper The Mercury in the following manner: “Mayville in Durban came to a 
standstill yesterday when a mob trashed streets, pelted motorists with rocks and tried to 
forcibly evict an elderly man who was accused of occupying a government house illegally.  
The police watched as the group, estimated to number about 700 people, went on the 
rampage, destroying public toilets, blocking the road, and stoning motorists and police cars in 
protest at alleged corruption in low-cost government housing” (Mkamba 2013).  This 
depiction of a supposed ‘mob’ on the ‘rampage,’ apparently destroying random pieces of 
public property in an incredibly unruly manner is an incredibly common way of portraying 
any act of protest by shack dwellers in South Africa.  From official government agencies 
such as the police, to Marxist intellectuals on the Left, slum protests are often written off as 
the acts of an unruly mob, lacking in formal organization, or as examples of ‘outsider 
meddling’ and an evil ‘third force’.  Even progressive portrayals rely upon the moniker of 
“service delivery protests” to describe any and all such actions that occur outside the formal 
workspace of a factory.  This depiction is intended to signal that the protests essentially 
amount to a complaint by shack and township residents that they have not received adequate 
government services.  While this is often the case, it unfortunately does not come close to 
capturing the level of discontent, nor the demands and desires of these communities in 
rebellion. Worse yet, such depiction often parallels the orthodox Marxist stance on the 
inadequacy of ‘merely spontaneous,’ expressions of dissent.  But as S’bu Zikode is fond of 
saying, there is no such thing as a spontaneous protest.  That is to say, every expression of 
dissent in the slum emerges from countless experiences on behalf of residents, and in a 
 
 
 181 
context whereby people have made multiple attempts to seek redress but are often silenced, 
ignored, or directly repressed.  Only when the poor took to the streets in acts of rupture to 
place a monkey wrench in the daily lives of a city’s inhabitants, businesses, and government, 
were shack dwellers finally recognized by the state officials, Bandile Mdlalose told me 
(Interview May 5, 2013).  Nonetheless, the predominance of certain strains of Orthodox 
Marxism in South Africa, even among progressive intellectuals, is such that the surplus poor 
of the slums is seen as a threatening group, a population that is extremely difficult if not 
impossible to organize.  Thus the moniker “service delivery protest” gives the impression 
that if only the government were to better perform their top-down obligation of delivery in a 
more efficient manner, the protests would whittle away.  But Abahlali’s own call for dignity 
can clearly not be realized through an improved technocratic process of government-led 
service delivery. 
A more fitting assessment of many of the expressions of outrage throughout South 
Africa’s townships and slums can be found in Alain Badiou’s typology of riots.  Interestingly 
for Badiou, the riot itself “is the guardian of the history of emancipation in intervallic 
periods” (Badiou 2012: 41).  Thus, rioting is an expression of the ever-present desire for 
emancipation—“the communist invariant”—that Badiou believes exists in all societies but 
remains latent, below the surface, expressing itself periodically in an “Event” that constitutes 
a dramatic rupture with the status quo (what for Fanon is symbolized by the movement from 
the zone of non-being to the new). Despite attempts by capital to thwart and repress it, this 
communist invariant cannot be eliminated.  Therefore riots become a kind of intermediary 
guardian force of history in between Events that signal the “rebirth of history”.   
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In an analysis that parallels Fanon’s own assessment of spontaneity, Badiou 
distinguishes between an immediate and a historical riot.   
An immediate riot is unrest among a section of the population, nearly always in the 
wake of a violent episode of state coercion…[it] is located in the territory of those 
who take part in it…Hence the blind destruction and pillaging of the very place the 
rioters live in, which is a universal characteristic of immediate riots.  For our part, we 
shall say that all this achieves a weak localization, an inability of the riot to displace 
itself…Finally, an immediate riot is always indistinct when it comes to the subjective 
type it summons and creates.  Because this subjectivity is composed solely of 
rebellion, and dominated by negation and destruction, it does not make it possible 
clearly to distinguish between what pertains to a partially universalizable intention 
and what remains confined to a rage with no purpose other than the satisfaction of 
being able to crystallize and find hateful objects to destroy or consume (Badiou 2012: 
22-25). 
 
Aspects of this description might fit some of the expressions of rage at a community level 
that are an on-going part of the “rebellion of the poor” that Peter Alexander claims include 
“mass meetings, drafting of memoranda, [petitions, toyi-toying, processions, stay-aways, 
election boycotts, blockading of roads, construction of barricades, burning of tyres, looting, 
destruction of buildings, chasing unpopular individuals out of townships, confrontations with 
the police, an forced resignations of elected officials” (Alexander 2010: 26).  In the case of 
Abahlali, and the group led by Nkululeko Gwala, it would appear that parts of Badiou’s 
description of an immediate riot apply, but other parts simply do not.  This was not 
temporally immediate, it was planned, and it occurred after many hours of consultation.  The 
targets of their attack were officials and residents accused of corruption, and their protest was 
accompanied by a clear analysis of the problem that the media explicitly ignored.   
 In contrast to the early form, an historical riot “is the result of the transformation of 
an immediate riot, more nihilistic than political, into a pre-political riot” (Badiou 2012: 33).  
It therefore takes the form of a more generalized expression of discontent, which for Badiou 
usually occupies the downtown part of any city, typified by the occupation of Tahrir Square, 
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Plaza del Sol, Pearl Roundabout, and Zuccotti park in the 2011 year of global uprisings.  
Three characteristics define a historical riot:  “A transition from limited localization to the 
construction of an enduring central site…a multiplicity of voices, absent or virtually absent 
from the clamour of an immediate riot, asserts itself…[And] a transition from the nihilistic 
din of riotous attacks to the invention of a single slogan that envelops all the disparate 
voices” (Badiou 2012: 33-35).  Despite the general character of Abahlali’s actions—staging 
gatherings throughout the city of Durban, and engaging in broader acts of rebellion in central 
locations in the city—it is clear that most of their actions, and certainly the protests led by 
Gwala in Cato Crest, would not fit the definition of an historical riot that Badiou provides 
here.  They almost always involve poor shack dwellers exclusively and are usually confined 
to a somewhat ‘local’ stage. While the central slogan of the movement has been “No land, 
No House, No Dignity, No Vote,” it isn’t entirely clear whether this is something that Badiou 
would qualify as a generalizable slogan for an entire populace. 
 The actions led by Gwala, along with much of Abahlali’s political protests, might be 
characterized as exemplary of an intermediary riotous stage that Badiou calls “latent riots”.  
A latent riot is neither characteristic of the problematic aspects of spontaneous, self-
destructive rebellion, but nor does it represent an obvious rupture and generalized expression 
of discontent that opens directly to the rebirth of history.  Rather, a latent riot represents the 
expression of a subjective condition that signals the possibility of a move towards an 
historical riot that might eventually constitute “an evental rupture” (Badiou 2012: 27-32).  
Rather than characterize such expressions of discontent on the part of organized shack 
dwellers as dangerous mobs, or as a call for more efficient service delivery, we should be 
careful to identify the potential that lies in such moments of latent rioting.  The question of 
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scale becomes important in this regard, as Badiou signals.  The same critics who decry shack 
protests as unorganized expressions of dissatisfaction by unruly mobs often denounce their 
inability to scale-up to a more effective national platform of intervention.    
The Scale of the Slum: From Local to National Politics? 
In a careful study of the localized nature of much of the South African rebellion of the 
poor, Richard Pithouse proclaims that more attention should be paid to the precise dynamics 
of struggle before denouncing them as ineffective and un-generalizable.  
While the shanty town and the gated community are both nodes in the space of flows, 
the lived sense of place, of the local, is much more pronounced in the former.  A key 
reason for this is that money extends the ability for mobility and reduces dependence 
on spatially situated sociality.  Most people in most of the world have little money; 
so, most people depend on spatially situated sociality for childcare, for security, for 
caring of the sick, for fire fighting, and for burying their dead.  For most people, then, 
there is a strong degree through which sociality is practiced through the local 
(Pithouse 2013: 105). 
 
 Arguably, the struggles that take place within the factory are equally localizable, and 
confined to the precise nature of a particular corporation’s relations with its employees.  The 
dangers and limitations—highlighted by Barchiesi in his critique of the wage-citizenship 
nexus—of an exclusive focus on the factory and its precarious conditions of work, should be 
clear in an era increasingly defined by structural unemployment.  But the scalar critique of 
shack-based struggles still seems to rely upon nostalgia for the era of strong union 
movement.  Such criticism elides the important point that all struggles—factory-based or 
community-based—need a specific, local context from which to grow.  
A mass movement cannot be built and sustained before local struggles have emerged, 
made errors and developed.  Sometimes these can coalesce into broader struggles, 
sometimes they will leave only a sedimented experience from which future projects 
can draw.  But without local struggles, a sustained broader struggle is unimaginable.  
The lesson is clear: local organization is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
sustained organization at a larger scale (Pithouse 2013: 106). 
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 In this context a variety of attempts have been made to generalize the latent and 
historical riots that emerge in the shack settlements like Cato Crest, in an effort to move 
away from political precarity and towards a broad-based “evental rupture”.  And yet, in the 
South African context, most of these efforts seem to rely on the mechanism of the political 
party as a mobilizing tool.  The Democratic Left Front (DLF) is perhaps the most interesting 
group of the traditional left—comprised of a combination of disaffected members of the 
SACP and Trotskyists who were always on the margins of the official anti-apartheid 
organizations of the ANC and SACP—still plans to mobilize the community struggles they 
support behind the banner of an oppositional party.  Martin Legassick is a key member of the 
DLF, and someone who has managed to maintain his support for the community struggles 
like Abahlali.  He is therefore representative of perhaps the best of the socialist Trotskyist 
tradition in South Africa.  But Legassick, too, relies upon the political party platform based in 
worker’s struggles as a more adequate expression of political agency than the existing social 
movements.  “Were it possible, a decision by a COSATU Congress to split from the Alliance 
and to launch a workers’ party would be a huge step forward for the South African working 
class, as big a step as the formation of COSATU itself in 1985.  Such a party could rapidly 
win majority support in the major urban centres, and, with a clear and convincing programme 
for all the oppressed, in small towns and rural areas as well” (Legassick 2007: 538).  
Legassick is unfortunately guilty of reproducing the orthodox approach to slum politics—
lacking the nuances in Fanon’s and Badiou’s own typology of riots—by characterizing all 
protests in these spaces as merely spontaneous.  “It is necessary to maintain an orientation to 
the rank and file of COSATU members, even if the most immediate task is to link up with 
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the spontaneous service delivery struggles and other struggles emerging in the communities” 
(Legassick 2007: 541, my emphasis).   
Gillian Hart is extremely careful to valorize both organized groups like Abahlali and 
the various forms of popular discontent that express themselves through both immediate and 
latent rioting.  She holds out hope for a reinvigorated, independent labor movement, but not 
necessarily with the project of mobilizing a political party.  Hart applies Peter Alexander’s 
distinction between a first round of struggle that lasted roughly from 1999-2004 and was led 
by organized groups like TAC, LPM, CCM, and APF on the one hand, and a second round of 
struggles from 2004 to the present characterized largely by relatively un-organized, informal 
expression of popular discontent located slums on the other hand. Since 2004, she argues, 
“we have witnessed the emergence and proliferation of popular anger and discontent 
extending far beyond the reach of the first round of new social movements.  These seemingly 
disparate mobilizations can usefully be understood in the same frame in terms of ‘movement 
beyond movements’…Often accompanied by intense rage, these municipal rebellions have 
become an entrenched feature of everyday life in the heavily segregated Black townships and 
shack settlements of post-apartheid South Africa” (Hart 2014: 3).    
 In her 2002 study of South Africa, Disabling Globalization, Hart argued that local 
government had become a key site for the expression of the contradictions and limitations of 
post-apartheid liberation.  In her most recent 2014 book, Rethinking the South African Crisis, 
she affirms this line of thought, but now claims that local government is the central site of 
contradictions in the country.  Therefore it makes sense that the rebellion of the poor has 
been oriented around specifically local issues.  But her solution also reaches out in the hopes 
that the traditional labor movement might form a political party and adequately represent this 
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supposedly ‘inadequate’ rage at the local level, on a more profound national scale.  In 
particular, for Hart, hope is to be identified in the recent NUMSA split. Unlike Legassick and 
Bond, however, Hart does not invoke a centralized political party as the solution, but rather 
invokes the grassroots mobilization efforts of the United Democratic Front in the anti-
apartheid struggle as a model to be reinvigorated.  “NUMSA’s challenge to the ANC alliance 
following shortly after Mandela’s passing is hugely significant…At the risk of allowing 
optimism of the will to overtake pessimism of the intellect, one can at least raise the 
possibility of NUMSA and others retrieving and renovating their histories of democratic 
organizing from the 1970s and 1980s” (Hart 2014: xx). 
From Precarity to Anti-Blackness 
 One problem with such proposals—whether they rely upon the older model of a 
centralized, socialist political party, or a grassroots labor-led democratic struggle—is that 
both have hitherto elided a central dynamic at play in the space of the slum that has become 
the epicenter of rebellion in South Africa.  The dynamics of precarity and surplus in South 
Africa have a specifically racialized dimension that has by and large gone unheeded by these 
two traditions of struggle rooted in the labor movement and a Marxist analysis.  The official 
Marxists—whether they are the SACP or the Trotskyist outcasts—continue to emphasize 
class at the unifying discourse of a post-apartheid moment that is best defined, they argue, by 
neoliberalism and “class apartheid” (Bond 2004, 2008, 2010).  Hart is one of the few South 
African Marxist theorists who continues to claim that such an analysis is inadequate to the 
contemporary moment, both because neoliberalism on its own cannot explain the 
developmental initiatives and social grants that the ANC has unfurled over the past decade at 
least, and because of the ongoing racialized dimensions of dispossession in the country.     
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 A number of political and intellectual figures argue that there is an inability in 
Marxist analysis to give an account of the prevalence of extra-economic violence directed at 
surplus populations who cannot be characterized as merely ‘unemployed’, but should rather 
be understood as racialized groups subject to the force of anti-Blackness.  Such an analysis is 
deployed in part by key members within the new Economic Freedom Fighters Party led by 
the ex-ANC youth league leader, Julius Malema.  The organization was formally launched in 
June 2013, the same month that Cato Crest was on fire with the protests that led to Gwala’s 
assassination.  Its constitution states:  
ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS is a radical and militant Economic 
Emancipation Movement which brings together revolutionary, fearless, radical, and 
militant Activists, workers’ movements, Non-governmental organisations, 
community based organisations, lobby-groups under the need to pursue the struggle 
for economic emancipation. 
EFF is a radical, Left, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist Movement with an 
internationalist outlook anchored by popular grassroots formations and struggles. EFF 
will be the vanguard of community and workers’ struggles and will always be on the 
side of the people. 
The EFF takes lesson from the notation that “political power, without economic 
emancipation is meaningless.  
The EFF draws inspiration from Marxist-Leninist and Fanonian schools of thought on 
its analysis of the State, imperialism and class contradictions in every society (2013). 
Despite gestures to being based on the popular will of the people, and affirmations of 
grassroots community based struggles, at its core it is clearly operating on the traditional, 
hierarchical Leninist model of a vanguard party.  The uniqueness of the group, however, lies 
in part in the important reference to Fanon as a direct inspiration for their political platform.  
This resulted from an alliance between Malema and the September National Imbizo, a Black 
Nationalist group inspired by the thought of Steve Biko and Frantz Fanon.  In my 
conversation with the members of this wing of EFF, they made it abundantly clearly that they 
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hoped to fill a vacuum in analysis and political practice in South Africa where race was 
concerned.  Explicitly attacking the tradition of non-racialism that has long been dominant in 
the country, these members of EFF are focused on the continued dominance that “white 
capital” has over the country.  In their view, white capital gave up their political power to a 
Black political class in 1994 for the same reasons the bourgeoisie conceded direct control 
over the state to the monarch Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte after 1848: in order to preserve their 
economic power (fieldwork notes).   
 Most interestingly, members of the September National Imbizo that are involved with 
the EFF are directly inspired by Frank Wilderson and the “Afro-Pessimist” intellectual 
movement he spearheads.  Wilderson is an American student of Edward Said who spent 
significant time in South Africa from the late 1980s until the mid 1990s and joined the armed 
wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, during this time.  “When I first arrived in South 
Africa in 1989, I was a Marxist,” Wilderson tells us.  “Toward the end of 1996, two and half 
years after Nelson Mandela came to power, I left not knowing what I was” (Wilderson 2008: 
97).  Spending time in the country during the first transition proved fundamental to his 
elaboration of the primacy of anti-Blackness in the modern world.  “In the last days of 
apartheid, we failed to imagine the fundamental difference between the worker and the 
Black.  How we understand suffering and whether we locate its essence in economic 
exploitation or in anti-Blackness has a direct impact on how we imagine freedom and how 
we foment revolution” (Wilderson 2008: 97).  Anti-Blackness, an idea he borrows from the 
philosopher Lewis Gordon, is predicated on the structural dehumanizing nature of the Black 
experience in a white dominated world.  Explicitly targeting the non-racialism that was and is 
predominant within the anti-apartheid and post-apartheid movements, Steve Biko’s thought 
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proves a rich breeding ground for re-thinking South African struggles through the lens of 
Black consciousness.  Like Malcolm X, Biko put forward the necessity for grasping an 
autonomous Black experience, which would be developed on the basis of an affirmative 
identity that did not need to come into synthesis with existing white society.  “Does this 
mean that I am against integration?” asked Biko, after disagreeing with the call from white 
liberals to celebrate the few places under apartheid where a limited form of integration had 
been accomplished in non-racial spaces and organizations.  “If by integration you understand 
a breakthrough into white society by Blacks, an assimilation and acceptance of Blacks into 
an already established set of norms and code of behavior set up by and maintained by whites, 
then YES I am against it” (Biko 1978: 28). 
 But Wilderson—despite his admiration for Biko and the Black Consciousness 
Movement that has been largely erased from the anti-apartheid narrative by a hegemonic 
story in which the ANC is lionized—goes further in an attempt to push beyond Biko, going 
back to Fanon for a theory of anti-Blackness.  For Wilderson the assent of the ANC was 
inextricably linked with the descent of Biko’s Black Consciousness Movement.  But oddly 
enough, Wilderson’s politics lie in a destruction of the existing world, rather than in the 
possibility of creating an autonomous Black space within the existing one, as Biko proposed 
through a combination of Freirean consciousness raising and community programs.  This is 
because Wilderson conceives of modernity, and its celebrated terrain of civil society15 where 
so much faith is placed in contemporary theories of social movements, as a space-time 
predicated upon anti-Blackness.  That is, only through dehumanizing the Black is 
contemporary civil society allowed to function.  This demonizing dehumanization is 
                                                
15 Here much more could said about the parallels between Wilderson’s conception of civil society and the way 
it is deployed in the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Mahmood Mamdani, and Partha Chatterjee.  
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representative of an extra-economic force, a “gratuitous violence” (Wilderson 2008: 105) that 
has its roots in slavery, and persists in the “after-life of slavery” today (Sexton 2010).  
Therefore, Marx’s emphasis upon exploitation cannot give a complete picture of the Black 
experience.  Only Fanon seems to provide such an account for Wilderson, eclipsing even the 
optimism of the will that Black Consciousness expressed, in favor of the pessimism of the 
intellect.  All this is true despite Biko’s careful engagement of Fanon’s own work (Turner 
2008).  
 For Biko’s Black Consciousness movement to have achieved a resolution between the 
fissure Wilderson identifies between a class analysis focused on exploitation and the 
racialized ontology of non-being that is Blackness in the modern world would have required 
a different reading of Fanon.   
For this to happen, Black Consciousness would have also had to undergo adjustments 
in its assumptive logic.  Adjustments that would have moved it away from its 
pragmatic interpretation of Fanon’s dream of disalienation; adjustments that would 
have allowed it to comprehend those moments in Fanon’s work when Fanon could 
not make the dispossession of the colonial subject jibe with the dispossession of the 
Black object or slave: Fanon’s revelations (albeit often more symptomatic than 
declarative) that Black colony is an oxymoron, for Blacks are not, essentially, 
dispossessed of land or labor power, but dispossessed of being…Steve Biko and 
Black Consciousness were compelled to read Black Skin, White Masks pragmatically 
rather than theoretically; thus denying their analysis the most disturbing aspects of 
Black Skin, White Masks which lay in Fanon’s capacity to explain Blackness as an 
antirelation; that is, as the impossible subjectivity of a sentient being who can have 
‘no recognition in the eyes of’ the Other (Wilderson 2008: 103). 
 
The persistence of the slave relation in the present thus confines what is thought to be an 
antagonistic relationship between capital and labor in a certain Marxist framework to a mere 
conflict.  An irreducible, un-synthesizable antagonism is rather said to lie in the relationship 
between the slave and the human. Drawing from the work of Italian feminist Leopoldina 
Fortunati, Wilderson extends his critique of class analysis to the terrain of gender.  Fortunati 
“argues that there is no exchange of filial affection (i.e., the nurturing of children by parents, 
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the nurturing of parents by children, or sexual encounters between parents) that is not in 
service to the reproduction of labor power and therefore to the valorization of capital” 
(Wilderson 2008: 108).  For Wilderson, this implies that no mere redistribution of wealth 
along the lines of the ANC’s original Keynesian RDP—now longed for by post-apartheid 
radical intellectuals—could solve the problem that reproduced a fundamentally classed and 
gendered inequality.  Rather, only a destruction of the existing community as it is currently 
understood could prevent the reproduction of capitalism through filial affection.  While they 
provide a useful parallel argument to his own, Wilderson still wants to go even further than 
Marxist feminists like Fortunati. 
But Fanon reveals a structural relation that is more comprehensive, more devastating, 
more essential, and therefore more unethical than either the filial relation or the 
capital relation—namely, the Human relation.  The filial relation is unethical because 
it is overdetermined by the Name of the Father and because it is parasitic on the 
position known as female.  It subsumes the world in asymmetrical power relations 
predicated on gender.  The capital relation is unethical because it is parasitic on the 
worker’s labor power. It subsumes the world in asymmetrical power relations 
predicated on class…The unethical structure of Humanity lies in the fact that its 
Other is the Black (Wilderson 2008: 108). 
 
The condition of non-being therefore lies on a more fundamental, ontological terrain for 
Afro-Pessimists than that of gender and class-based exploitation.  I find this argument 
simultaneously intriguing and problematic.  The intersectional analysis favoured by feminists 
of color is usually a more comprehensive and appropriate lens through which to study social 
problems, as it explicitly takes into account the overlapping and mutually constitutive roles 
played by gender, class, race and sexuality. And yet, intersectionality can sometimes be 
deployed by thinkers in an anti-intellectual and relativist fashion.  As such it can also 
function to erase the particularity of the raciailized dimensions of struggle by critiquing 
analyses that privilege race for ignoring class, gender, or disability.  While I certainly hesitate 
to adopt Wilderson’s formulation of race as always and everywhere more “essential” than 
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class or gender, I think his is an important wake up call to not automatically treat these 
different dimensions of analysis and struggle as absolutely equal in their effect, or as central 
to each and every particular social antagonism.  
But nor does this mean that struggles against anti-Blackness are somehow celebrated 
by the likes of Wilderson. To the contrary, it demonstrates how struggle within the existing 
conditions defined by the after-life of slavery reveal themselves to be a bottleneck out of 
which there is no apparent exit.   
No matter what Blacks do (fight in the realm of preconscious interest or heal 
disalienation in the realm of unconscious desire), Blackness cannot attain 
relationality.  Whereas Humans are positioned on the plane of being and, thus, are 
present, alive, through struggles of/for/through/over recognition, Blacks can neither 
attain nor contest the plane of recognition.  That is to say ‘Black Human’ remains an 
oxymoron regardless of political victories in the social order or the psychic health of 
the mind; not because of the intransigence of White racism, or the hobble of the 
talking cure in the face of hallucinatory whitening, but because were there to be a 
place and time for Blacks, cartography and temporality would be impossible 
(Wilderson 2008: 111). 
 
None of this analysis therefore leads Wilderson, like other followers of Biko’s Black 
Consciousness Movement, to believe that if only Biko had escaped his apartheid assassins 
and lived to see the demise of their government, the post-apartheid context would be 
somehow dramatically different.  But he does hold onto Biko’s critique of non-racialism and 
his engagement with Fanon as a positive influence in South African struggles that may have 
ultimately led to the discussion around anti-Blackness that Wilderson believes is required in 
order for any political project to have any possibility of success.  “I believe that had Biko 
lived, and had the Black Consciousness Movement survived as a credible alternative to the 
ANC and the UDF, the ethical imperatives of class analysis, that were hegemonic and 
unchallenged within the Charterist Movement, might have experienced a distended calculus 
through which the grammar of suffering could be debated rather than assumed”(112). 
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Gwala’s Legacy 
This chapter has presented the death of Nkululeko Gwala, a shack dweller organizing 
with Abahlali, as a window into debates regarding precarity and surplus in the contemporary 
globalized world.  Examining these questions from the specific spatialized context of the 
Black slum, I argue, forces us to shift the geography of reason in the work of Giorgio 
Agamben and others who have hitherto emphasized the refugee detention camp or 
Guantanamo Bay as paradigmatic spaces of exception.  In contrast, postulating the post-
apartheid slum as a zone of non-being allows us to understand how something new might 
emerge from this space of nothingness.  Racializing and spatializing the critique of precarity 
necessarily broadens our framework for grasping the conditions of possibility which give rise 
to the power to make die or let live which articulates with contemporary biopolitical 
imperatives to make live or let die.  While it provides a necessary framework for grappling 
with the primacy of anti-Blackness in contemporary South Africa, I argue that the Afro-
Pessimist critique also contains within it dangerous nihilistic, misogynistic and destructive 
tendencies, which are expressed quite openly in the contemporary Economic Freedom 
Fighters Party who see themselves in part as followers of Wilderson’s work.  Wilderson 
might counter that these are expressions of the modern world, rather than products of his own 
lens of analysis, and more work would be required to provide a significant counter-argument. 
In the specific political spaces of post-apartheid South Africa, the ethical choice is that 
between supporting a poor shack dwellers movement mobilized around the concepts of 
dignity and the production of a new human being, versus the class force of a NUMSA 
workers party or the populist Black nationalist mobilization of the Economic Freedom 
Fighters.   
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Hart holds out hope that the NUMSA faction will link up with the community 
struggles on a grassroots level that have been posing the problem of survival amidst an 
economy that has relegated them to the position of waste. Abahlali’s Vice President, Lindela 
Figlan, holds on to a similar optimism.   
We need the workers to take the side of the poor, to join with us in our struggles. We 
all know that this is impossible as long as the workers are controlled by Cosatu, 
which is under the ANC and influenced by the SACP too. But now that some workers 
are organising themselves autonomously from the ANC, like we have done in 
Abahlali baseMjondolo since 2005, it might be possible for the workers and the poor 
to struggle together (Figlan 2013).  
 
Unfortunately, it appears much more likely that even this breakaway faction of the labor 
movement will reproduce a vanguard structure of organization that privileges the work-space 
and reproduces the work-citizenship nexus that occludes the lived experience of precarity in 
the slum experienced by so many South Africans today.   
Others are fearful of the EFF’s populist mobilizing platform, and of the dangerous 
ways in which a racialized discourse is deployed within the group’s ranks.  On the one hand, 
the concern relates back to the Ugandan experience under Idi Amin, when an executive 
decision was taken to expel all “Asians” from the country in the 1970s because to be 
Ugandan was to be a Black African, not an Indian.  On the other hand, fear arises from the 
fact that many of the leaders within the EFF, Julius Malema amongst them, might benefit 
from a nationalization project that leaves the minerals energy complex of South Africa in 
their hands, allowing for further corruption and theft of the people’s wealth, something 
Malema stands formally accused of during his tenure as President of the ANC Youth League.  
Here the discourse of race is viewed as a convenient distraction from a project that simply 
replaces one ruling class with another more populist minded one.   
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But too few South Africans have either aligned themselves with the political 
formation of Abahlali and its partner movements of the poor throughout the country as an 
alternative to this apparent electorally focused political impasse.  And even fewer people 
willingly deploy an alternative analysis around race and anti-Blackness that could give an 
account of the ongoing forms of both racialized dispossession and gratuitous violence that 
populations confined to slums are arguably most often exposed to.  Could it be because these 
zones of abandonment are rarely ventured into by outsiders, who prefer to remain confined in 
the settler quarters of the city identified with contemporary civil society and its 
corresponding state privileges?  Regardless, the struggles of the poor in these spaces are not 
disappearing; indeed they continue to grow year by year.  As Richard Pithouse argues, while 
the slum does not have a privileged hold on precarious life, it has indisputably become the 
central flashpoint for social struggles.  
Of course, neither social exclusion, nor the myriad of ways in which it is resisted, can 
be reduced to the shack settlement.  But it is here—rather than in, say, the 
countryside, the school, the prison or the migrant detention centre—where the refusal 
to accept the idea that the human should be rendered as ‘waste’ (Mbembe 2011) has 
produced the most intense and sustained conflict between the state and its citizens 
over the last eight years (Pithouse 2013: 100).  
 
For this reason, any attempt to grapple with precarity and surplus life in contemporary South 
Africa will have to begin with the lived experience of shack dwellers like Nkululeko Gwala. 
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CONCLUSION:  
RACIALIZED CITIZENS, SUPERFLUOUS SUBJECTS, AND COUNTER-POWERS 
IN THE AREA FORM 
 
 In his monumental study of colonial and post-colonial Africa, Mahmood Mamdani 
attempts to displace the hegemony of political economy in studies of the continent with an 
acute attention to relations of power.  Arguing against writing African history through 
analogy to non-African experiences, Mamdani sought to uncover a specifically African 
colonial history that continued to shape power relations in the post-colonial present.  “I try to 
underline the specificity of the African experience,” he claimed, “or at least a slice of it.  This 
is an argument not against comparative study but against those who would dehistoricize 
phenomena by lifting them from context, whether in the name of an abstract universalism or 
of an intimate particularism, only to make sense of them by analogy.  In contrast, my 
endeavor is to establish the historical legitimacy of Africa as a unit of analysis” (Mamdani 
1996: 13).  By positing a division in rule between an urban civil society of citizens with 
rights and a rural traditional society of subjects, Mamdani went on to map the contours of 
power in Africa that destabilized anti-colonial revolts and continue to fracture the quest for 
social justice throughout the continent.  Conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, Arab 
and Zurga in Darfur, Zulu and Xhosa in South Africa, all represent holdovers from the 
specific colonial policies of decentralized despotism, where colonizing powers ruled through 
proxy tribal chiefs who were propped up, allocated land, or otherwise stratified at the 
expense of other tribes.  While colonial rule was as much racial as it was tribal, it is the 
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enduring and often spatialized divisions of tribal rule that Mamdani is concerned with in the 
post-colonial present, at a time when African states have been de-racialized.   
 Throughout the African continent, Mamdani read the disappointment of post-colonial 
governments as a product of neglecting the rural at the expense of the urban (or vice versa), 
and an insufficient attempt to grapple with the enduring nature of colonial power relations in 
the present.  Resistance movements, he argued, were shaped and overdetermined by the 
forms of power they were supposedly organizing to overcome.  This meant that internal 
violence plagued both anti-colonial struggles and post-colonial African societies.  In sum, 
Mamdani states: “I have already suggested that the fragmentation is not just ethnic. Rather, 
the interethnic divide is an effect of a larger split, also politically enforced, between town and 
country.  Neither was this double divide, urban-rural and interethnic, fortuitous.  My claim is 
that every movement against decentralized despotism bore the institutional imprint of that 
mode of rule.  Every movement of resistance was shaped by the very structure of power 
against which it rebelled” (24).   
 Mamdani therefore posits a largely deracialized African continent, plagued by 
persistent tribal division that persists in rural areas or wherever the rural has migrated into the 
urban (South Africa’s urban hostels under apartheid and during the first transition, for 
example, where Zulu migrant workers came into conflict with non-Zulus).  He presents 
social movements as overdetermined by the power relations they sought to confront, and he 
claims an urban civil society of citizens benefited at the expense of rural subjects. He argues 
for an attention to the specificity of the African experience rather than vague gestures 
towards history by analogy to the European experience.  In many respects, however, this 
dissertation can be read as at attempt to re-read Mamdani, against the grain of these brilliant 
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insights, in the context of contemporary South Africa, twenty years after he conducted his 
study.  
Africa clearly does have its own unique history that deserves independent study.  But 
regional geography and area studies as a whole have come under attack in recent years, 
highlighting the limits of absolutist approaches to space while emphasizing the necessity of 
approaching topics through relational conceptualizations of space that don’t always map 
neatly onto the physical geography of continents or the colonial geography of nation-states.  
By adopting the metaphorical (and at times literal) perspective of the migrant—what they 
call “border as method”—Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Nielsen replace the continental 
approach to area studies with the new critical regionalism, or what Ranabir Samaddar calls 
the “area form.”  
In contrast to their official constitution as tightly bounded entities, migratory 
movements throw into question the possibility of identifying an inside and outside to 
such continental spaces. They also tend to harden and soften their internal boundaries, 
depending on the pressures exerted on them by migratory flows and the composition 
of the populations traversing them.  These tendencies are themselves important 
examples of continental drift, and they need to be analyzed in relation to the longer 
history of cartographic anxiety and metageographic uncertainty” (Mezzadra and 
Nielsen: 55).    
 
“In the case of Samaddar’s analysis of the South Asian area form, we obtain a new 
perspective on regionalism by asking how border and labor struggles, which are 
increasingly carried out in urban spaces far from territory’s edge, imply ways of 
making the world—fabrica mundi—that are socially and politically remote from the 
dominant continentalist visions.  Again, it is a question of how the production of 
subjectivity intersects the production of space (Mezzadra and Nielsen: 54). 
 
Chapter two therefore sought to de-center the state and challenge the vertical topography of 
power by placing the dynamics of social movements below in direct conversation with other 
movements around the world, emerging coeval over the past years defined by economic 
crisis on the one hand, and a diversity of uprisings on the other.   
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If anti-colonial and post-colonial movements have in the past been shaped by the 
forms of power they confronted, I have tried to demonstrate that resistance can also shape the 
forms of power it resists.  In this regard, a more accurate conceptualization of power might 
move beyond state power to give an account of power as a more diffuse relation, always 
reversible, as Foucault argued, and subject to different logics in different socio-spatial 
settings.  Resistance that has emerged largely from the urban townships and shack 
communities of post-apartheid South Africa over at least the past fifteen years has therefore 
contributed to the rise of South Africa’s own developmental state.  Dismissing post-apartheid 
government as merely neoliberal—while incredibly useful as a heuristic device for grappling 
with what so many movements around the world are rebelling against—can nonetheless 
occlude the specific articulation between South Africa’s neoliberal and developmental 
policies.  It also ignores the fundamental ways in which counter-powers are constantly co-
opted, internalized, and subsumed within state powers.  Chapter three contextualized the rise 
of the developmental state through the lens of a Cornubia as one example of governance 
strategies forced to respond to the initiative of movements from below. 
While tribal divisions persist throughout the continent, and are certainly still prevalent 
in South Africa, I have argued for a renewed attention to the persistence of forms of 
racialization that equal if not surpass the predominance of tribal divisions in the country 
today.  Mamdani himself acknowledged, albeit in passing, that “Independence tended to 
deracialize the state but not civil society.  Instead, historically accumulated privilege, usually 
racial, was embedded and defended in civil society” (20).  The urban-rural divide also 
persists, and formed a key part of my argument in Chapter 3 regarding the impasse that urban 
housing policies reach in their failure to articulate with a rural demand for land reform.  And 
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yet, my study has also uncovered a division within urban civil society whereby some groups 
are understood as citizens entitled to rights and other populations are deemed threatening and 
are therefore subject to a range of sovereign powers.  The urban shack communities of 
Abahlali might best be conceived through the lens of what Partha Chatterjee calls political 
society, rather than civil society.   
While the urban sphere in Africa enables protest, it is the particular character of that 
urban sphere that also establishes the limitations within which protest must operate. 
Just as national state power is structured around a violent separation of the urban and 
the rural, so is it structured around a violent separation within the urban. Since 
colonial times, access to the guarantees and protections of liberal civil and political 
rights has been restricted to a small urban minority—the political elite, civil servants, 
professionals including those in the nonprofit sector, university administrators, 
faculty, and sometimes students, and organized wage workers. On the other side of 
this divide are the vast majority of urban inhabitants, the large urban underclass that 
has accompanied the expansion of African colonial cities since the beginning. Often 
unemployed or scraping by in the informal or illicit sectors, they have been excluded 
from the realm of civil and political rights. They instead relate to the state through 
regimes of politicized distribution of benefits and violent control. Therefore, each of 
these two groups has developed under entirely different forms of power, and it 
follows that each has different political imaginations, employs different modes of 
political action, and has different expectations for political change. We will call these 
two urban sectors, following Partha Chatterjee (2011), “civil society” and “political 
society” (Branch and Mampilly 2014: 7). 
 
The urban-rural divide clearly persists, but within the urban there is a rural component—
often conceived as a lumpen proletariat, a political society, or a surplus population—that 
attempts to eek out a living in the specific context of shack life.  Abahlali operates on this 
terrain, and while they sometimes work to enter the space of civil society as citizens, they 
often find, as Nkululeko Gwala did, that there is no space for them there.  Chapter 4 therefore 
argued that shack dwellers are subject to forms of precarity that exceed the parameters of 
changing conditions of work within the post-Fordist factory, verging on the designation of 
mere surplus populations.  Nonetheless, the experiences of Abahlali prove that even in such 
zones of non-being, resistance can never be expunged.  As S’bu Zikode explains, “Voting did 
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not work for us. The political parties did not work for us. Civil society did not work for us. ... 
We have no choice but to take our own place in the cities and in the political life of the 
country” (Quoted in Ballard 2014: 1). 
 Whether Nkululeko Gwala’s efforts to build a better world will go down as the 
frustrated attempts to gain recognition from an anti-Black world predicated upon the 
ontological inhumanity of Black populations, or will instead continue to add fuel to 
Abahlali’s own long march to freedom in their efforts to realize a second South African 
transition from below, remains to be seen.  One thing is certain: despite state repression, 
being abandoned, landless, homeless, and party-less, the poor shack dwellers of Abahlali 
baseMjondolo will likely not cease their mobilizing efforts anytime soon.  In the wake of 
Mandela’s death, Abahlali held a rally in Cato Crest, commemorating both Madiba and the 
life of Gwala.  The press release issued to announce their actions read: “Today we protest to 
demand land and housing and an end to corruption and repression, including assassination. 
This is how we will show our respect for Mandela’s struggle. We are continuing where 
Mandela left off. This new phase of the struggle is just beginning” (Abahlali 2013). 
 
  
 
 
 203 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abahlali baseMjondolo. (2013) “Today we Protest in Cato Crest to in Honour of Nelson  
Mandela,” http://abahlali.org/node/13328/ Accessed April 20, 2014. 
 
Abahlali baseMjondolo. (2010) “The High Cost of the Right to the City.”  
http://abahlali.org/node/6398 Accessed November 25, 2013 
 
Abahlali baseMjondolo. (2009) “Our Movement is Under Attack.”  
http://abahlali.org/node/5860 Accessed January 2, 2014 
 
Abahlali baseMjondolo (2008) “Statement on the Xenophobic Attacks in Johannesburg,”  
http://abahlali.org/node/3582/ Accessed March 12, 2014. 
 
Abahlali baseMjondolo. (2006) “An Introduction to the Movement.”  
http://www.abahlali.org/node/16 Accessed December 10, 2013 
 
African National Congress. (1955) “The Freedom Charter.”  
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/charter.html Accessed November 22, 2013 
 
Al-Bulushi, Yousuf. (2011) “Learning from Urban Revolt: From Watts to the Banlieues,”  
City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action. Vol. 16, No. 1-2: 
34-56. 
 
Alexander, Amanda. (2006) “Rights Beyond the Urban-Rural Divide: South Africa’s  
Landless People’s Movement and the Creation of a Landless Subject,” ‘Silencing 
Human Rights’ Conference Paper Presentation, University of Sussex, 8-9 June 2006. 
 
Alexander, Peter. (2013) “Marikana, Turning Point in South African History,” Review of  
African Political Economy.  Vol. 40, No. 138: 605-619. 
 
Alexander, Peter (2012) “A Massive Rebellion of the Poor,” Mail and Guardian. 13  
April. http://mg.co.za/article/2012-04-13-a-massive-rebellion-of-the-poor  Accessed 
December 20, 2013. 
 
Alexander, Peter. (2010) “Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa’s Service Delivery  
Protests—A Preliminary Analysis,” Review of African Political Economy. Vol. 37, 
No. 123: pp. 25-40.  
 
Arnold, Dennis and John Pickles. (2011) “Global Work, Surplus Labor, and the  
Precarious Economies of the Border,” Antipode. Vol. 43, Issue 5: pp. 1598-1624. 
 
Badiou, Alain. (2012) The Rebirth of History. London: Verso. 
 
Balibar, Etienne and Immanuel Wallerstein. (1991) Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous  
Identities. London: Verso.  
 
 
 204 
 
 
Ballard, Richard. (2014) “Geographies of Development III: Militancy, Insurgency,  
Encroachment and Development,” Progress in Human Geography. Vol. 38, No.  
2: 1-11. 
 
Ballard, Richard, Adam Habib and Imraan Valodia, editors. Voices of Protest: Social  
Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Press. 
 
Barnard, Rita and Grant Farred. (2004) After the Thrill is Gone: A Decade of Post- 
Apartheid South Africa: South Atlantic Quarterly, 103:4 Fall 2004.  
 
Barchiesi, Franco. (2011) Precarious Liberation: Workers, the State and Contested  
Social Citizenship in Postapartheid South Africa. Albany: SUNY Press. 
 
Barchiesi, Franco. (2006) “Classes, Multitudes, and the Politics of Community  
Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” pp. 211-246 in Challenging Hegemony: 
Social Movements and the Quest for a New Humanism in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa. Trenton: Africa World Press. 
 
Bayat, Asef. (1997) “Un-Civil Society: The Politics of the ‘Informal People’,” Third  
World Quarterly. Vol. 18, No. 1: pp. 53-72. 
 
Bevins, Anthony. (1996) “Nelson Mandela: From ‘terrorist’ to tea with the Queen,” The  
Independent. April 17. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/from-terrorist-to-
tea-with-the-queen-1327902.html Accessed April 10, 2014. 
 
Bhabha, Homi. (1999) “Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche, and the Colonial Condition,”  
in Rethinking Fanon, edited by Nigel Gibson. Amherst: Humanity Books. 
 
Biko, Steve. (1978)  I Write what I Like. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Bond, Patrick, editor. (2013) A BRICS Reader for the Durban Summit. Durban: Pambazuka 
News. 
 
Bond, Patrick. (2010) “Limits to Class Apartheid,” pp. 59-70 in Zuma’s Own Goal,  
edited by Brij Maharaj, Ashwin Desai and Patrick Bond. Trenton: Africa World 
Press. 
 
Bond, Patrick. (2008) “It’s class apartheid, stupid,” Mail & Guardian. April 24.  
http://mg.co.za/article/2008-04-24-its-class-apartheid-stupid Accessed April 15, 2014. 
 
Bond, Patrick. (2004) “South Africa’s Frustrating Decade of Freedom: From Racial to  
Class Apartheid,” Monthly Review. Vol. 55, Issue 10: 45-59. 
 
 
 
 205 
Bond, Patrick. (2000) Elite Transition. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Bond, Patrick and Shauna Mottiar. (2013) “Movements, Protests and a Massacre in South  
Africa,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 31, No. 2: 283-302. 
 
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. (2006) Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the  
Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Branch, Adam and Zacharia Mampilly. (2014) Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and  
Political Change. Unpublished Manuscript in author’s possession. 
 
Brenner, Neil, Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore. (2010) “Variegated Neoliberalization:  
Geographies, Modalities, Pathways,” Global Networks. Vol. 10, Issue 2: pp. 182-222. 
 
Cameron, Robert. (2004) “Local Government Reorganization in South Africa,” in  
Redrawing Local Government Boundaries: An International Study of Politics, 
Procedures and Decisions, edited by John Meligrana. Vancouver: UBC Press. 
 
Campbell, Emahunn Raheem Ali. (2011) “A Critique of the Occupy Movement from a  
Black Occupier,” The Black Scholar. Vol. 41, No. 4: 42-51. 
 
Campbell, Horace. (2013) Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya: Lessons  
for Africa in the Forging of African Unity. New York: Monthly Review Press.  
 
Chatterjee, Partha. (2004) The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics  
in Most of the World. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Colectivo Situaciones. (2003) “On the Researcher Militant,” Translated by Sebastian  
Touza.  http://transform.eipcp.net/transversal/0406/colectivosituaciones/en#redir 
 
Cooper, Fred. (2002) Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
 
Cowen, Deborah and Smith, Neil. (2009) “After Geopolitics? From the Geopolitical  
Social to Geoeconomics,” Antipode. Vol. 41, No. 1: pp. 22-48. 
 
Cravey, Altha. (1998) Women and Work in Mexico’s Maquiladoras. Lanham: Rowman  
and Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Cravey, Altha and Georgia Ann Cravey. (2008) “Lucy Parsons and Haymarket Days,”  
ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies. Vol. 7, No. 1: pp. 24-
31. 
 
Davis, Mike. (2006) Planet of Slums. New York: Verso Press. 
 
 
 
 
 206 
De Souza, Marcelo Lopes. (2006) “Together with the state, despite the state, against the  
state: social movements as ‘critical urban planning’ agents,” CITY. Vol. 10, No. 3: 
327-342. 
 
Debord, Guy. (1965) “The Decline and Fall of the Spectacle-Commodity Economy,”  
http://www.scribd.com/doc/183068299/The-Decline-and-Fall-of-the-Spectacle-
Commodity-Economy Accessed March 5, 2014. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles. (1988) Foucault, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.   
 
Denning, Michael. (2010) “Wageless Life,” New Left Review. No. 66, Nov-Dec 2010: 79- 
97.  
 
Desai, Ashwin. (2002) We are The Poors: Community Struggles in Post-Apartheid South  
Africa. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Dewey, Caitlin. (2013) “Why Nelson Mandela was on a Terrorism Watch List as Late as  
2008,” Washington Post, December 7. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2013/12/07/why-nelson-mandela-was-on-a-terrorism-watch-list-in-2008/ 
Accessed April 5, 2014. 
 
Dirlik, Arif. (1994) “The Post-colonial Aura,” Critical Inquiry. Vol. 20, No. 2: 328-356. 
 
Economic Freedom Fighters. (2013) Constitution of the Economic Freedom Fighters.  
http://effighters.org.za/documents/constitution/ Accessed April 5, 2014  
 
The Economist. (2012) “Going abroad, the World in their hands: State Capitalism looks  
outward as well as inward.” January 21-28, 2012. 
 
Ekine, Sokari and Firoze Manji, editors. (2011) African Awakening: The Emerging  
Revolutions. Nairobi: Pambazuka Press. 
 
Elden, Stuart. (2006) “The State of Territory under Globalization: Empire  and the  
Politics of Reterritorialization,” Thamyris/Intersecting, No. 12: pp. 47-66. 
 
Elden, Stuart. (2005) “Missing the Point: Deterritorialization and the Space of the  
World,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. Vol. 30, No. 1: pp. 3-
19. 
 
Escobar, Arturo. (2001) “Culture Sits in Places: Reflections on Globalism and subaltern  
Strategies of Localization,” Political Geography. Vol. 20: pp. 139-174. 
 
Escobar, Arturo. (1995) Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the  
Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
 
 
 
 207 
Escobar, Arturo. (1992) “Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought,  
Development and Social Movements,” Social Text. No. 31/32: pp. 20-56. 
 
Esteva, Gustavo and Madhu Prakash. Grassroots Post-Modernism: Remaking the Soil of  
Cultures.  New York: Zed Press. 
   
Fanon, Frantz. (2004) Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. 
 
Fanon, Frantz. (2008) Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press. 
 
Fanon, Frantz. (1967) Toward the African Revolution. New York: Grove Press. 
 
Farred, Grant. (2007) “Many are Guilty, Few are Indicted,” Radical History Review.  
Issue 97, Winter 20078: pp. 155-162.  
 
Farred, Grant. (2006) “‘Shoot the White Girl First’: Race in Post-Apartheid South  
Africa,” pp 49-71 in Globalization and Race: Transformations in the Cultural 
Production of Blackness, edited by Kamari Clarke and Deborah Thomas.  Durham: 
Duke University Press. 
 
Ferguson, James. (2006) Global Shadows: African in the Neoliberal World Order.  
Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Ferguson, James. (1994) The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and  
Bureaucratic Power. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Figlan, Lindela. (2013). “Time to Stop Feeding the Parasites,” Daily Maverick. August  
11. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2013-08-11-time-to-stop-feeding-the-
parasites/#.U1WBMccoxGM Accessed April 12, 2014. 
 
Figlan, Lindela, Rev. Mavuso, Busi Ngema, Zodwa Nsibande, Sihle Sibisi, and S’bu  
Zikode. (2009) Living Learning. Pietermaritzburg: Church Land Programme. 
 
Ford, Glenn. (2011) “Lynch Law and Summary Executions in Rebel-Held Libya,” Black  
Agenda Report April 6, 2011. http://blackagendareport.com/content/lynch-law-and-
summary-executions-rebel-held-libya  Accessed on February 19, 2013.  
 
Foucault, Michel. (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics. London: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Foucault, Michel. (2003) Society Must be Defended. New York: Picador. 
 
Freund, Bill. (2013) “A Ghost from the Past: The South African Developmental State of  
the 1940s,” Transformation. No 81/82: pp. 86-114. 
 
Freund, Bill. (2007) The African City: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press. 
 
 
 208 
 
Friedman, Steven. (2012) “Beyond the Fringe? South African Social Movements and the  
Politics of Redistribution,” Review of African Political Economy. Vol. 39, No. 131: 
85-100. 
 
Gibson, Nigel. (2011) Fanonian Practices in South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: University  
of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 
 
Gibson, Nigel, editor. (2006) Challenging Hegemony: Social Movements and the Quest  
for a New Humanism in South Africa.  Trenton: Africa World Press. 
 
Gibson, Nigel. (2006) “Calling Everything into Question: Broken Promises, Social  
Movements and Emergent Intellectual Currents in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” pp. 
1-54 in Challenging Hegemony: Social Movements and the Quest for a New 
Humanism in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Trenton: Africa World Press. 
 
Gigaba, Malusi and Brij Maharaj. (1996) “Land Invasions During Political Transition:  
The Wiggins Saga in Cato Manor,” Development Southern Africa. Vol. 13, Issue 2: 
pp. 217-235. 
 
Gilmartin, Mary and Berg, Lawrence. (2007) “Locating postcolonialism,” Area. 39.1:  
120-124. 
 
Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. (2002) “Fatal Couplings of Power and Difference,” The  
Professional Geographer. 54(1): 15-24. 
 
Gilroy, Paul. (2013) “1981 & 2011: From Social Democratic to Neoliberal Rioting,”  
South Atlantic Quarterly. Vol. 112, No. 3: 550-558. 
 
Guehenno, Jean-Marie. (2000) The End of the Nation-State. Minneapolis: University of  
Minnesota Press. 
 
Harber, Anton. (2011) Diepsloot. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers. 
 
Hardt, Michael. (2007) Michael Hardt Presents Thomas Jefferson: The Declaration of  
Independence. New York: Verso. 
 
Hardt, Michael. (1995) “The Withering Away of Civil Society,” Social Text. No. 45: pp.  
27-45. 
  
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. (2012) Declaration. New York: Argo Navis Author  
Services. 
 
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. (2009) Commonwealth. Cambridge: Belknap Press of  
Harvard University Press. 
 
 
 
 209 
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. (2000) Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. (1994) Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State  
Form. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Hart, Gillian. (2014) Rethinking the South African Crisis: Nationalism, Populism,  
Hegemony. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 
 
Hart, Gillian. (2008) “The Provocations of Neoliberalism: Contesting the Nation and  
Liberation After Apartheid,” Antipode. Vol. 40, No. 12: 678-705. 
 
Hart, Gillian. (2007) “Changing Concepts of Articulation: Political Stakes in South  
Africa Today,” Review of African Political Economy. Vol. 34, No. 111: 85-101. 
 
Hart, Gillian. (2002) Disabling Globalization: Places of Power in Post-Apartheid South  
Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Harvey, David. (2003) The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Henry, Paget. (2000) Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy. New  
York: Routledge. 
 
Hickel, Jason. (2014) “ ‘Xenophobia’ in South Africa: Order, Chaos, and the Moral  
Economy of Witchcraft,” Cultural Anthropology. Vol. 29, Issue 1: 103-127. 
 
Hindson, Doug and Jeff McCarthy, editors. (1994) Here to State: Informal Settlements in  
KwaZulu-Natal. Dalbridge: Indicator Press. 
 
Huchzermeyer, Marie. (2011) Cities with Slums: From Informal Settlement Eradication  
to a Right to the City in Africa.  Cape Town: UCT Press.  
 
Hughes, Craig. (2012) Occupy Zuccotti: Social Struggle and Planned Shrinkage. War  
Machines Zine. 
 
Hunter, Mark (2010) Love in the Time of AIDS: Inequality, Gender, and Rights in South  
Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
The Invisible Committee. (2009) The Coming Insurrection. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e). 
 
James, CLR. (1995) A History of Pan-African Revolt. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr. 
 
James, CLR. (1986) State Capitalism and World Revolution. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr. 
 
Jameson, Fredric. (2011) Representing Capital: A Commentary on Volume One. London:  
Verso. 
 
 
 
 210 
Ka-Manzi, Faith. (2013) “Murder in Cato Crest,”  
http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/default.asp?2,68,3,2981 Accessed March 25, 2014. 
 
Katsiaficas, George. (2012) Asia’s Unknown Uprisings, Vol’s I & II. Oakland: PM Press. 
 
Kipfer, Stefan. (2007) “Fanon and Space: Colonization, Urbanization, and Liberation  
from the Colonial to the Global City,” Environment and Planning D: Society and  
Space. Vol. 25: 701-726. 
 
Kirsch, Scott. (2012) Review Essay of State, Space World: Selected Essays, by Henri  
Lefebvre. Antipode. Vol. 44, Issue 3: pp. 1042-1049. 
 
Klaaren, Jonathan and Jaya Ramji. (2001) “Inside Illegality: Migration Policing in South  
Africa after Apartheid,” Africa Today. Vol. 48, No. 3: 35-47.  
 
Klein, Naomi. (2007) The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New  
York: Picador. 
 
Lefebvre, Henri. (2009) State, Space, World: Selected Essays. Minneapolis: University of  
Minnesota Press. 
 
“”. (1968) The Sociology of Marx. New York: Vintage Books. 
 
Legassick, Martin. (2007) Towards Socialist Democracy. Pietermaritzburg: University of  
KwaZulu-Natal Press. 
 
Legassick, Martin and Harold Wolpe. (1976) “The Bantustans and Capital Accumulation  
in South Africa,” Review of African Political Economy. No. 7: 87-107. 
 
Makhulu, Anne Marie. (2010) “The ‘Dialectics of Toil’: Reflections on the Politics of  
Space after Apartheid,” Anthropological Quarterly. Vol. 83, No. 3: pp. 551-580. 
 
Marais, Hein. (2011) South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy of Change.  
Cape Town: UCT Press. 
 
McDonald, David. (2008). World City Syndrome: Neoliberalism and Inequality in Cape 
Town. New York: Routledge. 
 
Miraftab, Faranak. (2009) “Insurgent Planning: Situating Radical Planning in the Global 
South,” Planning Theory. Vol. 8(1): pp. 32-50. 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. (2011) “Beyond Nuremberg: The Historical Significant of the Post- 
Apartheid Transition in South Africa,” Talk delivered at CUNY Graduate Center 
Conference: Law, Justice, and Global Political Futures. October 14, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 211 
Mamdani, Mahmood. (2002) “Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the  
Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa,” Diacritics. Vol. 
32, No. 3/4: pp. 32-59. 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. (1996) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy  
of Late Colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Marx, Karl. (1976) Capital: Volume 1. New York: Penguin Press. 
 
Marx, Karl. (1975) Early Writings. London: Penguin.  
 
Marx, Karl. (1916) 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. New York: International  
Publishers. 
 
Mayekiso, Mzwanele. (1996) Township Politics: Civic Struggles for a New South Africa.  
New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Mbali, Mandisa. (2006) “TAC in the History of Patient-Driven AIDS Activism: The Case  
for Historicizing South Africa’s New Social Movements,” pp. 129-156 in 
Challenging Hegemony: Social Movements and the Quest for a New Humanism in 
Post-Apartheid South Africa. Trenton: Africa World Press. 
 
Mbembe, Achille. (2011) “The Ordinary, the Event and the Accident” talk given at  
Johannesburg Workshop in Theory and Criticism, July 12, 2011. 
 
Mbembe, Achille and Sarah Nuttall. (2008) Johannesburg: The Elusive Metropolis.  
Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Mda, Zakes. (2013) “Nelson Mandela: Neither Sell-out nor Saint,” The Guardian.  
December 6. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/06/nelson-
mandela-statesman-saved-south-africa-economic-reform Accessed April 15, 2014. 
 
Merrifield, Andy. (2006) Henri Lefebvre: a Critical Introduction. New York: Routledge. 
 
Mitchell, Katharyne. (2009) “Pre-Black Futures,” Antipode. Vol. 41, No. 1: 239-261. 
 
Mkamba, Lungelo. (2013) “Cars Stoned in Rampage over Housing Graft,” The Mercury.  
Tuesday June 25. Pg. 3. 
 
Mngxitama, Andile, Amanda Alexander and Nigel Gibson, editors. (2008) Biko Lives!  
Contesting the Legacies of Steve Biko. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Modisane, Bloke. (1987) Blame Me on History. Johannesburg: Ad Donker Publishers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 212 
Moore, Nikki. (2013) “KZN: Anatomy of an Assassination,” Daily Maverick. July 30.   
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-07-31-kzn-anatomy-of-an-
assassination/#.U1WCK8coxGM Accessed April 2, 2014. 
 
Naidoo, Prishani and Ahmed Veriava. (2004) “Re-Membering Movements: Trade Unions  
and New Social Movements in Neoliberal South Africa,” Center for Civil Society  
Research Report, No. 28. 
 
Neocosmos, Michael. (2010a) From ‘Foreign Natives’ to ‘Native Foreigners’:  
Explaining Xenophobia in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA. 
 
Neocosmos, Michael. (2010b) “Analyzing Political Subjectivities: Naming the Post-
Developmental State in Africa Today,” Journal of Asian and African Studies. 45(5): 
pp. 534-553. 
 
Neocosmos, Michael. (2006) “Rethinking Politics in Southern Africa Today: Elements of  
a Critique of Political Liberalism,” pp. 55-102 in Challenging Hegemony: Social 
Movements and the Quest for a New Humanism in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 
Trenton: Africa World Press. 
 
O’Donnell, Lawrence. (2013) “MSNBC on NYPD Police Brutality during Occupy Wall  
Street Protest,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zgr3DiqWYCI.  Accessed March 
10, 2014. 
 
Oldfield, Sophie. (2006) “Building Unity in Diversity: Social Movement Activism in the  
Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign,” pp. 111-132 in Voices of Protest: Social 
Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Press. 
 
Padayachee, Vishnu and Bill Freund. (2002) (D)urban Vortex: South African City in  
Transition. Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 
 
Patel, Raj. (2009) “Cities Without Citizens,” in Contesting Development, edited by  
Phillip McMichael. New York: Routledge. 
 
Pickles, John and Daniel Weiner. (1991) “Rural and Regional Restructuring of  
Apartheid: Ideology, Development Policy and the Competition for Space,” Antipode. 
Vol. 23, No. 1: 2-32. 
 
Pithouse, Richard. (2013) “Conjunctural Remarks on the Political Significance of the  
Local,” Thesis Eleven. 115, (1): 95-111.   
 
Pithouse, Richard. (2011) “Conjunctural Remarks on the Political Significance of ‘the  
Local’,” Thesis Eleven. 115(1): 95-111.  
 
 
 
 
 213 
Pithouse, Richard. (2009) “In the Forbidden Quarters: Shacks in Durban till the end of  
Apartheid,” The Commoner. November: pp. 1-40. 
 
Pithouse, Richard. (2005) “The Left in the Slum: the Rise of a Shack Dwellers’  
Movement in Durban, South Africa,” History and African Studies Seminar: 23 
November. 
 
Read, Jason. (2009) “A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the  
Production of Subjectivity,” Foucault Studies. No. 6: 25-36.  
 
Robins, Steven. (2008) From Revolution to Rights in South Africa: Social Movements,  
NGOs and Popular Politics After Apartheid.  Pietermaritzburg: University of 
KwaZulu-Natal Press. 
 
Robinson, Cedric. (1993) “The Appropriation of Frantz Fanon,” Race and Class. Vol 35,  
No. 1: 79-91. 
 
Roediger, David. (1991) The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American  
Working Class.  London: Verso. 
 
Sacks, Jared. (2013) “The Political Arrest of Bandile Mdlalose,” October 7.  
http://africasacountry.com/the-political-arrest-of-bandile-mdlalose/comment-page-1/ 
Accessed March 21, 2014. 
 
Sahle, Eunice. (2014) “Intellectuals, Oppression, and Anti-Racist Movements in South  
Africa,” unpublished manuscript. 
 
Sahle, Eunice. (2010) World Orders, Development, and Transformation. New York:  
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Sahle, Eunice. (2008) “African States’ NEPAD Project: A Global Elite Neoliberal  
Settlement,” pp. 135-156 in Neoliberalism and Globalization in Africa, edited by 
Joseph Mensah.  New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Sapa. (August 20, 2008) “Durban aims for low-cost housing” accessed September 20,  
2013. http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/city-threatens-big-land-grab-
1.413138?ot=inmsa.ArticlePrintPageLayout.ot 
 
Sassen, Saskia. (2006) Cities in a World Economy. London: Sage Press. 
 
Saul, John. (2011) “Proletariat and Precariat: Non-Transformative Global Capitalism and  
the African Case,” Conference Paper Presented to Beyond Precarious Labor: 
Rethinking Socialist Strategies at Center for Place, Culture, and Politics, CUNY 
Graduate Center, New York, May 12-13, 2011. 
 
  
 
 
 214 
Savides, Matthew. (August 20, 2008) “City Threatens Big Land Grab” IOL, accessed  
September 15, 2013. http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/city-threatens-big-land-
grab-1.413138?ot=inmsa.ArticlePrintPageLayout.ot 
 
Schroeder, Richard. (2012) Africa After Apartheid: South Africa, Race, and Nation in  
Tanzania. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
 
Seria, Nasreen. (2010) “Gordhan Says South Africa Safe from Greek Contagion,”  
Business Week, May 7. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-07/gordhan-
says-south-africa-safe-from-greek-contagion-update2-.html  Accessed December 1, 
2013. 
 
Sexton, Jared. (2010) “People of Color Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery,”  
 Social Text. Vol. 28, No. 2: 31-56. 
 
Soja, Ed. (2000) Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions. Malden:  
 Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Sparke, Matthew. (2005) In the Space of Theory: Postfoundational Geographies of the  
Nation-State. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Standing, Guy. (2011) The Precariat: A New Dangerous Class. London: Bloomsbury. 
 
Sullivan, Sean. (2013) “Nelson Mandela’s History with U.S. Presidents—in 10 images  
and Video,” The Washington Post. December 5. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/06/27/nelson-mandelas-
history-with-u-s-presidents-in-10-images-and-videos/ Accessed April 10, 2014. 
 
Sutherland, Catherine, Vicky Sim, Diane Scott and Glen Robbins. (2011) “The Urban  
Politics of a Large Scale Housing Investment: The Case of the Cornubia Housing 
Project in Durban, South Africa,” A Research Report for Chance 2 Sustain.  
http://www.chance2sustain.eu/26.0.html  Accessed September 23, 2013. 
 
Surplus People Project (1983) Forced Removals in South Africa: Vol. 4 Natal 
 
Tissington, Kate. (2011) A Resource Guide to Housing in South Africa 1994-2010:  
Legislation, Policy, Programmes and Practice.  Johannesburg: SERI. 
 
Trott, Ben. (2013a) “Introduction” to “Rebellious Subjects: The Politics of England’s  
2011 Riots,” South Atlantic Quarterly. Vol. 112, No. 3: 538-540. 
 
Trott, Ben. (2013b) “Reading the 2011 Riots: England’s Urban Uprising—An Interview  
with Paul Lewis,” South Atlantic Quarterly. Vol. 112, No. 3: 541-549. 
 
 
 
 
 
 215 
Turner, Lou. (2008) “Self-Consciousness as Force and Reason of revolution in the  
Thought of Steve Biko,” pp. 69-82 in Biko Lives! Edited by Amanda Alexander, 
Andile Mngxitama and Nigel Gibson. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Turok, Ben. (2012) Development in a Divided Country: Understanding the ANC today.  
Johannesburg: Jakana Press. 
 
Verwey, Bonny. (2005) “Development close to Umhlanga Ridge and Mount Edgecombe:  
R10bn low-cost housing plan” The Mercury p. 1, November 18.  
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. (2013) “Whose Interests are Served by the BRICS?”  
Commentary #352, May 1, 2013: http://www.iwallerstein.com/interests-served-brics/  
Accessed January 10, 2014. 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. (2000) The Essential Wallerstein. New York: The New Press. 
 
Wilderson, Frank. (2008) “Biko and the Problematic of Presence,” pp. 95-114 in Biko  
Lives! Edited by Amanda Alexander, Andile Mngxitama and Nigel Gibson. New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Wilderson, Frank. (2007) “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal,” in  
Warfare in the American Homeland, edited by Joy James. Durham: Duke University 
Press. 
 
Wolpe, Harold. (1972) “Capitalism and Cheap Labor-Power in South Africa: from  
Segregation to Apartheid,” Economy and Society. Vol. 1, No. 4: 425-456. 
 
Woods, Clyde. (2007) “ ‘Sittin’ on Top of the World’: The Challenges of Blues and Hip  
Hop Geography,” Black Geographies, edited by Katherine McKittrick and Clyde 
Woods. Cambridge: South End Press. 
 
Wooldridge, Adrian. (2012) “The visible hand,” The Economist. January 21-28, 2012. 
 
Wynter, Sylvia. (2001) “Towards the Sociogenic Principle,” in National Identities and  
Sociopolitical Change, edited by Antonio Gomez-Moran and Mercedes Duran-
Cogan. New York: Routledge. 
 
Zibechi, Raul. (2012) Territories in Resistance: A Cartography of Latin American Social  
Movements.  Edinburgh: AK Press. 
 
Zibechi, Raul. (2010) Dispersing Power: Social Movements as Anti-State Forces.  
Oakland: AK Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 216 
Zikode, S’bu. (2013a) “The Poor are Punished for Demanding our Constitutional Rights,”  
The Daily Maverick. March 5. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2014-03-
06-the-poor-are-punished-for-demanding-our-constitutional-rights/#.U1VQKccoxGM 
Accessed April 5, 2014. 
 
Zikode, S’bu. (2013b) “Upgrading Informal Settlements in South Africa—Abahlali  
baseMjondolo supports a Participatory and Democratic Approach,” 
http://abahlali.org/node/9874/#more-9874  Accessed February 10, 2014. 
